Will and Homo Ludens

Bergson's concept of the human species as Homo Faber, rather than as Homo Sapiens, corresponds to his concept of the evolutionary significance of locomotion as fundamentally purposive. So, because he conceives the nature of humanity as fixed, his concept of the entailed relation between Consciousness and Motility is likewise immutable, i. e. the human species is unsurpassably purposive. Thus, he cannot appreciate that the relation between Homo Sapiens and Homo Faber is an evolutionary development, nor that a further transition, entailing a further shift in the relation between Consciousness and Motility, is possible. While he can only conceive disembodied Consciousness, i. e. Intuition, as a mode of existence superior to that of homo faber, Heidegger hints alternatively at a transition from Technological Man to Poetic Man. Formaterialism recognizes Heidegger's suggestion as a continuation of the evolvement from Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber, to an evolvement from Homo Faber to Homo Ludens. In particular, what is continued in that development is the emergence of Motility from its subordination to Consciousness, arriving at Will as a co-valent partner of the latter, and, accordingly, at Experience as the playful interaction of the two, with respect to which, the prior stages--Experience as Theory, and Experience as Practice--are special, underdeveloped, cases.