Free Will

According to a prevalent model of human behavior, physiological motion is in itself inert, requiring some external motivation, typically the needs and wants of the organism, to activate it. Insofar as various versions of the model, despite their differences, tend to agree that 'will' is a means in the pursuit of those ends, the model rejects the thesis that 'will is free'. Even Rationalists, such as Spinoza and Kant, who espouse 'freedom of will', do not dispute the basic model when arguing that 'Will' can be liberated via the supervention of Reason. In contrast, in Formaterialism, non-mechanical motion is Motility, i. e. is fundamentally dynamic, and, furthermore, Motility is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of Action, i. e. Action also requires some Formal Cause, e. g. the representation of an end, to shape and direct Motility. It is that latter necessary condition of Action that the standard model interprets as a necessary pre-condition of physiological motion. But, in itself, Motility is independent of any such Formal Causality, and, hence, in itself is free of the positing of ends. Thus, since Motility is Will in Formaterialism, Will is 'free' in this system. However, that attribution is not an expression of agreement with Spinoza, Kant, et al., but of a reconfiguration of the basic model to which they subscribe as much as their opponents do.