Thursday, June 30, 2011

Will, Consciousness, Homeostasis

Because 'cyberspace' is often associated with the 'information highway', the segment 'cyber' seems equivalent to 'information'. However, 'cyber' has the same root as 'govern', and the ancestor of 'cyberspace', 'cybernetics' was originally coined to indicate the homeostatic capacity of systems, i. e. that they can self-correct. A similar misdirection has tended to beset theories of Consciousness over the centuries--what primarily serves a homeostatic function in an organism is often interpreted as playing an data-processing role. By retaining what, in itself, effects a rupture with its antecedent conditions, Consciousness is, fundamentally, a homeostatic complement to Will, which introduces that discrescence into Experience. This concept of Consciousness is not completely idiosyncratic--Kant, recognizes that Consciousness unifies the experiential manifold, but he falls short of considering that that manifold is primarily produced by the motile dimension of Experience, i. e. by Will. As has been previously discussed, the Retaining effected by Consciousness, interiorizes ongoing Motility, thereby transforming its moments into incomplete phases of a complete process, and, hence, unifying what had been a manifold. So, what Consciousness retains, first and foremost, is not experiential information, but the subject of Will, which, in itself, indefinitely extends beyond previously settled experiential episodes.

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Will and Transcendence

The superiority of one realm to another in traditional hierarchical Dualisms often consists in asymmetrical causality, i. e. the superior realm can affect the inferior, but not vice versa. One expression of such asymmetry is the thesis that the idea of a transcendent realm can be experienced by a human only if the idea originates in that transcendent realm, so that that very idea can be taken as proof of the existence of its object. Accordingly, even Levinas' Outer-Inner Dualism is hierarchical, respectively, because, for him, transcendent Exteriority can only be passively experienced by Interiority. In contrast, in Formaterialism, the Material Principle of Experience, Will, is the mundane process of the surpassing of the given. In other words, Will is Transcendence, i. e. in Formaterialism, Transcendence has an immanent origin.

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Will and Detachment

Will, in Formaterialism, is the principle of Diversification in Experience--the generation of an indefinite novel Otherwise. It is Will, in its earliest phase, that is traditionally characterized as the 'detachment' that for many doctrines is the cardinal philosophical moment. However, lacking an appreciation for the fundamentality of Diversification in Experience, these systems can only interpret that moment as a transition to a transcendent 'nowhere', rather than to a previously non-existent otherwise. Hence, the dualisms that are constructed to accommodate such a nowhere, e. g. in order to locate it in a metaphysical realm, are based on an abstraction from a more mundane experiential process.

Monday, June 27, 2011

Will and Binary Subjectivity

Formaterialism consists of two fundamental principle--the Material Principle, i. e. the process of Becoming-Diverse, and the Formal Principle, i. e. the process of Becoming-the-Same. In the sphere of personal experience, these principles are Will and Consciousness, respectively. In the former, the initial moment is I, while in the latter, the terminal moment is I. Hence, Formaterialism entails what can be called 'binary subjectivity', because each I is fundamentally a moment in a distinct subjective function, in terms of which hypostasization, abstraction, and homogenization produce the more familiar unitary 'I' of traditional theories. Three prominent theories that wrestle with binary subjectivity are Kant's, with both a theoretical and a practical subject; Whitehead's, with its subject-superject dichotomy; and, Sartre's, in which Consciousness both is aware of its object and is a flight from it. However, none of these offers a satisfactory systematization of it.

Sunday, June 26, 2011

Will and I

On Kant's analysis, the I of the 'I think' is the source of the unity of Consciousness. On Whitehead's innovative variation, the I only emerges at the end of the Concrescence that produces 'I am conscious of X', i. e. it is a novel I, not either one that precedes the process, or one that remains identical throughout it. Furthermore, for Whitehead, every new I, in turn, becomes a constituent in a subsequent Concrescence that generates a newer I. Now, as has been previously discussed here, Whitehead neglects the discrescent moment that ensues upon the completion of one Concrescence and eventuates in a subsequent Conscrescence. In other words, he does not recognize the I which originates Discrescence. In Formaterialism, experiential Discrescence is Will, so what Whitehead does not recognize is the I that is the initial moment of Will.

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Will and Referring

Will, on the definition here, is Motility that exceeds one's perceived given situation. One motile process is uttering. Some utterances are referential, i. e. they indicate some object of which one was aware prior to one's issuing of them. Hence, Referring entails Will. A similar analysis applies to Describing.

Friday, June 24, 2011

Will and Empiricism

The standard definition of 'Empiricism' is 'the theory that all Knowledge originates in the senses'. However, the etymological root of 'empirical' is 'to attempt', so, a more literal definition of it, as perhaps Dewey best understands, is 'the theory of experimental knowledge'. Now, every experiment is an active departure from antecedent conditions that both seeks new knowledge and puts established knowledge at risk. But, the experiential principle that exceeds the given, as has been discussed, is Will. Hence, Empiricism, properly conceived, originates in Will, in the modes of active motile processes, such as looking at, listening to, touching, etc., from which the passive 'senses' of traditional 'Empiricism' are abstracted.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Will and Ethics

The Rational-Animal distinction pioneered by Plato, and radicalized by Descartes, corresponds to a split between Ethics and Psychology. For, on that model, Psychology lacks the normative dimension that is essential to Ethics. The efforts of Hume and Mill to overcome the duality, by conceiving Rationality as ancillary to Animality, are undercut by their Atomism--the definition of 'Good' in terms of 'Pleasure' in an Atomistic theory of Experience cannot explain the superiority of some 'goods' to others upon which each thinker presumes. In contrast, in Formaterialism, Will is both Motility and Excession, so, what is the source of the locomotion that the tradition regards as the essence of 'Animality', is also the principle of 'doing better', upon which any system of evaluation depends. Hence, the thesis that Will, as defined in Formaterialism, is a fundamental component of Experience, effectively overcomes the model that conceives Ethics as an extrinsic imposition upon Animality.

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

Will and Hierarchical Soul

Aristotle's and Kant's concepts of Virtue as Self-Control makes explicit what is implicit in a hierarchical model of the Soul, pioneered by Plato, upon which each is based--that Reason is superior to Animality. The main difference between the two models is that, following Descartes, Kant denies that Animality, is even a part of the Soul. Otherwise, for both, Virtue consists in gaining rational control of locomotion, the fundamental characteristic of Animality. In contrast, Formaterialism rejects entirely this traditional hierarchical model, preferring, as the basic dimensions of its concept of Personhood, Outer and Inner, derived from the the fundamental processes of Exteriorization and Interiorization. On this model, Locomotion is a mode of the former, i. e. of Will, which the latter, i. e. Consciousness, structures, which is one reason why they are also classified as Material Principle and Formal Principle, respectively. But, there is no systematic hierarchical relation between them, i. e. neither is superior to the other. Hence, what Aristotle and Kant interpret as an imposition of a higher faculty on a lower faculty, is re-conceived here as coordination, the more balanced, the better, yielding a process of Self-Creation, rather than of Self-Control.

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Will and Virtue

For Aristotle and Kant, each, 'Virtue' is constituted by self-control--one in terms of the concept of Balance, the other, on that of Rational Universality. Each presents a formula for the self-constraint that can counter external influences. Now, the original meaning of 'virtue' is 'excellence', and, as previously discussed, 'to excel' means, literally, 'to exceed'. So, insofar as Will is the principle of Excession in Experience, Virtue, is, essentially, a mode of Will. Thus, Formaterialism conceives Virtue as the cultivation of self-innovation. The divergence of this concept from the traditional one is based on more than on its stricter interpretation of the term 'excellence'--it, more substantively, reflects its highlighting of the inhospitability of traditional doctrines to human creativity, which Vitalists, notably Nietzsche and Bergson, expose. So, at minimum, it demonstrates the arbitrariness of the application of the term 'Virtue' to self-control, and, at maximum, it suggests that such an application entails a violation of the fundamental meaning of the term.

Monday, June 20, 2011

Will and Excellence

'To excel' literally means 'to exceed', so 'excellence' and 'excellent' are both, literally, comparative notions that do not preclude further surpassing. Hence, the most common uses of them abstract from those characteristics, i. e. 'excellent' usually describes a discrete paragon. But the more significant abuse of those terms is in prominent Ethical theories. By equating 'excellence' with 'goodness', Plato implies that it is as incomparable as is the former. By imputing to 'excellence' Teleological Causality, Aristotle implies that it is unsurpassable. Likewise, such doctrines abstract from the involvement of Will, the principle of Excession in Experience, in Excellence.

Sunday, June 19, 2011

Will and Self-Actualization

Though nearly identical, literally and etymologically, 'self-activation' and 'self-actualization' generally have two very different meanings. While the former is usually used to describe the process of setting oneself in motion, the latter, notably as the cardinal principle of a Psychological doctrine, is synonymous with 'the fulfillment of one's potential'. The contrast thus exposes two consequential metaphysical prejudices entailed by that doctrine--that Selfhood is conditioned by potentiality that precedes actuality, and, that personal development is intrinsically limited, i. e. limited to realizing its potential. For Formaterialism, in which self-activation, i. e. Will, is a fundamental principle, personal development is, in principle, emergent and indefinite, and, hence, is potentially stifled by a program that aims at self-actualization.

Saturday, June 18, 2011

Will and Materialization

In common parlance, to 'materialize' means to 'appear out of nowhere'. The connoted transition, from Immateriality to Materiality, is difficult to explain in dualistic systems that include Matter as one of its antitheses, and is impossible in monist Materialisms. In contrast, that connoted transition is precisely what constitutes Will in Formaterialism.

Friday, June 17, 2011

Will, Thought, Extension

Since Descartes, Extension has been a cardinal feature of modern Philosophy. But, as has been previously discussed here, even Vitalist theories treat Extension as a fait accompli, i. e. they fail to consider that Extension is the product of a process of Extending. Such neglect abets Thought-Extension dualism, since it preempts the possibility of the latter resulting from a process that has the former as its point of departure, e. g. the possibility of Will, as defined here. Instead, Motility, and deliberate conduct, in general, is typically characterized, often groundlessly, as a fall of mental substance into alien material substance, in contrast with which, the interpretation that posits a fortuitous parallelism between Thought and Extension, respects, with greater consistency, the posited dualism.

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Will, Homo Faber, Extension

Bergson's proposal, that the human race be redefined as 'Homo Faber', instead of 'Homo Sapiens', reflects the historical transition from the Age of Enlightenment to the Age of Technology. Hence, when he interjects that such a redefinition requires that "we rid ourselves of all pride", he is implying that the historical transition constitutes a degenerative trend. In contrast, as an apparent departure from his own critique of Modernity, Heidegger discerns in Homo Faber not a fall of Spirit into Matter, as does Bergson, but Being making for the sake of making. Potentially reinforcing Heidegger's insight is the further observation that not all instruments serve ulterior material purposes--some produce the music that, for Bergson, exemplifies the transcendence of Matter by Spirit. A third interpretation of Homo Faber recognizes that instruments, both of work and of play, are extensions of the human body, i. e. they extend Motility. That characteristic is of sufficient interest to Formaterialism, for which Extending for the sake of Extending is a fundamental principle of human Experience, i. e. is the experiential Excession and Diversification effected by Will.

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Will and Others

Insofar as Will is conceived, as is generally the case, to be fundamentally at the service of private ulterior ends, its scope is completely selfish. However, insofar as it is defined, as it is here, as the principle of Diversification in Experience, Will, in combination with the equivalence, proposed by Levinas, of Alterity and Exteriority, can be recognized as the ground of Being-towards-others. One flaw in Heidegger's analysis of Experience is to dismiss gregariousness as an Ontological deficiency, rather than to appreciate the constructive dimension of seeking the company of others, even if it risks degenerating into losing oneself in others. Likewise, Will is the origin of other-oriented principles such as Sympathy and Kantian Respect, as well as is the ground of Aristotle's thesis that humans are by nature political beings.

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

Will and Homo Ludens

Bergson's concept of the human species as Homo Faber, rather than as Homo Sapiens, corresponds to his concept of the evolutionary significance of locomotion as fundamentally purposive. So, because he conceives the nature of humanity as fixed, his concept of the entailed relation between Consciousness and Motility is likewise immutable, i. e. the human species is unsurpassably purposive. Thus, he cannot appreciate that the relation between Homo Sapiens and Homo Faber is an evolutionary development, nor that a further transition, entailing a further shift in the relation between Consciousness and Motility, is possible. While he can only conceive disembodied Consciousness, i. e. Intuition, as a mode of existence superior to that of homo faber, Heidegger hints alternatively at a transition from Technological Man to Poetic Man. Formaterialism recognizes Heidegger's suggestion as a continuation of the evolvement from Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber, to an evolvement from Homo Faber to Homo Ludens. In particular, what is continued in that development is the emergence of Motility from its subordination to Consciousness, arriving at Will as a co-valent partner of the latter, and, accordingly, at Experience as the playful interaction of the two, with respect to which, the prior stages--Experience as Theory, and Experience as Practice--are special, underdeveloped, cases.

Monday, June 13, 2011

Will and Improvisation

Bergson's concept of Duration is plainly inspired by the continuity of Music, so, likewise, are the cardinal durational notions of his system--Spirit and Elan Vital. However, his enthusiasm for Music tends to gloss over its Material basis, i. e. the performers and instruments that produce it, and over its discontinuities, i. e. the silence between notes and between beats. Now, his exposure to music was almost certainly only to that which is pre-composed, so he likely did not have the opportunity to appreciate how improvised music more directly exemplifies Elan Vital. Given that opportunity, he might have discovered that Diversification is essential to Creativity, i. e. improvisation is, in general, a variation on a theme, and, in particular, every new passage varies what precedes it. Similarly, Will--the principle of Diversification in Experience--when freed of its involvement in ulterior pursuits, is revealed as essential to the fundamental creativity of all personal action.

Sunday, June 12, 2011

Will, Motion, Diversification

While Bergson inverts the traditional Parmenidean-Platonist privileging of Rest over Motion, it accepts its priority of Unity over Multiplicity. Hence, he sometimes struggles to explain the creativity of Elan Vital, i. e. to explain how a unitary impetus can be the source of novelty, sometimes seeming to concede that apparent change is no more than the trace of the effect of that force on Matter. Formaterialism rejects that shared thesis, by recognizing Becoming-Diverse and Becoming-the-Same, i. e. its Material Principle and its Formal Principle, respectively, of equal value. Hence, as opposed to Bergsonism, Formaterialism can unambivalently characterize Will as both an initiation of Motion and a Diversification of given circumstances, without accepting the Parmenidean-Platonist judgment of it as a degenerative process.

Saturday, June 11, 2011

Will and Mutation

In standard Evolutionary theory, Mutation is the introduction of Variation into a given organism. Will is, likewise, the process of Mutation at the experiential level. For Bergson, the significance of Mutation is that it is an expression of Spirit transcending a previous state of Matter into which it had descended. Thus, any modification of Matter that it effects in the process is evolutionarily incidental, e. g. the development of opposing thumbs, has, in itself, for him, no intrinsic evolutionary significance. More generally for him, the hierarchical relation between Motion and Inertia is one of Unity and Multiplicity. So, while he recognizes the evolutionary value of the locomotion of the animal kingdom, he cannot appreciate that any evolutionary superiority of the human race is a function of its seemingly unmatched diversity of mobility. Similarly, while he might appreciate that Will qua Motility is a principle of personal growth, he cannot accommodate that Will qua Diversification is.

Friday, June 10, 2011

Will and Vitalism

That neither Bergson nor Whitehead offer a theory of Will reflects, in each case, a prior systematic commitment. Will, as defined here, is Motility, i. e. the deliberate process of setting oneself in motion that diversifies given circumstances. On the basis of Bergson's Spiritualism, Will is a degenerative process, while for Whitehead, for whom all processes are concrescent, Will is a discrescent process. It is, thus, no coincidence that each of these generally recognized Vitalists have difficulty conceiving Growth. Growth entails Diversification, and, as their treatments of Will suggest, the system of neither provides the resources for accommodating Diversification in a constructive mode. In other words, the aversion of each to Motility compromises the Vitalism that it otherwise espouses.

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Will and Excession

Sartre vacillates in his characterization of Consciousness--sometimes its relation to its object is cognitive, and sometimes it is normative. In the latter cases, it interprets its object as deficient in some respect, but, when it does, Sartre shows that the deficiency originates in Consciousness itself, not in the object. So, either as cognitive or as normative, Consciousness is spontaneous, i. e. it is, with respect to its object, 'de trop', i. e. absurd and excessive with respect to its object. Now, in Formaterialism, Will is, analogously, a principle of Excession, with respect to given conditions, i. e. it is self-activating, but it is neither deficient nor absurd. Rather, it is a surplus with respect to the given, the initiation of an episode of personal growth, i. e. of the fundamental conatus of an individual.

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

Will and Suicide

One of the relatively unnoticed significant debates of modern Philosophy is that between Spinoza and Nietzsche regarding the nature of Suicide. For Spinoza, self-destructiveness is impossible--because self-preservation is the basis of all behavior--so, destructive thoughts can never tryly be one's own. For Nietzsche, self-destructiveness is the minimum expression of Will to Power--one would rather will Nothing than not will at all--which Freud codifies as the 'Death Instinct'. In contrast to both, Formaterialism, as previously discussed, interprets 'negation' as abstracted from 'diversification', and, furthermore, recognizes Will, regardless of what it eventuates in, as in itself a vehicle of diversification. Hence, Formaterialism diagnoses suicidal thoughts as frustrated Will, i. e. as frustrated Diversification, desperately projecting an indeterminate modification of the status quo. The therapeutic implications of this third diagnosis are potentially substantive--an emphasis on the development of creative alternatives, rather than on strengthening resistance to hostile external influences, or on the cultivation of quiescence to adverse circumstances.

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

Will, Diversification, Negation

On the Formaterial analysis, the awareness of one's situation, and the self-activation by which one exceeds that situation, involve two distinct mental operations--Consciousness and Will, respectively--which can seem to be one process, because of fluidity of coordination. In contrast, Sartre conflates the two, when he asserts that Consciousness negates its object. Furthermore, while 'x differs from y' entails 'x is not y', 'x diversifies y' does not entail 'x negates y', because the latter is equivalent to 'x obliterates y'. In other words, Formaterialism regards Sartre's notion of active 'Negation' as an inappropriate rendering of 'Diversification'. Thus, Formaterialism regards its formulation 'Will diversifies experience' as an improved version of Sartre's 'Consciousness negates its object'.

Monday, June 6, 2011

Will and Variation

The standard model of behavior--that one sets oneself in motion as a means to achieving some pre-posited end--is plainly not a misrepresentation of an experiential sequence. Its shortcoming is, rather, in the thesis that it constitutes a fundamental principle of behavior, a thesis which glosses over its derivative character. The essential pattern emerges when one is restless, i. e. when one moves simply for the sake of moving. Furthermore, moving simply for the sake of moving entails an awareness of the given situation, e. g. the awareness that 'nothing is happening', so, that motion is, more precisely, an introduction of variation into the given circumstances, a pattern which also is at the heart of the standard model, which also is activated by an awareness of circumstances as they are. In other words, purposive action is a species of variation in behavior, i. e. of Will, the Material Cause of Experience, as previously defined here, with the pursuit of an end extrinsic to the essential pattern.

Sunday, June 5, 2011

Will and Novelty

Despite its prominence in some systems, Will is typically treated by them as ancillary to some other principle, e. g. to Self-Preservation, Power, Goodness, etc. Hence, both such systems, as well as the traditional 'Free Will vs. Determinism' debate to which they are subjected, easily overlook that one plain fundamental characteristic of Will is that it introduces novelty into experience. Now, the conditioned nature of Novelty, in both casual and rigorous contexts, is rarely recognized, i. e. 'new' is always, more properly, 'newer'. In other words, Novelty is both a function of its antecedents as well as a departure from them. Likewise, the construal of Will, in Formaterialism, as both conditioned and free, is neither contradictory nor esoterically paradoxical.

Saturday, June 4, 2011

Will as Both Free and Conditioned

In Formaterialism, Will is a Material Principle of Experience, i. e. it is an immanent cause of the Diversification of a given Unity. Hence, it is both free and conditioned by its circumstances. In some systems, that combination of characteristics of 'Will' is fatally contradictory. But, in those systems, the 'Free Will vs. Determinism' debate is usually either explicitly or vestigially ancillary to a more fundamental problem--the origin of 'Evil'. For, in systems that assert all three of the following--that Evil exists, that God is omnipotent, and that God is Good--God cannot be the source of Evil. Hence, the proof of the existence of Free Will is, in those systems, a means to ascribing to humans responsibility for the existence of Evil, which is why that Freedom must be established as absolutely independent of circumstances. In contrast, Formaterialism has no such theological commitments, so it is satisfied to let fidelity to experiential facts serve as the criterion of the soundness of its concept of Will. Meanwhile, the difficulty in seemingly all actual cases to classify someone as absolutely either fully responsible or as a victim of circumstances, is strong evidence that the traditional Free Will-Determinism debate is an idle oversimplification of human conduct.

Friday, June 3, 2011

Atomism and Immanent Causality

The two main theses of Atomism are--there are indivisible discrete elements, and any manifold is a compound of elements. The chronic weakness of Atomism is its applicability. As its history has shown repeatedly, the classification of a phenomenon by an Atomistic system has regularly been arbitrary, i. e. such phenomena have seemingly always been eventually proven to be divisible. Conversely, as Bergson eminently notes, Atomism falsifies a manifold continuity when it fragments its phases into isolated elements. Similarly, one shortcoming of Hume's Atomistic interpretation of Causality is its fracturing of a dynamic process into a mere conjunction of its initial and final moments. Hence, his influential theory of Causality is inapplicable to processes which consist in immanent causality, such as Formal Causality and Material Causality, as defined here. It is also likewise inapplicable to Kant's example of immanent causality, i. e. the process of obeying his Principle of Pure Practical Reason. Hence, Kant's demonstration of the limitation of Humean Causality with respect to Practical Reason focuses on only a specific example of that more general limitation.

Thursday, June 2, 2011

Free Will

According to a prevalent model of human behavior, physiological motion is in itself inert, requiring some external motivation, typically the needs and wants of the organism, to activate it. Insofar as various versions of the model, despite their differences, tend to agree that 'will' is a means in the pursuit of those ends, the model rejects the thesis that 'will is free'. Even Rationalists, such as Spinoza and Kant, who espouse 'freedom of will', do not dispute the basic model when arguing that 'Will' can be liberated via the supervention of Reason. In contrast, in Formaterialism, non-mechanical motion is Motility, i. e. is fundamentally dynamic, and, furthermore, Motility is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of Action, i. e. Action also requires some Formal Cause, e. g. the representation of an end, to shape and direct Motility. It is that latter necessary condition of Action that the standard model interprets as a necessary pre-condition of physiological motion. But, in itself, Motility is independent of any such Formal Causality, and, hence, in itself is free of the positing of ends. Thus, since Motility is Will in Formaterialism, Will is 'free' in this system. However, that attribution is not an expression of agreement with Spinoza, Kant, et al., but of a reconfiguration of the basic model to which they subscribe as much as their opponents do.

Wednesday, June 1, 2011

Will, Intention, Wish

As previously argued, Intention is neither a lure for behavior, nor a preview of a lure that sets behavior in motion, but a representation that shapes and guides a course of action. In other words, Intention is neither a Teleological nor an Efficient, but a Formal Cause. Its Matter is the internally generated, outward-directed, but otherwise characterless, exertion of energy, i. e. Will. Hence, Will and Intention are not synonyms, as they are sometimes conceived to be, but are the mutually inverse primary principles of action. Now, 'Wish' is Intention abstracted from its functional context. Hence, Will and Wish are not synonyms either, despite some common usages. Among those usages are ones that are not casual--e. g. in the prayer 'Thy will be done', and the legal notion of Will, which requires an 'executor' to carry it out. But, regardless of how ingrained or codified such usages of 'will' are, from the perspective here, 'wish' is the more systematically appropriate term in those contexts.