Leviathan, Marxism, Will to Grow

Modern Political Philosophy is framed by the English Civil War, which Hobbes diagnoses as rooted in a 'war of all against all', each of whom is motivated by Self-Preservation.  Accordingly, his solution is a general Peace, implemented by a contractually empowered sovereign.  Now, the arc of the Marxist doctrine can be recognized as a special case of the Hobbesian project--class warfare is the problem, resolved by the elimination of conflict in a class-less society, in which sovereignty is immanent.  So, both doctrines can be conceived as expressing a Will to Peace as its Species-Principle.  However, while the scope of Leviathan is national, that of Marxist Socialism is global, e. g. the exhortation to the workers of the world.  So, the Species-Principle expressed by the intervening two centuries is a Will to Grow.

Human Species, History, Will to Grow

There is evidence for each of the following four moments in Human history: 1. Origin at a single location; 2. World-wide inhabitation; 3. Unprecedented capacities for global transportation and communication; 4. Extra-terrestrial travel and exploration.  From these can be inferred that the Species is governed by a principle that can be called a Will to Grow, implying an effort, though not necessarily a successful one.  This principle is an alternative to the more prevalent Will to Peace, to Harmony, or to Unity, including that as a phase of a Fall-Redemption arc.  Accordingly, any episode in history is to be interpreted and evaluated on the basis of the Will to Grow.  Thus, for example, if Socialism is superior to Capitalism, and if it is a permanent arrangement, are determinable by reference to the Will to Grow.

Species and Political Philosophy

The primary aim of a Political Philosophy, whether Ancient or Modern, is to define the best mode of social organization.  Now, since, according to Marxism, Economic relations determine Political ones, Socialism is the basis of a Political Philosophy.  Thus, for Marx, Species-Being functions as a principle of organization, with the Species as the concrete Unity of the members of Human society.  However, as such, the Species is still partly abstract.  For, as is expressed in the familiar concept, 'the propagation of the species', the Human Species is determined by a principle that is independent of its mere function as the Unity of its individual members, a principle that, if Darwinism is correct, is itself profoundly significant.  In other words, the concept of Species entails a content that is a determinant in the mode of social organization that it effects, e. g. an Evolutionary factor.  Thus, the introduction of Species as a Political concept signals, regardless of Marx's ambitions, the possibility of development well beyond the achievements of unity and peace in Human society, which are the traditional goals of Political Philosophy.

Globalization and Species-Being

Despite standard jingoist political propaganda, the ubiquity of the World Wide Web is one indication that Global-Consciousness is no longer an abstract or teleological dream, but a concrete, even if incomplete, reality.  Likewise, the inhabitants of this Cosmopolity are, transcending all previous particularities, 'Humans'.  Thus, Species-Being is no longer a Biological concept, but a Political one, as well.  Similarly, it, not 'Reason', 'Spirit', 'Will', etc., is revealed as the fundamental principle of History.

Politics, Economics, Locality

If, as has been said, all politics is local, history has shown that so, too, is Economics, and that 'local' is variable.  As the prefix 'eco-', which connotes 'household', suggests, the origin of Economics is even more modest than that of Politics, which connotes 'city'.  In sharp contrast, by the 18th-century, the scope of each is the Nation, as Smith's title plainly expresses.  So, Marx-Engels' exhortation to the "workers of the world" signals a further expansion of locality that has since been, and continues to be, gradually actualized, by both Capitalism and Socialism.  In other words, what is becoming 'local' are both Cosmopolitics and Cosmoeconomics, with respect to which the Nationalist doctrines of the 17th- and 18th-centuries, including Wealth of Nations, may be quaint, if not obsolete.

Nationalism and Invisible Hand

The expression 'wealth of nations' is ambiguous--it could mean 'the wealth of a nation', or 'the combined wealth of an indefinite group of nations'.  Now, most of the substance of Smith's work suggests that the former is its topic.  On the other hand, in some passages, e. g. his objections to protectionist tariffs, he seems to be extending the scope of free enterprise principles to a multiplicity of nations.  In so doing, he exposes the fundamental inconsistency underlying both scenarios--between the concept of Nation, and that of the Invisible Hand.  For, the latter entails no such limitation as the former, from which it follows that Capitalism is neither a national nor even a multi-national system--it is global, with respect to which a Nation is as inessential a constituent unit as is a Precinct.  That contradiction remains only superficially addressed in contemporary political platforms that are both jingoistic and Economically laissez-faire.

Friendship and Capitalism

Aristotle discerns elements of Friendship in each of three types of constitution, what he calls 'Monarchy', 'Aristocracy', and 'Timocracy', but lacking in three corresponding "perversions" of each--'Tyranny', 'Oligarchy', and 'Democracy', respectively.  But, though he briefly alludes to the role of Wealth in an Oligarchy, he does not address whether or not Plutocracy entails Friendship.  Regardless, it is easy to deduce that it does not.  For, the latter entails action that benefits another, whereas, one exemplification of the former, Capitalism, explicitly excludes such an end as motivation.

Friendship, We, Revolution

Aristotle conceives Friendship as based on Self-Love, because it consists in the treatment of the Friend as another I.  However, even as he discerns the role that the relation plays in any mode of political organization, he does not consider one further stage of its development--the combination of the Is into a We. Thus, the appearance of the latter at the outsets of the U. S. Constitution and the Marseillaise, unprecedented in the history of Political Philosophy, signifies its revolutionary character, and, conversely, the synthesis that is the foundation of modern Revolution.

Family, Friendship, Socialism

As has been previously discussed, in the German Ideology, Marx-Engels attempt to distinguish between 'natural' and 'voluntary' relations, using the family as an example of the former.  Now, one curiosity in the discussion is that there is no explanation of how the husband-wife connection, which is the product of some contract, is 'natural'.  Instead, there is no such curiosity in a much clearer illustration of the natural-voluntary contrast: Family vs. Friendship, i. e. because the relation of siblings is biological and involuntary, as well as not necessarily amicable.  So, the use of "brothers" and "sisters" in reference to the members of a Socialist society is antithetical to the presumed voluntariness of the latter, whereas "comrade" is more appropriate.

Friendship, Socialism, Marxism

An argument in favor of Socialism is: 1. The best social arrangement, regarding both the whole and each of its parts, is Friendship, as Aristotle conceives it; 2. Thus, the best Economic system is the one that best promotes Friendship; 3. Socialism is the Economic system that best promotes Friendship; 4. Therefore, Socialism is the best Economic system.  Now, it is unclear why a Marxist would object to this argument, and, yet, it entails none of the standard Marxist principles.  That absence tends to indicate that the strength of Marxism is its exposure of the flaws of Capitalism, though perhaps undercut by an insistence on expressing its diagnoses in neo-Hegelian terms, i. e. Dialectical Materialism.

Friendship and Socialism

The codification of the priority of Theory over Practice begins with Aristotle. on his grounds that the former, but not the latter, can be self-sufficient.  However, a Practical Virtue which he recognizes, but that does not reduce to his standard formulation, i. e. an activity guided by a Mean, is Friendship, which consists in the mutually-recognized, reciprocal treatment of an other as another Self.  Now, Aristotle does not consider that Theoretical Virtue, i. e. Contemplation, rather than being independent of Friendship, is deprived of it, and, hence, is the lesser Good.  So, specifically lost in the subsequent history is the significance of mutual recognition, which is not included in Kant's Kingdom of Ends, and is lacking by Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness.  It also eludes any reduction of an association to the sum of those associated.  In other words, Friendship presents a paradigm for Socialism, though it is unclear if it is appreciated as such by Marxists.

Organism, Socialism, Ecosystem

Kant conceives an Organism as a Whole from which each Part benefits and to which each Part contributes.  Hence, the concept is exemplified by that of Marxist Socialism, i. e. as expressed by Marx's "from each . . . to each" formulation, as well as by the common concept of Ecosystem.  However, aside from veterinarian activity, the best evidence to date is that if Humanity affects the rest of Nature at all, it is destructively.  Accordingly, a concept of Nature as an Ecosystem that includes Humanity is difficult to accept.  Still, there are three reasons why that judgment might not be conclusive.  First, the problem has rarely been even considered, so better evidence of the contributions of the species to an Ecosystem of which it is a part may yet be forthcoming.  Second, if, as Marx proposes, Humanity is a work-in-progress, so, too, is its role in Nature.  Finally, if, as is implicit in the works of both Darwin and Nietzsche, the species is a transition to another, that development itself would constitute a contribution to an eventual Ecosystem.  Otherwise, failing all three, it is difficult to deny that Anthropocentrism has survived the repudiation of Geocentricism.

Socialism, Chain of Being, Ecology

The repudiation of Geocentricism may have toppled the part of the Great Chain of Being above Humanity, but not the part from there downwards.  The survival of that segment of the heirarchy is best represented in the Teleology of Kant, i. e. the Philosopher most closely associated with Copernicus, in which Humanity is designated as the "ultimate purpose" of Nature.  Likewise, while Trotsky promotes an organic model of human society, his Cosmology remains vertical, with Humanity atop the rest of Nature.  Instead, the appropriate correlate to Socialism is the Ecosystem, in which, likewise, each of the parts, including the Human Species, both contributes and benefits, though any demonstration of the former of which in the case of Humanity has hitherto been lacking.

Species-Being, Economics, Ecology

The concept of Species-Being can be understood as sublating the two dominant, and antithetical, Philosophical concepts of the centuries preceding the nineteenth--the Cartesian Cogito and Newtonian Physics.  For, in Species-Being, individual thought is supplanted by collective action, and Physics, by Biology.  However, Marx's further judgment, inspired by the French Revolution, that Economics likewise sublates Epistemology and Metaphysics as the fundamental Philosophical enterprise, is short-sighted.  For, as Darwin brings to attention, Nature is the more comprehensive context for any species.  Accordingly, a systematic derivation of Economics presupposes the establishment of Ecological principles, as does, therefore, Socialism, as well as Capitalism.

Anthropocentrism and The Environment

More than three hundred years after Spinoza recognizes that the repudiation of Geocentricism entails that of Anthropocentrism, the full implications of what can be classified as his Rational Pan-Naturalism are only slowly being realized.  For example, Anthropocentricism is implicit in Trotsky's Materialist proposition that the rest of Nature is unconditionally at the disposal of Humans.  Likewise, it is entailed in the popular concept of 'The Environment', i. e. which locates Humans in the center of its biota.  Instead, the complete elimination of vestigial Anthropocentrism yields an Ecosystem with no privileged element.  Now, one facet of such a Rational Pan-Naturalism has to date rarely been even entertained, let alone explored--the essential role of the Human Species in the system, i. e. how it affects the rest of it even when, through the careless discharge of its waste products, it is not wreaking havoc on the rest.  The limitation of Spinoza's prototype is not its scope of Human influence, but its restriction to merely Mechanistic relations.

Species-Being and Climate Change

The Marxist premise, that Socialism is the actualization of the universal consciousness of the Species-Being of its members, is problematic in two respects.  First, as has been previously discussed, Species-Being entails Nature-Being, so that the former involves the elimination of inter-personal exploitation is contingent on the principles of the latter, to which that goal might be indifferent or even contrary.  Second, the relation between that entailment, and Trotsky's proposition that Socialism is based on and promotes the human power over Nature, is difficult to reconcile.  for, Trotsky takes for granted that the rest of Nature is at the disposal of the Human Species, thereby merely secularizing a traditional Theological proposition, which seems antithetical to the subordination of Species to Nature.  Indeed, without any divine sanction, the presumption that Humans have been granted by Nature indefinite power over Nature seems arrogant, as has been confirmed in subsequent decades by the emergence of the destructiveness by that Human power over Nature.  Especially significant is the phenomenon often mischaracterized as "Global Warming", the error of which is only its second term.  For, that Climate Change is, indeed, global, indicates that the presumed power of the Species over Nature is conditioned in some respect, contrary to Trotsky's formulation.  Of course, given that the U. S. and China are both perpetrators of that phenomenon shows that it is not exclusive to either a Capitalist or a Socialist system.

Species-Being and Nature-Being

Though the separation of Individual from Species is antithetical to Marxist Socialism, acceptance of the concept of Species-Being potentially poses a stronger challenge to the doctrine.  For, insofar as it is difficult to deny that the human species is part of Nature, it is difficult to deny that Species-Being is determined by Nature-Being.  Thus, if Nature-Being is, for example, as Darwin conceives it, then human Species-Being for each member consists in the promotion a new, more evolved, species.  But, none of the various Marxist arguments for Socialism is on the basis that it is a means to the next evolutionary step, i. e. there is no demonstration that the Marxist concept of Species-Being is consistent with the concept of Nature-Being that has prevailed in the past century and a half.  Its concept of Socialism is similarly vulnerable to most other concepts of Nature-Being.

Species-Being and Being

Detachment of the Individual from the Species has been accomplished in a variety of ways over the centuries: via the traditional theological concept of the incorporeal Soul; by Philosophical surrogates for the Soul, e. g. Leibniz' Monad and Kant's Noumenon; and by Smith's Egoism.  Now, in apparent opposition to these Individuations is Heidegger's re-appropriation by Being from fallenness into Beings, a plightwhich mirrors the structure of Marx's concept of alienation from Species-Being, and inverts it into a mode of Nihilism.  However, there is one weakness in Heidegger's project that has no Marxist correlate: an abstraction of Being from its origin as the Husserlian Phenomenologist functioning in 'the Life-World'.  Rather, the correlate of that abstraction is Heidegger's eradication of any association with his Jewish mentor.  So, re-grounding this presumed 'Fundamental Ontology' in concrete activity exposes all of its elements, including its concept of 'individual beings', as a possible product of aliention from Species-Being.

Species-Being, Alienation, Individual

A familiar expression of alienation from Species-Being is the common use of the word 'individual' as a substantive.  For, individual is properly a quantifier, so the abstraction of it from a bearer, i. e. 'human', reflects a detachment from the species.  Likewise, in any ensuing 'individualism' vs. 'collectivism' debate, usually as a proxy for a Capitalism vs. Socialism dispute, 'collective' actually connotes 'collection of individuals', thereby reinforcing the alienation, and falsifying Marxist Socialism.

Species-Being, Species-Consciousness, Dialectical Materialism

Insofar as Marxist Socialism is a whole, what distinguishes it from the sum of its parts is what can be called universal Species-Consciousness, in which awareness of Species-Being, a concept that Marx borrows from Feuerbach, becomes explicit in each member.  Now, prior to the achievement of Species-Consciousness, Species-Being is obscured because of alienation from it that reaches an extreme in Capitalism, which codifies Social Atomism.  But, presupposed in that analysis is a non-alienated precondition, the loss of which requires an explanation that seems to be lacking, and which seems beyond the resources of Dialectics, which is a process of progressive totalization.  So, the relations between Species-Being, Dialectical Materialism,and Species-Consciousness in Marxism are unclear.

Whole, Parts, Spirit

What distinguishes Sublation or Emergence from mere Association might be formulated by the principle 'The whole is greater than the sum of its parts'.  Thus, resistance to Atomism by either Dialectical Materialism or Emergent Evolution depends on the adequacy of the characterization of the surplus that elevates a Whole over the sum of its Parts.  Now, one traditional concept can help fill that gap--Spirit, but as immanent in that Multiplicity, not as a supervention from a transcendent realm.  In other words, it functions precisely as does the Dialectic in Dialectical Materialism.  Accordingly, the latter can be conceived not as eliminating Spirit, nor as reducing it to a phantasm, but as relocating it from its traditional position.

Emergent Evolution, Dialectical Materialism, Unity

While Emergent Evolution and Dialectical Materialism each entails a process of Unification at a higher level, in the former, the initial condition is any Multiplicity, in the latter, it is exclusively a contradictory Dyad.  So, since a Dyad is a special case of a Multiplicity, Emergent Evolution is the more comprehensive theory.  Furthermore, the restriction on Dialectical Synthesis means that it is only from a Two-Class conflict that Socialism qua Unification can be produced, with no explanation for the development of a unified Class-Consciousness from an atomized Proletariat.  In contrast, Emergent Evolution easily accounts for the development of Socialism from the radical Individuation of Capitalism.  So, the rigid adherence of Marxism to Dialectical Materialism, can hinder, in at least some crucial respects, the rise of Socialism.

Socialism, Emergent Evolution, Dialectical Revolution

One interpretation of Techne is that it is the product of what Alexander calls 'Emergent Evolution', which, as a pervasive primitive pattern, is less an explanation than a general description.  The main features of the pattern are a specifically configured multiplicity from which a novel unity emerges, important Philosophical examples of which are a color, from an underlying photoelectric configuration, and Consciousness, from an underlying cerebral configuration.  So, one potential further application of the concept is to Socialism, which can be interpreted as emerging from a specific social configuration.  Now, Emergence seems analogous to the Sublation that constitutes the Synthesis moment of Dialectics.  However, the translation into Marxism is otherwise problematic.  For, Emergence is essentially fortuitous, and so its Evolution cannot be the product of deliberate Revolution.  Furthermore, when Marxists do seem to entertain the possibility of the former, under the rubric the transformation of Quantity into Quality, the Quality is the Negation of, not the Sublation of, Quantity.  Likewise, by implication, what in Emergent Evolution is the emergence of Socialism from a social configuration, is, in Dialectical Materialism, the Negation of a Revolutionary process.  So, despite the structural similarity of Emergence and Sublation, Emergent Evolution is not only not instructive for Dialectical Materialism, it conflicts with it in crucial respects.

Techne, Technology, Ethics

Properly conceived, 'Technology' is 'the study of Techne', i. e. the structure of skilled activity. So, since gymnastics and dancing are skilled activities, Technology does not necessarily involve instruments, means of production, or anything that the common use of the term signifies.  Now, the fundamental challenge to a Technology is to define its distinguishing feature, i. e. the dimension of a skilled activity that is lacking in unskilled activity.  One possibility is Aristotle's concept of Balance, formulated as the Mean between Extremes, which can also be appreciated as gracefulness.  In that case, because, in his system, balanced conduct is the highest Practical Virtue, Technology and Ethics therefore converge, even if elsewhere he separates Techne and Phronesis.

Techne and Dehumanization

Just as skilled conduct transcends merely mechanical behavior, Techne involves mastery of Automation, which is why the commonly conceived equivalence of the latter and Technology is so deeply erroneous.  Now, one variety of dehumanization is mechanical behavior, yet Marxism's attention to the former problem overlooks Techne as a solution to it.  For example, Marx-Engels present co-ownership of the means of production in an industrialized Socialist society as adequate compensation to the self-employed artisan for the loss of the value of their craft, even suggesting that resistance to the compensation is Lumpenproletarian.  Furthermore, Trotsky's promotion of human power over Nature does not entail such power over the Automation that would replace human Labor.  In other words, without an incorporation of Techne into it, Socialism that abolishes Economic exploitation does not suffice to completely eliminate dehumanization.

Techne, Phronesis, Socialism

Concrete experience is continuous.  For example, picking up a hammer and hitting a nail into a piece of wood, or picking up a hammer and striking someone with it.  It is thus only by a subsequent abstraction from these two courses of action that a single Means--wielding a hammer--is isolated from a choice of two possible Ends, i. e. either a carpentry project, or injuring someone.  Likewise, Aristotle's distinction between Techne--skill--and Phronesis--wisdom in choice of Goods--thus presupposes such an abstraction.  Accordingly, Dewey's diagnosis of Class prejudice as determining the segregation of Means from End, e. g.  productive labor from the enjoyment of its fruits by someone else, implies that under Socialism, i. e. the abolition of Classes, Aristotle's distiction between Techne and Phronesis would also be dissolved.

Techne, Technology, Automation

The original meaning of "techne" is "skill", which, since it is equivalent to "know-how", is classified by Aristotle as an "Intellectual Virtue".  Thus, the common use of "technique" accurately reflects its ancestry.  On the other hand, "technology", properly parsed, would present an analysis of skilled conduct, e. g. of the interaction of mental and physiological process involved.  In other words, the common use of "technology" is radically improper, as the more accurate "automation" suggests, i. e. "techne" connotes a human process, while automation is in itself inert.  Thus, for example, while the "power over nature" to which Trotsky alludes is Automation, an analysis of the form-imposing action that liberates Hegel's 'slave' would be Technological.

End, Means, Socialism

As has been previously discussed, Trotsky, in asserting that there are some means that Socialism does not justify, conceives the relation between Means and End as a continuum, of which the former is an earlier phase, and the latter, the final one.  Now, though not himself a Marxist, Dewey deepens that analysis, arguing that the split of the two phases reflects a separation of Classes--the Working class, and the Leisure class whose ends the former serves.  So, implicit in Dewey's analysis is an insight that Trotsky misses--the abolition of Classes in Socialism, and the integration of Means and End in action, are systematically related.

Husband-Wife: Religion, Socialism, Technology

According to Marx-Engels, the subservience of Wife to Husband is "natural", though they offer no definition of that term.  In contrast, according to Genesis, it is not natural qua Edenic, but is part of the divine curse on the species.  Nevertheless, Religion in recent centuries has insisted upon it as if were itself a divine ordering, any deviation from which being what is sinful.  Now, presumably, though it is not explicitly addressed, the abolition of Private Property in Socialism applies to the Husband-Wife relation.  Still, well beyond the anticipation of Marx-Engels has been the liberation of women, Wife or not, via Technology, e. g. in vitro fertilization.

Practice, Virtue, Sin

While, in Genesis, there are direct references to sexual intercourse at the end of ch. 2 and the beginning of ch. 4, there is none in ch. 3.  Rather, the eating from the tree of Good and Evil described there is comparable to Prometheus' theft of fire--it renders Adam and Eve like God (lines 5 and 22), and makes them "wise" (line 6).  In other words, the alleged 'original sin' of Western Theology is not sexual intercourse, but the acquisition of Practical Wisdom.  Thus, in the appropriation of ancient Philosophy by Medieval Religion, what for Aristotle is a methodologically inferior Virtue, is transformed into the archetypal Sin.  Accordingly, Marx's exhortation to Philosophers to privilege Practice involves a defiance of that Religious tradition.  Still, because of his inattention to Practical Religion, previously discussed, he misses the deep irony of Genesis 3--it vilifies all Religious rites, including that of the reading of the passage itself.

Religion, Individual Soul, Class Consciousness

Though it does not appear literally as such in Genesis 3, the curse that is upon Adam and Eve, specifically, is usually extended to the entire species.  Nevertheless, the Salvation from it offered by Christianity does not have that scope.  Rather, that Salvation is directed at an element that is not part of the original premise, but seems borrowed from a different tradition--an individual Soul.  Thus, Religion is antithetical to Socialism in a respect other than its Immateriality--the cultivation of Egoism, which, even of a 'higher' sort, hinders the development of Class Consciousness as a dissociative influence.

Labor, Punishment, Salvation

The punishment, according to Genesis III, of the human race includes Labor, in two senses.  Thus, the salvation from that condition promised by Christianity includes the liberation from toil.  So, because Christianity is the predominant Religion of the era, that liberation is very likely part of the "illusory happiness" to which Marx opposes Socialism.  Now, implicit in the Biblical scenario is the status of Labor as inherently an accursed condition for humans.  But, if so, that status complicates Marxism in several respects.  First, insofar as Socialism is a rival to Religion as a means to Happiness, it accepts the denigration of Labor, thereby varying from the dignifying of it in some cardinal passages.  Furthermore, if having to toil is a divine punishment, then not having to toil can only have divine blessing, either on a priori grounds, or as a by-product of Salvation.  In either case, the reality of the existence of the ownership classes as a liberated condition needs to be addressed by the Socialist critique of Religion, the simplification of which as an illusion leaves unaddressed.  

Religion and Labor

According to one of the most influential passages in Western civilization, Genesis III, Labor is a curse on Humanity.  Thus, Religion is as much scourge as opium, and the promise of happiness that it offers, real or not, obscures the reality of the misery that it has codified.  In that context, the exploitation of Labor is a relatively trivial injustice.  More generally, Marxism occasionally seems to be at cross-purposes--dignifying Labor vs. promoting the elimination of it via Technology.  If there is a confusion in that respect, it is rooted in a relatively benign diagnosis of the influence of Religion in Western civilization.

Religion, Happiness, Power

While according to Marx, Religion seeks Happiness, according to the other major 19th-century critic of it, Nietzsche, it seeks Power.  Thus, Heaven, for the former, consists in the satisfaction of all wants, while for the latter, a necessary, if not a sufficient condition of it, is the achievement of superiority over hitherto dominant forces, natural as well as political.  Implicitly, therefore, while for Marx, it is the alienation from the fruits of one's labor that is the breeding ground of Religion, for Nietzsche, it is the alienation from one's labor itself.  But then, insofar as Socialism achieves a maximum of Power, as Trotsky proposes, contrary to Nietzsche's concept of it as the actualization of the traditional Religious ideal, it is the antithesis of the latter.  For, that ideal is passively received from 'God', whereas the Marxist goal is a product of human self-determination.

Religion and Hierarchy

The term 'hierarchical' derives from the Greek for 'sacred'.  Thus, even without the spatialization of the Sacred-Profane contrast as High-Low--perhaps a consequence of the Above-Below contrast of Geocentrism--non-Pantheistic Religion is inherently inegalitarian. Now, there are no doubt other grounds of social domination, e. g. superior weaponry.  But because of his inattention to Religion as Practical, Marx's characterizations of it as "opium" and "illusory happiness" offer only superficial diagnoses of social hierarchies involving it.

Religion, Opium, Steroids

Marx's characterizations of Religion as "opium" and "illusory happiness" are as experienced by sufferers in a society.  They, thus, do not include the ways that it informs the status of the overclass.  In a Theocracy, it is the explicit basis of Power.  In other systems, it can effectively reinforce a hierarchy by the thesis that such a social arrangement expresses a 'divine will', in any of several ways, e. g. a thesis of pre-determination, a theory that income distribution is determined by a superhuman force or by deservedness, etc.  In these cases, Religion enhances Power, suggesting that for some of the people, at least, the appropriate pharmaceutical metaphor for it is one with which Marx has no acquaintance--steroids.

Religion, Power, Nature

The concept of Religion as Practical bears out that the fundamental Marxist criticism of it is, as Trotsky puts it, "power over nature".  In those terms, the advantage of Marxism over Religion, given the Technological boom of the Modern Era, is one of efficacy, rather than of truth.  On the other hand, Religion retains one asset for which Marxism has no rival--the possible existence of an omnipotent deity.  Even in the decline of Religion during the rise of Technology in recent centuries, the persistence of the former reflects the continued popularity of 'Pascal's Wager', i. e. of the willingness to believe in the existence of a power over nature that far exceeds any attributable to Technology.  Marxism can easily dispute the truth of that existence, but not of its possibility.

Religion, Illusion, Passivity

Right after characterizing Religion as "opium for the people", Marx adds that it is an "illusory happiness", thereby implicitly attributing to the experience a cognitive error.  A contrasting diagnosis begins with the concept of Religion as Practical, as it is in its most primitive manifestations, constituted by action in accodance with a causal hypothesis one term of which is a deity, e. g. a dance that appeals to a god to bring rain.  So, in simpler cases, Religion can be evaluated on the basis of its efficacy, i. e. whether or not the wished-for result occurs.  But, in more complicated Religion, the effect is deferred indefinitely, replaced more immediately by a promise, e. g. that of inheriting the earth as an effect of meek conduct.  Now, the promise itself is not illusory, so, nor is the hope that can be derived from it.  But, the adoption of that causal hypothesis cultivates passivity as a response to unhappiness, whereas the Marxist remedy, revolution, is active.  So, on the Practical diagnosis of Religion, the Real-Illusory contrast is replaced by that of Effective-Ineffective and/or of Active-Passive, in which 'Real' and 'Illusory' are exposed as characteristics of a passive condition.

Religion and Opium

The medical value of an opiate is as a suppressant of pain, while its dangers include addiction, and a distraction from removing the cause of a pain.  Likewise, Hope can offer a temporary respite from psychic distress, but, as a continuous condition, it can be malign.  So, Marx's famous phrase, the actual wording of which, in the Introduction to his projected Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, is "Religion is the opium of the people", involves a two-fold over-generalization, i. e. of Religion and of opium.  For example, Religion qua healing via prayer can concretely alleviate despair by offering, after all else has failed, the hope of a one-time success, but its value is more dubious as a regular preemption of established surgical methods.

Religion and Means of Production

In its more primitive manifestations, Religion consists in the performance of rites designed to appeal to a deity for favorable treatment, e. g. for bountiful crops.  Such rites thus function as Means of Production, and the performers as laborers.  Accordingly, therefore, insofar as the reading of scripture is an essential rite, it functions as a Means of Production, with its reader as a laborer.  Thus, Religion can function as both Base and Superstructure in a society.  Furthermore, in such conditions, the number of copies of scripture in existence determines the political structure--few copies creates an Oligarchy, and an indefinite number creates a Democracy, though, in the latter case, the need for experts to advise in the operation of the Means of Production, i. e. in how to read the scriptures efficaciously, can involve an Oligarchical dimension.  So, the relation of Religion to Economics is more complicated than Marx seems to conceive, due, perhaps ironically, to his neglect of the Practical aspect of the former.

Individual. Atom, Cell

A defining characteristic of an Atom, in the purest sense, is that it is essentially discrete with respect to its surroundings, a property formulated by Atomists as the 'externality of relations', which entails that an Atom remains unchanged by a relocation.  Thus, insofar as a Soul survives the death of a body that it inhabits, it is an Atom, as are a Capitalist Individual and Private Property, i. e. because of their independence from the rest of a society.  In contrast, a Cell is separated from its surroundings by a permeable membrane, i. e. a medium of interaction, which means that it is essentially of that location.  Now, the contingency, in Marxism, of an Individual with respect to their environment, is an indication of a repudiation of Atomism.  However, it is unclear if it goes further and accepts the Cellular concept of the Individual.  For, that concept entails permeability, and, hence, an interpenetration of Individual and environment, whereas Dialectical Materialism entails only their interaction, which can transpire merely in between them.  So, Marxism can be interpreted as constituting a partial transition from Physicism to Biologism.

Atom, Cell, Socialism

In his dissertation, ostensibly a comparison of the Atomism of Democritus with that of Lucretius, Marx introduces Dialectical Atomism as an alternative to the standard Mechanical Atomism.  This precursor of Dialectical Materialism thus reflects the predominance in the era of Newtonian Physics.  Now, decades later, incorporating more recent discoveries in Biology in his attempt at a Dialectical Materialist Science, Engels recognizes that the basic unit of life is the Cell.  However, he offers no derivation of the Cell from the Atom, other than to briefly note its relatively late emergence into Nature.  Absent such a methodical derivation, insofar as Socialism is a Biological formation, i. e. is a condition of the Human species, it is not a product of Dialectical Materialism.

Materiality, Corporeality, Socialism

As has been previously discussed, Smith's system is populated by de-corporealized Atoms, equivalent to a Theologically typical aggregation of spiritual souls, e. g. 'Heaven'.  Now, restoring Materiality to those Atoms does not suffice to render them Human, since mere Materiality is not equivalent to Biological Corporeality, even if governed by a Dialectical principle, as Engels' theory of Physics proves.  In other words, absent a grounding in a Biological principle, e. g. a Species, Socialism remains abstract collectivism.

Capitalism and Spiritualism

The concept of the incorporeal soul is Atomistic in two respects.  First, absent a body, it is free of the reproductive organs that tie it to the other members of the species, and, second, insofar as a soul can be 'saved' or reincarnated, its fate is isolated from the fate of the souls of other members of the species.  Now, as Berkeley shows, Phenomenalism is equivalent to Spiritualism.  Thus, Smith's Capitalism, which is a system of Phenomenalist Atomism, is essentially a spiritualization of Economics, as the concept of an Invisible Hand that mediates relations in that realm only underscores.

Socialism, Base, Dialectical Materialism

The cardinal characteristic of Socialism--the collectivization of property--can be expressed as 'Our', and Our presupposes We.  Thus, the Base of Socialism is We.  Now, there is nothing Philosophically arcane about We, a familiar feature of everyday experience.  But, what distinguishes the Socialist version is its potential universality.  So, since the loci of the everyday instances are finite groups, e. g. family, nation, club, class, etc., the Socialist We cannot be derived from them alone via an historical process.  Rather, since the Universe entailed in the concept is that of the race, that We must presuppose the species as its ground, and as the origin of the process that leads to it.  Thus, the process is one of what is implicit becoming explicit.  But, that is not a Dialectical pattern.  Thus, Dialectical Materialism is inadequate as the Base of Socialism.

Socialism, Ground, Base

Marx's Base-Superstructure image signifies a construction, the logic of which presupposes a pre-construction ground, with respect to which the edifice is stable.  Now, one of the charges against Socialism is that even if achievable, it is unstable, because it suppresses 'natural' differences in ability.  But, that charge is inapplicable to the principle "From each according to one's abilities . . . "  Still, the construction of Socialism on a sound basis, which can be subsequently diversified in accordance with that principle, requires a concept of We that is in some respect contiguous with its antecedents.  Three scenarios in which that concept can be established are: 1. As an actualization of some potential in the species; 2. As an unprecedented product of a dialectical process; and 3. As an unprecedented product of an evolutionary process, e. g. the Will to Power.  Marxism entails #2, though without addressing the non-identity in the image of the natural ground and the Base of the edifice, i. e. the non-identity of an aggregate of individuals and a We.

Base and Superstructure

Marx uses the image of a Base-Superstructure contrast to explain how Economic relations determine Political ones.  On that analysis, for example, institutional conditions in the U. S., such as the impunity of illegal activity of the financial sector, and the codifications of a corporation as a "person", and spending money as "free speech", reflect the inequalities at the Base.  More concisely, the thesis disputes, for two reasons, the popular identification of Capitalism and Democracy.  First, since the former is an Economic system, and the latter is a Political one, they are distinguished as Base and Superstructure.  Second, and more important, since the latter, unlike the former, entails Equality, they do not even correspond as Base and Superstructure.  Rather, the Political system that is the Superstructure of Capitalism is Oligarchy, or, more precisely, Plutocracy, while the Base of Democracy can be only the system which entails Economic Equality, namely Socialism.

Will to Power, Dialectical Materialism, Socialism

The concept of a 'second nature' entails that of a transition from a 'first nature', one which, as the intentional acquisition of any new skills evinces, is deliberate.  Hence, underlying the two 'natures' is a more fundamental process, which Nietzsche calls Self-Overcoming.  But, Self-Overcoming is one manifestation of Will to Power.  So, insofar as Marxist Revolution consists in a transition to a second nature, as has been previously discussed, it can be attributed to the Will to Power, which is consistent with Trotsky's formulations, and avoids the difficulties entailed in deriving Socialism from Dialectical Materialism, e. g. the conflict between Necessity and Voluntary.

Socialism, Second Nature, Technology

Since what Human Nature is has long been in dispute, so, too, is what a Second Nature constitutes unsettled.  However, since the use of tools is unarguably an acquired activity, it seems difficult to deny that Technology is part of any Second Nature of Humans.  Now, according to Marx, Technology is what differentiates the Human species from all others.  Thus, Marxist Socialism is a Second Nature doctrine.  In contrast, Capitalism is not, not so much because Technology is not an essential factor in it, but because one of its essential features, the Invisible Hand, is conceived as independent of Human artifice.  Furthermore, that concept of Socialism functions as a means to the organization of society.  Hence, it is part of the Technology that constructs that organization, not a mere Nominalist characterization of it.

Socialism, Superman, Will to Power

In 'On the Philosophy of the Superman', Trotsky strongly opposes Nietzsche's concept, on the grounds of its privileging Individuality.  However, that judgment is significantly complicated by the passage from Their Morals and Ours that has been previously discussed.  For, his characteristization, in the latter work, of a Human "power" over Nature, that includes that over the natural "power" of one human over another, plainly expresses an adoption of Nietzsche's Will to Power principle.  He thereby diverges from traditional Marxist analysis, by attributing Capitalist exploitation as for its own sake, not as a means to economic profit.  He also extends the principle in a direction that is generally unconsidered by Nietzsche.  For, he ascribes power over Nature to the species, not to an individual, thereby entertaining the possibility of the former as possessing a Will to Power of its own, which Nietzsche never seems to do.  Similarly, therefore, the Superman can be interpreted as the species with respect to individual humans, and, hence, as equivalent to the Dionysian principle.  Thus, Trotsky shows, wittingly or not, how Socialism can be derived from the Will to Power, or, in other words, that Marxism intersects with Nietzsche's doctrine.

Nature and Second Nature

While the expression 'second nature' has no precise definition, at minimum, it connotes a transcendence of a 'nature' that is not necessarily incorporeal.  Now, in a pivotal passage in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel uses the term to characterize the relation of Will to Mind, i. e. the actualization of the freedom of the latter in the former.  So, Marx is plainly familiar with a concept of a Second Nature, and while he might not accept the implied characterization of incorporeal Mind as 'natural', there would be no such problem in adopting the contrast to Materialism.  So, the transcendence of 'nature' by voluntsry activity, in the German Ideology, and by a "power", in Trotsky's Their Morality and Ours, can be explained as a Second Nature, though the status of Dialectical Materialism in the immanent Dualism remains unclear, i. e. insofar as it precludes the exercise of Free Will, it, too, is transcended by the Second Nature.

Nature, Humans, Power

As has been previously discussed, Trotsky's conjoined goals of Socialism--the promotion of the power of humans over Nature, and the elimination of the power of humans over humans--appear to conflict, insofar as humans are part of Nature.  Now, an alternative interpretation of his formulation is suggested by passages from the German Ideology, in which intra-human exploitation is classified as "natural", and is overcome in a communist society.  On that basis, the power over Nature, expressed in the first clause, consists in the power over intra-human exploitation.  However, that interpretation requires the existence of a super-Natural power, e. g. Kantian Reason, though there is no evidence in any of the cardinal Marxist literature of the kind of systematic Philosophical exposition that would adequately explain the dualistic relation between such a super-Nature and Dialectal Materialism.

Technology, History, Weaponry

While Marxists conceive Technology as integral to the emergence of Socialism, they do not explain how the history of Technology coincides with the history of Economic relations.  Now, the Means of Production is not the only aspect of society that is influenced by Technology.  Communication is, too, i. e. Gutenberg's invention has plainly helped shape society, without any obvious derivation from Economic relations.  But, a perhaps more decisive impact of Technology on the course of human history, beginning with the necessity of its adequacy if a Revolution is to succeed, is weaponry, a topic absent from Marxist analyses of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism.  Especially troublesome to a Marxist theory of History is the apparent defeat of the Soviet Union by the U. S., because of its military inferiority.  But, even granting Communism a more favorable outcome of the Cold War, confirmation of Trotsky's thesis, that technological progress conduces to the ascendance of Socialism, requires a more rigorous, generalizable, derivation of that result, from Einstein's moment of inspiration regarding the relation of Energy and Matter, via its application to the development of nuclear weaponry, in the forefront of which has been the U. S.

Socialism, Nature, Humans

As has been previously discussed, Trotsky, reflecting the essentiality to it of technological development, characterizes Socialism as constituted by both a progressive power of Humans over Nature, and the abolition of the power of humans over humans.  However, he does not recognize the potential contradiction between the two that is made explicit by the introduction of the unarguable proposition that humans are part of Nature.  Furthermore, that all the parts of Nature are systematically related makes difficult a modification of the first clause that would decisively distinguish Human Nature from non-Human Nature.  That difficulty has been repeatedly illustrated by the adverse consequences of technological development on vital environmental features such as air, water, and climate, which are independent of Economic distinctions, as their occurrences in the U. S., Chernobyl, and the atmosphere of China, alike, demonstrates.  Nor, given the role of Technology in the concept of Marxist Socialism, can Trotsky simply jettison that clause.  Instead, the proposition can be respected as instructive--that in a Naturalist concept of Socialism, Economics cannot be isolated from Ecology.

Socialism, Technology, Power

In 'Their Morals and Ours', Trotsky declares that Socialism serves two purposes: 1. "Increasing the power of man over nature"; and 2. "Abolition of the power of man over man".  Now, it is easy to take the latter as the essential clause, since it invokes the fundamental Marxist focus on the elimination of the source of that power--Private Property.  But #1 is the decisive one of the two.  For, it is an allusion to the achievement of the stage of technological development that enables the transcending of exploitation, i. e. because machines can perform the work of the Proletariat, and can produce enough goods to satisfy the needs of all.  At the same time, it therefore jettisons one of the cardinal premises of traditional Marxism--that Socialism is a stage of the Dialectical Historical development of human society.  Rather, according to #1, it is a function of the species' relation outside of itself, to the rest of nature.  Thus, contrary to the title of the piece, Trotsky's use of the word "power" in relation to the rest of nature suggests what Nietzsche calls an "extra-moral" context.

Two Invisible Hands

Marx-Engels do not deny the existence of Smith's Invisible Hand; rather, they interpret it as a manifestation of a General Will in alienation from its origin in the members of a society.  Now, that diagnosis provides evidence for a hitherto unexplored implication of Smith's image.  For, since hands come in pairs, if there is one Invisible Hand, there must be two.  In other words, the metaphor suggests that a society is governed by two principles not one.  So, the condition of alienation is one in which the two are distinguishable.  Accordingly, they can be characterized as a principle of Unity and a principle of Multiplicity, or, equivalently, Form and Matter.  Furthermore, the two can be conceived as interacting dialectically.  But, if so, then one error of Marxist analysis is to not recognize that Class Conflict is not an instance of a primary Dialectic, and that, instead, it is a symptom of a Multiplicity lacking Unity.  Furthermore, since, as the metaphor of two hands entails, the problem is to coordinate them, not to fuse them, the second error of  Marxist analysis is the concept of Synthesis, not coordination, as the resolution of a Dialectical pattern.  Likewise, on the basis of the premise of the existence of two Invisible Hands, insofar as Socialism is the result of a resolution of a Dialectical antagonism, the sublation involved is constituted by a coordination of the two principles, not by the negation of each..

Slave Morality and Capitalism

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche's fundamental criticism of Marxism is not, as it is often taken to be, of its Egalitarianism per se, but of its concept of the latter as an objective Value.  The misinterpretation has contributed to the assumption, e. g. Rand's, that Nietzsche is, therefore, an advocate of Capitalism.  To the contrary, Human, All Too Human #45, and #33 of the Expeditions of an Untimely Man section of Twilight of the Idols, indicate that the Atomism that Smith promotes is itself an expression of Slave Morality.  Instead, any ascription to Nietzsche of an endorsement of an Economic system requires a methodical derivation from the Will to Power, not cherry-picked agitprop slogans.

Slave Morality and Socialism

Nietzsche is often interpreted as arguing against Marxism on the basis of 'Master Morality': 1. There are those who are naturally strong, and those who are naturally weak; 2. Might is Right; 3. Therefore, the strong have a right to enslave the weak; 4. Therefore, there are Moral grounds for rejecting Marxism.  Now, while that interpretation has textual support, his stronger argument against Marxism is on the basis of 'Slave Morality': 1. Slave Morality expresses the Values of Slaves; 2. According to Slave Morality, Values are objective; 3. The positing of the existence of objective Values is an expression of a desire to submit; 4. Marxism posits the existence of an objective History the goal of which is Socialism; 5. According to Marxism, Socialism is 'good'; 6. Thus, Marxism is an expression of a desire to submit. 7. Thus, Marxism is self-contradictory, because its presumed liberation of Slaves only perpetuates Slave Morality.

Slavery and the Market

It follows from Hume's thesis--Reason is the slave of Passions--that any successful manipulation of a Passion constitutes enslavement.  For example, working out of fear of immediate physical harm, or of irretrievable loss of income, is Slavery.  Furthermore, so, too, is doing so in anticipation of being able to afford a product the desire for which is the result of an effective advertising campaign, especially in the context of the pervasive acceptance of the marketing of a concept of 'freedom' as the having a choice between alternative products.  In other words, Slavery is business-as-usual in Capitalism, an unsurprising reflection of Smith's adherence to Hume's behavioral model.  Indeed, his only break with the latter is his positing of an impersonal Invisible Hand as the ultimate adjudicator of market activity, which is tantamount to a positing of a concept of Reason as potentially liberated from the Passions, as Kant well realizes.

Dialectic, Dialogue, Slavery

The literal meaning of 'contradict' is 'speak against', a reminder that Dialectic, of which Contradiction is a decisive moment, originates as the species of verbal communication associated with Socrates, i. e. as Dialogue.  Likewise, Synthesis, as the resolution of a Contradiction, expresses the fundamental function of Communication as an integrative factor among the members of the species.  Now, Kant's representation of Dialectic, entailing conflicting propositions, reflects that root, from which Hegel's definition of Contradiction as mere 'opposition', the terms of which are any mental elements, is, therefore, a double abstraction.  Thus, Marx's Materialist counterpart, in which Contradiction is any social antagonism, retains one of those abstractions.  In other words, he misses that Materialist Dialectic is fundamentally Dialogue.  Now, if Slavery were, as Hegel depicts it, constituted by such properly Dialectical processes, a Thesis uttered by the Master would be met by an Antithesis uttered by the Slave.  So, since the latter would likely result in physical punishment, in that context, Dialectic falls apart.  Thus, the proper Dialectical Materialist response to Hegel's passage is that it distorts the Dialectical relation that obtains between Master and Slave.

Slavery, Dependence, Dialectic

In the section of the Phenomenology commonly characterized as the "Master-Slave Dialectic", Hegel conceives Slavery as essentially Dependence.  However, his attempt to classify it as a moment in a Dialectically determined Spiritual development gets complicated, because the transition to the next stage, i. e. the self-liberation from the Master of the Slave, necessarily involves Matter, upon which the Slave works.  With that concrete detail incorporated, the representation of the transition that emerges less abstractly resembles that of an employee's becoming self-employed.  But, implicit in that portrayal is that of the Master as a benefactor of someone who is weaker because dependent.  It is thus easy to conceive Marx as judging the suppression, by that portrayal, of the force entailed in Slavery as Bourgeois apologism, therby inspiring a Materialist alternative, updated with a class of Slaves, i. e. the Proletariat, and with an industrial Means of Production mediating the relation between the two parties.  So, with that genealogy, the relevance of Dialectic Materialism, even if flawed, to the exposition of Socialism, seems less contrived than if Marx is interpreted as adopting it for some less specific reason.

Capitalism and Slavery

The ugly racial history of the U. S. has obscured Slavery as an Economic relation, comprised of 1. A owning the work--both the process and the product--of B, and 2. B being forced to work for A.  Now, the most immediate manifestation of such force is the threat of violent harm, usually in the context of imprisonment  But, the alternative to working being impossibility of survival, even if no detention is involved, can be just as effective as a direct threat.  In other words, the difference between the expense of rooming and boarding a slave, and that of subsistence-level wages to an employee is inessential to the power relation involved.  Marx's insight is to recognize the latter variety, even if unanticipated by Smith, as the inevitable foundation of Capitalism, reinforced by Theology and/or the Ideology of "Freedom".

Socialism and Slavery

The fundamental principle of Marxism can be formulated as: Technology renders Slavery obsolete.  Marxist concepts such as Exploitation, Class Conflict, and Proletariat, are various allusions to Slavery, i. e. to the necessity of having to work for another, and the abolition of Property that Socialism achieves begins with that of the ownership of the work of another, i. e. Technology replaces the latter.  Accordingly, the otherwise problematic relevance to Socialism of Dialectical Materialism comes into sharper focus--it is a Materialist response to Hegel's 'Master-Slave Dialectic', while the history of technological development, i. e. of the Means of Production, can be interpreted as teleologically determined by the goal of the elimination of the need for a Slave class.

Ability, Need, Marxism

Marx may have popularized the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need", but he is not the coiner of a phrase that antedates him by a century.  So, the occasion of his expressing it is not a pioneering of the formulation of Socialist ideals, but the observation that the stage of technological development at the time has accelerated its actualization, i. e. with the mass production of goods now achievable, needs can be universally satisfied, and work can thus be a voluntary activity.  So, from him, the proposition is an historical judgment, not the articulation of an ideal.  But, while thereby remaining consistent with Materialist methodology, i. e. because the ideal is concrete, there is nothing in the principle that systematically relates it to the analysis that distinguishes Marxism from other varieties of Socialism, i. e. that the conditions that it describes are the necessary products of a Dialectical process that resolves the Class Conflict underlying the specific exploitation of the specifically Manufacturing Proletariat.  Accordingly, while implying solidarity with other Socialists, Marx's embracing of that principle only emphasizes the contingency of his distinctive contribution to the tradition.

Proletariat, Property, Labor

One elucidation by Marx of the emergence of Socialism is: 1. The Proletariat is the revolutionary Class; 2. The principles of any ruling Class are expressions of its fundamental characteristics; 3.  The fundamental characteristic of the Proletariat is property-lessness; 4. Thus, the defining characteristic of an ascendant Proletariat is property-lessness;  5. The fundamental characteristic of Socialism is the abolition of Private Property; 6. Thus, Socialism is the result of a Proletariat revolution.  Now, #3 is problematic, because it assumes that the Proletariat remains property-less after a revolution, i. e. that its members do not keep what they have seized for themselves.  But, the deeper problem with that premise is that it is false.  For, it is a cardinal tenet of Marxism that any worker owns their Labor, as well as the fruits of it, even as it is alienated from them.  Thus, the Proletariat is not property-less, with, therefore, 4. Thus, the defining characteristic of an ascendant Proletariat is Labor.  Accordingly, #6 can be preserved by a revision of #5 as: the fundamental characteristic of Socialism is the collectivization of Labor, from which the collectivization of Property can follow.

Labor and Manufacturing

The Marxist focus on Manufacturing Labor likely reflects the recognition of unprecedented industrialization as the predominant factor in the determination of social relations.  Thus, the demonstrable exploitation involved in that determination, based on the fact that the owners of the means of production and the operators of the means of production are not the same, and, therefore, according to the ethos of Capitalism, have conflicting interests, is novel.  But, if that contradiction is specific to the Manufacturing sector of that era, then its generalizations are strained, e. g. the classification of land as a 'means of production' in order to reduce a feudal landowner to an 'owner of the means of production', or, the extension of that mode of exploitation to other sectors.  Likewise, if the mode of exploitation is specific to it, then so, too, is its remedy, e. g. the nationalization of manufacturing industry does not in itself justify that of the transportation or of the health sector of a society.  So, the Marxist emphasis on Manufacturing Labor conversely entails a limitation that is ignored in its analyses.

Lumpenproletariat and Productivity

The prototype of Marx's concept of Labor is manufacturing, a transforming of some given material that, by virtue of having a yield, can be characterized as 'productive'.  Now, these concepts of Labor and Productivity can be extended to other kinds of work, e. g. the arrival of food is the product of the labor of a waiter, and the improved condition of a patient is the product of the labor of a physician.  But, then, so, too are the applicable to the pleasure that is the result of the efforts of an organ-grinder, or of those of a prostitute.  So, Non-Productivity is not the adequate criterion for the categorization of the latter two as Lumpenproletarian as Marx takes it to be.

Lumpenproletariat and Organ-Grinder

Another member of Marx's Lumpenproletariat is the organ-grinder, once again ostensibly on grounds of non-productivity, but in this case, the arbitrariness of that criterion is a little more conspicuous.  For, Praxis per se, does not distinguish between purposeful and purposeless doing, so Practice does not inherently privilege productive action over non-productive action, e. g. a performance of an orchestra.  And yet, for Marxists, any Art is necessarily either reactionary or revolutionary, a thesis based on a concept of Art as purposeful.  So, the categorization of the organ-grinder as Lumpenproletarian is symptomatic of the reductionist convenience that that Class affords Marxism.

Lumpenproletariat and Prostitution

Marx classifies the world's oldest profession as part of the Lumpenproletariat, ostensibly on grounds of non-productivity, possibly sharing a moral judgment with ideologies that he otherwise repudiates.  He thereby evades consideration that prostitution be categorized as a 'service', to which Marxism seems inadequate.  For, since any Service, e. g. treatment by a physician, does not involve the production of a Good, its value cannot derive from the Labor via which some material is transformed.  Accordingly, since there is no surplus-value in the work of e. g. plumbers, a Capitalist victimization of them, like that of prostitutes, e. g. via a generalized deliberate suppression of fees, eludes the Marxist concept of Exploitation, while even fair fees are not explained the Labor Theory of Value to which the Marxist subscribes. Thus, as is the case with the chronically unemployed, as has been previously discussed, the marginalization of prostitutes as Lumpenproletarian reflects more a systematic covenience than some inherent deficiency in their activity.

Lumpenproletariat and Unemployment

In some passages, Marxists include the chronically unemployed among the Lumpenproletariat, presumably on the grounds of non-productivity.  However, as contemporary events evince, unemployment can be a consequence of Capitalists hoarding their accumulated wealth, rather than, as Smith optimistically projects, redistributing it, e. g. via investments, one remedy for which has been the Keynesian policy of government picking up that slack.  Thus, it may only be because Marxist analysis is inadequate to some varieties of victimization under Capitalism, that in the supplanting of the latter by Socialism, some members of the Lumpenproletariat are transformed from indifferently neglected to methodically marginalized.

Lumpenproletariat and Socialism

In some passages, Marx seems to ground his marginalization of the Lumpenproletariat on the principle that someone who is non-productive is not entitled to the sharing of the fruits of labor that Socialism affords.  However, it does not follow that an organ-grinder or a prostitute is not entitled to protection of Law from physical harm.  In other words, the marginalization of the Lumpenproletariat is, conversely, a circumscription of the scope of Socialism, which undermines one the fundamental tenets of Marxism--that Economics and Politics are related as Base to Superstructure, i. e. that all Political relations are determined by Economic ones.

Lumpenproletariat and Dialectical Materialism

Some successors are more sanguine than is Marx about the revolutionary potential of the Lumpenproletariat.  Nevertheless, the challenge remains that according to Dialectical Materialism, that sub-class is either exploiter or exploited, even though its multifarious members are not involved with the Means of Production that, according to Marxist analysis, mediates the exploitation that is at the heart of its critique of Capitalism.  So, as much as does the thesis that an empowered Working Class acts voluntarily, not by necessity, the existence of the Lumpenproletariat exposes the inadequate reductionism of Dialectical Materialism, an inadequacy that is arguably concretely manifest in the totalitarian rigidity of some subsequent Communist regimes.  

Proletariat and Lumpenproletariat

While Marx-Engels often use "working class" and "proletariat" interchangeably, their functions within the system diverge, a vacillation that is symptomatic of a more general failure.  In Marxism, the significant characteristic of the working class is that its members are victims of exploitation, constituted by others profiting from the fruits of their labor, while the significant characteristic of the proletariat is its property-lessness, which is the concrete historical ground of the post-revolutionary abolition of property.  But, as Marx well recognizes, not every member of the population that is property-less is also an exploited worker; such non-productive types are a range of misfits that includes bohemians, the chronically poor, and petty criminals, that he glosses as the "lumpenproletariat".  Now, corresponding to the disdain that he sometimes expresses for these types, is the inadequacy of his system to their existence.  For example, as neither exploiters nor exploited, they are outside of the Dialectical scheme of both History and Society, so, specifically, Marxism cannot recognize the chronically poor as victims of a ruling class, and, generally, falls short of adequacy as a comprehensive theory of Society or History.  In concrete terms, the fate of the Lumpenproletariat in Marxist Socialism is uncertain, which a systemic failure, since other less "scientific" varieties manage to incorporate those misfits into their societies.

Society and Being-with-Others

In Heidegger's system, each Individual is essentially Being-in-the-World, one dimension of which is Being-with-Others.  In contrast, as Marx-Engels' concept of Consciousness connotes, each Individual is essentially Being-with-Others.  Accordingly, each Individual can be conceived as a Materialist, window-ed, Leibnizian Monad, distinguished from any Other by its uniqueness of Perspective, and, furthermore, insofar as essentially Practical, door-ed, as well as window-ed, thereby constituting a unique Prospect.  Thus, a 'Society' appropriate to Socialism is a totality of the relations between all Beings-with-Others, a complex network, not a mere co-existence of simple Individuals.  

Consciousness, Practice, Language

What distinguishes Kant's concept of a General Will from any of its rivals is that it is expressed verbally, i. e. as the Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason, and essentially so, because it functions prescriptively in the determination of conduct.  Furthermore, his concept of Individual Will is similarly verbal, expressed as Maxims.  Now, his concept of Consciousness as primarily Practical is preceded by Spinoza's, but the concept of it as fundamentally linguistic is innovative, anticipating developments of almost a century later.  So, in his system, Consciousness is not only fundamentally Practical, but social because verbal, a concept which plainly escapes the notice of Marx-Engels even though they are familiar with it.

General Will, Egalitarianism, Means of Communication

The structure of Plato's ideal Polis is determined by the principle 'each according to their abilities'.  Hence, it is not necessarily the case that a non-exploitative political system is not hierarchical, nor that the resolution of hierarchical antagonisms, e. g. Class Conflict, is Democratic.  More generally, the example illustrates that there is nothing inherently Egalitarian about a General Will or a Common Good.  So, Dialectical Materialism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient ground for the emergence of Socialism, nor is either Rousseau's concept of a General Will, or the French Revolution. adequate as an inspiration for it.  Indeed, technological development is, as Marx-Engels posit, a significant factor in the rise of their system, but not as it informs the Means of Production.  Rather, the clear precedent of the Egalitarianism of the entire era is the transition from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism that pervades Europe, a transformation effected by one event--Gutenberg's invention.  So, Socialist revolution can be interpreted as one of a series of consequences of a change in the predominant Means of Communication in Europe, another of which is the preceding emergence of the concept of a General Will.

Varieties of 'General Will'

At least five interpretations of 'General Will' seem possible: 1. It is a Nominalist concept equivalent to the aggregate of Individual Wills; 2. It is a heuristic concept useful in analyzing events; 3. It is a fundamental species drive; 4. It is a determinant of conduct as a means to social organization; 5. It is a combination of #3 and #4.  Now, #3 is Schopenhauer's version, #4 is Kant's, and either could be Rousseau's.  furthermore, whether or not he intends it as such, Smith's is a combination of #2 and #4--the former, the Invisible Hand as explaining the posited equilibrium of phenomena, the latter, the basis for the imperative for an individual to pursue Self-Interest exclusively, as opposed to Kant's concept of the General Will as a basis for overcoming Self-Interest.  Now, Marx-Engels vacillate between #3 and #4, thereby falling short of #5--their #4 is expressed in the analysis that when the Means of Production reaches a certain stage of development, the Proletariat becomes conscious of their solidarity, but, rather than further elaboration, they typically resort to their #3, i. e. History as Dialectically determining both the arrival at that stage, and what ensues.  In, contrast, a systematization of the General Will as a species drive, and the General Will as a Practical concept, e. g. the concept of the latter as a supplement to the former, is an example of #5.

Socialism and General Will

As has been previously discussed, the collectivization of Property is derived from the collectivization of Action.  So, since, the ground of Action is Will, Socialism is an expression of a General Will.  Now, on a Kantian interpretation, according to which a General Will can function only as a deliberate motivator, Socialism is the unique actualization of the General Will.  However, in numerous Marxist passages, a General Will is conceived as alienated from personal Wills, i. e. as an impersonal force that is either actually antithetical to the latter, or is imagined as such.  In either case, it is being presented as a force that pre-exists Socialism.  But, if so, then, it is also possible that the General-Personal antithesis, and the condition of alienation that is manifested, is itself an expression of a General Will, as is any Class Conflict that precedes the arrival of Socialism.  In other words, it follows that the General Will is History, governed by a Dialectical pattern, in which, whether or not Socialism is itself a transitory stage, that system enjoys no moral superiority over exploitative systems.  So, if Marx-Engels intend a privileged status for Socialism, they must follow Kant, and conceive it as a deliberate motivator of Revolution, and of what ensues.

Alienation and Power

The essential structure of Capitalist exploitation is the gainful appropriation of the fruits of the labor of another in exchange for the market value of that labor.  Underlying that structure is the arrangement of working for another, which is constituted by the subordination of one's labor to the ends of another in exchange for a perhaps minimal satisfaction of one's own ends.  Thus, underlying the concept of the alienation of the fruits of one's labor is that of the alienation of one's labor.  Now, Labor is a purposeful mode of Action, and Action is an exercise of Power.  So, Capitalist exploitation is a process of disempowerment, and, therefore, the transition to Socialism is one of Empowerment.

Property, Means of Production, Labor

As Trotsky, among others, formulates it, Socialism eliminates Capitalist exploitation by the elimination of private property.  But, on standard Marxism diagnosis, the fundamental exploitative scenario consists in the owner of the means of production profiting from the Labor of others.  Accordingly, the immediate corrective to exploitation is the collectivization of, specifically, the Means of Production, which spans everything from land to tools.  Furthermore, though often only occasionally explicitly expressed, entailed in the collectivization of the Means of Production is that of Labor, as well, i. e. the erstwhile owners of the means of production now share in the Labor, as well.  So, Trotsky's formulation tends to encourage the popular concept of Socialism as merely a redistribution of goods, which obscures the essence of the Marxist response to Capitalism.

Prospectivism, Collective Action, Collective Property

As has been previously discussed, according to the Prospectivist concept of Consciousness, what is most immediately one's own is one's Action.  Hence, the basis of any concept of Collective Property is Collective Action.  Accordingly, in a transition to a Prospectivist social system, those without property gain access to goods, while those who have been inactive must share in productivity.  Thus, the transition eliminates the unilateral acquisition of Property by inactive members from active members.  In other words, the Prospectivist concept more adequately grounds one of the implicit dimensions of Marxist Socialism.

Prospectivism and Socialism.

Standard academic segregation of Philosophy and Political Science departments tends to obscure the Practical significance of Epistemological Theory.  For example, Locke's concept of Primary Qualities, as inhering in objects of Consciousness, connotes social commonality.  Likewise, Berkeley's reduction of them to Secondary Qualities is equivalent to a privatization of the erstwhile public sector, the fuller political consequences of which emerge when Smith eliminates his concept of the Common Good from the determination of personal behavior.  Similarly,  "for me" connotes property that is either received or taken.  In contast, in a "from me" concept of Consciousness, i. e. a Prospectivist one, what is fundamentally one's own is one's actions, from which it follows that any concept of common property is based on one of collaborative action.  So, a transition to Prospectivism can reinforce both the concept of Consciousness that Marx-Engels adopt, as well as the concept of Property that it entails.

Consciousness, For Me, From Me

As Hegel argues, Possession is preceded by Acquisition. But, an obect thereby becomes one's own only by virtue of the act of acquiring it already being one's own. Likewise, in the Prospectivist concept of Consciousness, a World is one's own only by virtue of being a field of potential Action, with the latter as what is fundamentally attributable to one. Thus, this concept of Consciousness is, more accurately, "from me", rather than "for me", and, perhaps, is presupposed by the latter.

Prospect, World, Existence of Others

In a Prospectivist concept of Consciousness, previously introduced, one is a center of a field of potential Action that can be called a 'World'. Such a concept of the objects of Consciousness bypasses centuries of self-indulgent Epistemology, i. e. of armchair speculation about the 'reality' of those objects, with the accuracy of Perception a Practical problem resolved by trial-and-error methodology. For example, if Descartes' scenario were the starting or the dousing of a fire, speculation about an Evil Genius would be a silly distraction from the problem of determining the optimum arrangement of tinder and logs, as might have been Galileo's primary concern. Now, such a concept of World implies the possible existence of a plurality of Worlds, a concept that is less exotic than when 'world' is taken in an absolute sense. Furthermore, the problem of the existence of Worlds other than one's own, which entails that of the chronically vexing Philosophical question of 'the existence of others', is a lot less stymieing when those others are conceived as centers of Action, rather than as subjects of Perception. For, while many Philosophers, including even Sartre, have been mesmerized by the unprovability of the possibility of a Consciousness within the head of an Other, the mundane observation of someone else modifying some feature in one's World, e. g. of moving some object, or, more tangibly, walking up to one and pushing one down, more easily leads to the conclusion that there exists other Agents, with their own Worlds, which are outside of any "for me".

Consciousness, Perspective, Prospective.

As has been proposed, Consciousness can be conceived as a centered Perspective in relation to its objects. Furthermore, with respect to the latter, it is not only a terminal of Perception of them, but the origin of Action on them. Thus, Consciousness can function as both a Perspect and a Prospect on objects Accordingly, qua Theoretic, Consciousness is a Perspect, but qua Practical, it is a Prospect. Thus, the concept of Consciousness as primarily Practical can be termed Prospectivist.

Consciousness and Perspective

"For me" can connote either privacy or perspective, a distinction which, since Berkeley's reduction of Primary Qualities to Secondary Qualities, e. g. the assimilation of the perception of a coin as an ellipse, to color-blindness, is often obscured. Corresponding to, and perhaps underlying, the distinction is a Metaphysical one of the concept of the I as an Atom, and that of it as essentially in relation to a world. Likewise, Selfishness may be Atomist, while Egocentrism is implicitly relational, i. e. a Center entails the existence of points of which it is the center. Also, Perspective connotes Finitude, but not necessarily fixed, because a perspective can vary in scope. For example, Hegel's 'Phenomena' are actually Perspectives that, in the course of the Phenomenology, increase in scope Dialectically. Now, the essentially social character of Marx-Engels' concept of Consciousness indicates that it is perspectival. Furthermore, just as a Center can be the locus of both centripetal and centrifugal motions, Consciousness that is at the center of experience can be both the end point of perception, and the origin of action. In other words, the Perspectivist concept of Consciousness can ground both Theory and Practice.

For Me and In-Itself

The concept of "for me" is opposed to that of "in-itself". While the former connotes that the contents of Consciousness are entirely private, the latter connotes that those contents, or, more properly, the objects, of Consciousness are independent of it. Thus, the contrast is one of Appearance and Reality, and the classifications of the two concepts of Consciousness are Phenomenalist and Realist, respectively, with Phenomenological one variation of the former. So, the attractiveness of the "for me" concept to Marxism, probably via Hegel, is that it can be a safeguard against Ideology, insofar as in the latter, Appearance is presented as Reality. However, in their adoption of that concept, Marx-Engels seem to overlook its potentially reactionary features, stemming from its initial introduction by Locke, i. e. Secondary Qualities, which are privately experienced. Accordingly, Berkeley's radicalization of that category eliminates all commonality, i. e. Locke's Primary Qualities, from social life, while retaining one characteristic--that of Consciousness as a mere observer of its contents/objects. Furthermore, as Spinoza best understands, Phenomenalists are naive about the presumed opacity of the "for me"--about how it can be the product of heteronomous inclinations, i. e. that it can be an expression of externally determined prejudices. So, in sum, the concept of Consciousness that Marx-Engels adopt is one of selfishness and idleness, i. e. that of the Capitalist.

Property, Practice, Consciousness

As has been previously discussed, the concept of Property, in an Economic sense, is derived from that of Use, i. e. an owned object is one that is available to be employed. Accordingly, the abolition of Private Property is equivalent to that of Exclusive Use, e. g. in a public library, an unused book is available to others, whereas a book in a private library that is not being read, is not. Now, Use connotes Practice. Hence, if there is a personal Consciousness that can be transformed by the transition to Socialism, it is the Practical variety, i. e. that which determines action, not the Theoretical variety, i. e. that which functions as an observer disengaged from its object, even from oneself. So, likewise, the Philosophical transition in priority from that of Theory, to that of Practice, can itself constitute a revolutionary moment.

Selfishness and Exploitation

An influence of Kant on Socialism is more explicit in Trotsky's version of it. For, the latter's declaration that the ultimate end of Socialism is, via the abolition of private property, the elimination of interpersonal exploitation, can be recognized as the Kantian duty to not treat others as mere means to one's ends. But, then, that ultimate end, like that Duty, entails vestigial Selfishness, since it potentially protects disassociative personal pursuits from interference. In contrast, a concept of Socialism inspired by the corresponding "Imperfect", though more demanding, Kantian Duty, i. e. to promote the well-being of others, overcomes that vestige, and constitutes a better integrated Socialism.

General Will and Sharing

Marx's juxtaposition to Hegel overshadows a potentially instructive contrast with Kant. Both he and the latter are influenced by Rousseau's General Will, but while Kant conceives it as primarily a Moral Principle, for Marx, it is a Political one. For Kant, it is the ground of an overcoming of Egoistic drives, which he further projects as the basis of a polis, i. e. his Kingdom of Ends, but the latter remains an abstract ideal, mediated with actuality by 'God'. In contrast, Marx regards Kant's concept of Morality as an expression of social alienation, with the abolition of Private Property the actualization of the General Will that reconciles Morality and Politics. However, so long as his "for me" concept of Consciousness is unaffected by that abolition, the projected reconciliation remains incomplete. In an alternative to both approaches, the concept of Sharing is both a Moral expression of the General Will, and the basis for the concrete achieving of the Socialist goal of the abolition of Private Property, i. e. it can change both persons and the world in accordance with Rousseau's concept.

Philosophy, Communication, Change

Marx's rendering of the Theory-Practice contrast as 'interpret the world' vs. 'change the world' abstracts from Philosophy as the content of communication, e. g. of a book. Hence, the formulation abstracts from the effects of each type of project on the audience of a work. In other words, it abstracts from the social function of Philosophy. Now, from the perspective of Communication, his classifications get complicated. For example, while Epistemology and Political Philosophy are typically categorized under Theory and Practice, respectively, the presentation of a method for establishing Knowledge, e. g. the Cartesian, is Practical, and an outline of an ideal polis, e. g. a City of God, can be Theoretical. Furthermore, the recognition of the communicative phase of Philosophy opens up a distinction between changing the world and changing the people who, only after reading a book, change the world. Now, while Marx generally treats the two changes as concomitant, they he overlooks the significant case in which they are not--the possibility of a Socialist society being inhabited by members whose mode of Consciousness is essentially egocentric, i. e. a Phenomenological "for me" mode. He, thus, overlooks the possibility of an implied distinction between changing the world and changing people, i. e. changing their mode of Consciousness from selfish to universal, as well as the possibility that the latter change has ultimate priority over the former.

Marxism, General Will , Private Property

Following Rousseau and Kant, the fundamental Practical principle of Marxism, only occasionally explicitly cited as such, is the General Will. Smith's Invisible Hand is also in that tradition, but its apparent divergence from the line is crucial to the development of Marxism. For, the respect in which it seems to diverge--that it is a Theoretical law of Nature, not a principle determining Practice, is, according to Marx-Engels, a product of the alienation that is a consequence of the privatization of property. Accordingly, the specific contribution of Marxism to the tradition is the thesis that entailed in the General Will is the elimination of exclusively private property, though a methodical exposition of that entailment, e. g. via an application of Dialectical Logic, is not presented, as it would in a distinctively Philosophical treatment.

Philosophy, Marxism, Practice

As Marx attends to the distinction between Philosophy as interpreting the world, and Philosophy as changing the world, he overlooks another distinction that is implicit therein--that between changing the world, and a specifically Philosophical mode of changing the world. Now, the distinctively Philosophical dimension of Marxism is Dialectical Materialism. But, that system never functions as more than an interpretation of the world, even when applied to future events. What it is not applied to is the specifically Practical dimension of the doctrine, crystallized as the Ten Planks in the Manifesto. For those proposals are as randomly organized a mere list as are the Ten Commandments. In contrast, the paradigms of specifically Practical Philosophy are the principles articulated by Kant and Mill, each of which is applicable in each and every experience, and from the former of which is derived a system of duties. On the basis of those models, a distinctively Philosophical presentation of the Ten Planks would be methodically organized, beginning with the formulation of a fundamental Practical principle, followed by a derivation of any other proposition, e. g. a demonstration of 'Abolish private property' as following from 'Conduct oneself in accordance with the General Will', perhaps via an application of Dialectical Logic. As is, Marxism in its Practical dimension is not a Philosophical doctrine.

Practical Consciousness and Necessity

As has been previously discussed, Practical Consciousness is constituted by attention guiding physiological motion. Now, such attention is not required in habitual behavior, in which an outcome arrives, under normal circumstances, as expected. Where it is required is when habit is either not established, e. g. in a novel experience, or is inadequate to the circumstances, e. g. in which unusual factors, such as illness, intervene. So, the outcome of Practical Consciousness is essentially uncertain, even if intended. which can explain why Practice is depreciated in the Cartesian tradition. Likewise, a significant problem for Marxism is that either Revolution is not a product of Practical Consciousness, or else it is not governed by historical Necessity.

Self-Consciousness and Practical Consciousness

A common instance of self-consciousness, rarely recognized as such, is when one pays attention to what one is doing. In such cases, one is not merely observing what one is doing, one guides it, as if one were carrying out a set of instructions. Hence, in the process, Consciousness functions as a cause of behavior. Thus, this Self-Consciousness can be classified as Practical Consciousness, in contrast with the mere Consciousness of Practice. Now, the physiological motions that can be affected by this guidance are not only those of the limbs, but of the sense organs as well, e. g. keeping one's eyes and ears trained on some object. Hence, in the 'consciousness' of an outer object, there are distinct strata that are often conflated in some theories of Perception, such as in the Phenomenological one adopted by Marx-Engels. The suppressed distinction also signifies the main shortcoming in their concept of Practice.

Consciouness and Others

A common use of the term 'self-conscious' is to one's concern for how one appears to others, applicable to most looks in a mirror. Implicit in that usage is the attribution of Consciousness to others. Thus, there is a distinction between the awareness of oneself in association with others, and one of oneself in association with others who possess their own such awareness. Now, Consciousness, which is inherently "for me", as conceived by Marx-Engels, cannot recognize the latter possibility, which entails an in-itself existence, and so lacks the capacity to account for a concept of Self-Consciousness that even in Capitalist conditions, transcends an egocentric orientation. Furthermore, their concept thus also lacks the capacity to distinguish between conscious beings and inanimate objects. It, therefore, includes no ground for the elimination of the treatment of the former as the latter, i. e. of the exploitation of others, which is a necessary condition of their concept of Socialism.

Consciousness and Selfishness

According to Marx-Engels, the fundamental object of Consciousness is oneself in some relation with others.  Now, because that relation is indeterminate, and the Consciousness is "growing", a range of structures is possible, including that of one as a member of an exploited Proletariat, i. e. Class-Consciousness.  Still, regardless of the stage of development therein, Consciousness is inherently "for me", according to this concept of it, perhaps a Phenomenological one adopted from Hegel.  Hence, it is an inherently egocentric one, and, thus, in the service of Selfishness.  Yet, they do not seem to recognize that it may be an historically contingent one, a likely product of a Capitalist society, that itself requires revolutionizing, if the Consciousness of living in a Socialist society is not to remain a reactionary factor.

Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Society

Marx-Engels assert of Consciousness that it is of "other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious".  So, in other words, they identify Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, as opposed to, say, Hegel, who distinguishes them.  And, therefore, their concept is one that is essentially social, in significant contrast with, notably Descartes',  However, the concept of Self-Consciousness as essentially social is not exclusive to Materialism--neither Kant's, in his Refutation of Idealism, nor Heidegger's Being-in-the-World, each implicitly social, is Materialist.  Regardless, nothing in Marx-Engels' formulation of Self-Consciousness includes Practice qua Purposiveness; rather, it entails only association with others, which can be for its own sake.  Hence, rather than as another means to the survival of the individual, Self-Consciousness can also be interpreted as a manifestation of a Formal Species-principle, the main function of which is to integrate its otherwise randomly compresent members.

Consciousness and Practice

According to Marx-Engels, Consciousness is a distinctively human characteristic the fundamental function of which is social and practical.  Their exposition of the concept in the German Ideology includes the following analysis:  "Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into 'relations' with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all.  For the animal, its relation to other does not exist as a relation."  Now, the "for me" signifies a concept of Consciousness that is either Phenomenological or Epiphenomenal, in contrast with concepts in which the object of Consciousness is no mere appearance, but a reality, in itself.  So, implicit in the Consciousness of a relation is that it represents some indeterminable Species interaction, from which it follows that Class Consciousness is no more than a special case of such an representation, and that 'Revolution' is only an interpretation of some Species activity, as is the attribution to it of 'Necessity'.  But, the deeper problem for them is that such a concept of Consciousness lacks causal efficacy, so no Consciousness, and no degree of development of Class Consciousness, suffices to motivate the Proletariat to Revolution.  In other words, their concept of Consciousness may be a Consciousness of Practice, but it is not a Practical Consciousness.

Consciousness, Language, Species

At various points in the German Ideology, Marx-Engels assert the following: 1. "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life"; 2. "Language is practical consciousness; and 3. "Consciousness only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men."  Now, from #3, it follows that in the case of self-sufficient humans, they would possess neither Consciousness nor Language.  Hence, the concepts of Consciousness and Language entailed is Atomist, in which such relations are contingent.  Furthermore, from #2, it follows that Consciousness is essentially non-practical, and, hence, theoretical, thereby re-opening the possibility precluded in #1, namely, that it transcends Life.  So, their concepts of Consciousness and Language seem muddled, one solution to which is to jettison the Atomist model, in favor of one that includes the possibility of a transcendence that is yet immanent in Life.  In that one, it is the Individual, but not Life, that is transcended--by the Species, with Consciousness and Language fundamentally functioning as a Formal Species-principle, i. e. functioning to maintain social cohesion, with respect to which communication with others as a means to the satisfaction of vital needs is a frequent, but inessential application that presupposes the fundamental function.  On that basis, the Consciousness-Language relation is that of implicit-explicit.

Print and Class Consciousness

Marx might regard the content of the Bible as abstract Ideological fiction, but the influence of Gutenberg's invention--an unprecedented concrete homogenization of society--is independent of both the Roman Catholic interpretation of that content, and the Protestant decentralization of it that the invention enables.  Similar developments have been in evidence very recently--in the extension of that homogenization, via the extending of print technology through the 'World Wide Web', which includes the capacity of virtually instantaneous translations between different languages.  Likewise, lacking in standard Marxist analysis, is any consideration of the role that Print, as a prevailing Means of Communication, plays in the cultivation of Class Consciousness, i. e. of the generalized awareness of the specific sufferings of individual members of the Proletariat.

Form, Matter, System

This solar system consists in the Sun and 8 or 9 planets organized in a certain manner.  In traditional Logical terms, the Sun and planets are its Matter, and the manner of their organization, e. g. gravitational relations, are its Form, a pairing that for Plato was also Ontological and Epistemological.  So, a 'System' can be defined as a combination of Form and Matter, with the latter two mutually independent, but complementary.  Thus, Atomism, as Matter without Form, is not a System, and Nominalism, as excluding Form, is inadequate as a Semantics of Systems.  Now, Capitalism is barely a System, with its only Formal principle the vague Invisible Hand.  In contrast, Marxism entails a more emphatic Formal principle--History--but is otherwise as Materialist, in this sense, as is Capitalism, with its group terms, e. g. Class, Society, etc. essentially Nominalistic.  But, in sharper contrast with both Systems, the concept of Species entails a more influential Formal principle, manifested in both reproductive processes, and in the capacity of its members to communicate, neither of which is adequately grounded in either Capitalism or Socialism.  That is, both reproduction and communication are adjuncts to individuals in both those Systems, and, hence, are in them contingent Materialist properties, rather than Formal principles independent of those individuals.

Individual and Species

The Earth both spins on its axis and revolves around the Sun, and while distinct, the two motions regularly combine, e. g. the Summer Solstice is the 'longest day'.  Also, other familiar phenomena may be due to relations with planets in other solar systems.  In any case, the example illustrates one of the limitations of both Atomism and Nominalism, since the Earth clearly simultaneously has both properties that are specific to it as an individual planet, and those that are a function of it as one of a solar system.  Furthermore, the relations of the Earth to other planets in the system are ultimately at least partly centrally determined.  But, while these distinctions are usefully drawn in Astronomical study, Economics, both Capitalism and Socialism, remains bogged down by an Atomism and a Nominalism that are explicit in the former and implicit in the latter.  Thus, remaining unexamined by either is that the behavior of individuals can be co-determined by both internal drives and social forces, and that interpersonal relations can be grounded in a species principle.

Capitalism, Marxism, Nominalism

According to Nominalism, the 'human race' is no more than its individual members, i. e. there is no 'human species' that is distinguishable from that manifold.  Likewise, in Nominalism, no group concept, e. g. Nation, Family, Society, Class, etc. is distinct from its members.  Now, Capitalism is plainly a Nominalist system, in which any group is no more than an association of members.  But, despite its focus on groups, especially on Class, Marxism never abandons Nominalism, distinguished from Capitalism by conceiving individuals as related dialectically, rather than associatively.  So, one challenge to it, as much as to Capitalism, is to explain why the respective mode of relation is specific to certain entities, or, in other words, why either kind of relation does not extend outside of the species.  Such circumscription suggests that the behavior of its members is, at least to some extent, governed by a Species-principle that transcends the members to which it applies.