Certainty and Speaking

According to a widely-accepted interpretation of it, Descartes' procedure at the outset of the Meditations consists in two main phases--1. A withdrawal from the world to a personal I; and 2. The discovery of that I in a mental operation.  However, #1 is subject to the alternative analysis that the transition begins in personal sense-experience, and ends at an impersonal, universally common, I.  Furthermore, the purported 'mental' operation cited in #2, i. e. I think, is derived from the process of Doubting, which, as Descartes might have difficulty disputing, is based on the ability to say 'No'.  In other words, according to that challenge, Doubting presupposes Speaking, and, similarly, 'I think' is, more accurately, 'I affirm', as is evinced by the construction 'I think that P'.  So, on the alternative interpretation of Descartes' procedure, his achievement of Certainty is the discovery of his ability to Speak.

The Cartesian Bottle

Wittgenstein's expression, in both phases of his career, that "clarity" is his philosophical goal, professes an allegiance to Cartesianism, that, despite his exceptional acuity to the use of Language, inherits a Cartesian blindness in that respect.  For, as has been discussed here earlier, The Meditations goes astray from the outset--whereas, in those passages, Descartes purports to be sitting in front of a fire, wondering what truly exists, he, in self-evident fact, is at a desk, writing.  So, rigorous self-conscientiousness at that point could lead him to the realization that "I write" is certain and true whenever he produces it.  From there, God, Mathematics, the Body, etc., are all topics of Writing, and, hence, of Communication, to which Clarity has subordinate value.  In other words, what Descartes is showing is not what he is saying, and, so, despite Wittgenstein's pervasive attention to that distinction, his prioritizing of Clarity suggests that he remains trapped, with Russell, and with most Modern Philosophers, in a Cartesian bottle.

Philosophy, Algorithm, Method

The central role of algorithms in the writing of computer programs is well-recognized.  Now, defined as 'a set of rules that precisely defines a sequence of operations', an Algorithm, in the context of the writing of a Philosophical program, is better known as a Method.  So, Modern Philosophy, the original work of which is the Discourse on Method, with the subsequent proliferation of competing Methods, e. g. Rationalism, Empiricism, Phenomenology, Dialecticism, etc., can be interpreted as a species of Programming.  That Philosophical Pluralism seems to be appreciated by Wittgenstein, in #133 of the Investigations, when he observes that "there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods".  However, earlier in #133, his assertion that "the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity" indicates that his Method, like Russell's, remains Analysis, regardless of his later divergences.

Philosophy, Program, System

The concept, proposed here, of Philosophy as a Rule-Writing activity is derived, of course, from Nietzsche's projection of the Philosopher as a "Legislator".  One alternative, with a  perhaps more contemporary resonance, is a 'Programmer'.  In other words, a Philosophical Theory can be conceived as a 'Program'.  Now, while some Philosophers write only one or two Programs, e. g. Berkeley, more ambitions ones, notably Aristotle and Kant, produce several, interrelated Theories, i. e. Epistemology, Ethics, Aesthetics, Physics, etc.  So, in such cases, the product is a System.  Thus, the Language-Game of Philosophy can be termed 'System-Programming'.

Rule-Writing and Logic

The primary difference between the Logic of Russell and that of Hegel is that the fundamental principle of the former is 'If A, then A', expressing the essential fixed identity of an entity, while that of the latter is 'If A, then not-A', expressing the essential instability of an entity.  In other words, their difference is a variation of one of the oldest in the history of Philosophy--that between Parmenides and Heraclitus.  Now, the persistence of that debate indicates either 1. Both principles are correct; 2. One is correct, but the decisive factor in its favor has yet to be established; 3. Neither is correct, because some alternative, e. g. their synthesis, is correct; or 4. Neither is correct, because each principle, despite its appearance, is not a Proposition, and, hence, has no truth-value.  An example of the latter has been previously discussed here--that Philosophy is fundamentally a Rule-Writing activity, so that each of those principles is a Proposal, not a Proposition, and, hence, is neither true nor false.  So, one likely point of agreement between Russell and Hegel is a rejection of that example of #4, with Wittgenstein's position with respect to it uncertain--on the one hand, Rule-Writing is entailed in the concept of a Language-Game, but, on the other, he seems insistent that the Philosopher remain a detached observer of any use of Language.

Rule-Writing and Theory

The concept, previously proposed here, of Philosophy as a Rule-Writing activity, might seem less obviously applicable to theoretical fields than to practical ones.  However, once it is accepted that a Theory is essentially interpretive, then its legislative dimension is easier to recognize.  For, in such cases, Rule-Writing defines how elements of Experience are to be interpreted, e. g. classified.  Thus, for example, Locke's theory of Cognition proposes that colors be distinguished from shapes, while Berkeley's proposes that they not be so distinguished.  Similarly, a theory of Metaphysics offers rules for the identification and classification of the most general features of Experience, while that of Physics focuses on Motion, with the thesis that 'All Motion is absolute' one rule of interpretation, and that that 'All Motion is relative', another.  So, that Logic is a 'theoretical' discipline does not immunize it from the possibility that it is the product of a Logician's Rule-Writing.

Philosophy, Rules, Writing

An important dimension of a Game is its Rules, Wittgenstein's primary attention to which is the following of them, on the basis of which he conceives the role of the Philosopher as that of a non-interfering observer.  In contrast, Nietzsche's concept of a 'Legislator' suggests that of Philosophy as a Rule-Writing activity.  On that basis, the works in the tradition can be interpreted as Rule-Writings for various aspects of human experience, even of 'Metaphysics', once its formulations are demonstrated, e. g,. by Kant, to be grounded in cognitive faculties.  Still, Platonists, e. g. Russell, contend that such Writing is the representation of eternal Ideas, and, hence, that Philosophy is still fundamentally a contemplative activity.  However, modern innovations, such as the incorporation of Zero into Mathematics, and Russell's own introduction of the Existential Quantifier into Logic, indicate that even the most abstract of Philosophical enterprises are less than 'eternal', and, thus, are the products of more than mere Contemplation.

Externalization and External Relations

Entailed in Russell's theory of External Relations is a denial of the Hegelian thesis that interpersonal associations are necessary moments in the development of a universal Logos.  So, even while he and Whitehead are collaborating to reveal the inherent Logical structure of Mathematics, that relation is as accidental a happenstance as would have been their being neighbors, unaware of the existence of each other.  So, the theory of External Relations lacks the capacity to distinguish the Moral process of concomitant Externalizations, i. e. respectful Communication, that dynamically constitutes their specific External Relation. The theory, thus, lacks the capacity to even consider that their Logicization of Mathematics is, likewise, a brilliant construction, rather than a making visible an eternal Logos that is a rival to Hegel's.  Or, perhaps, Russell might prefer to avoid considering that Principia Mathematica demonstrates the application of a useful tool, rather than reveals a universal truth.

Communication and External Relation

Russell's theory of 'External Relations' presupposes a relation between Internal and External.  Now, that relation cannot be Internal, since, by definition, any Internal Property is independent of any External Property, including Relation.  Hence, the relation between Internal and External must be External.  But,  'External' means 'Contingent'.  Thus, insofar as Communication is an External Relation, while Logic is a system of Necessary Propositions, independent of its being symbolized, the thesis that Communication is contingently related to Logic is itself contingent, regardless of Russell's ambitions.

Atomism and Meaning

According to Atomism, all relations are 'external', i. e. they are extrinsic to each relatum.  But Meaning is a Relation, and, furthermore, Meaning is an essential feature of Language.  Thus, Atomistic Logicism is challenged to explain how Language inheres in reality, independent of the conventions of Communication.

Language and Atomism

The structure of one type of Proposition does correspond to that of what it represents--the Conditional, which, like its object, is sequential.  And yet, Russellian Logicism dismantles that ordering, replacing it with a Conjunction, which is a reversible relation.  So, the one case in which the Logical structure of a Proposition might be meaningful is one in which the structure is abandoned by that Logicism.  The example thus illustrates that for Russell, Atomism is more fundamental than Logicism, i. e. that that the World is an aggregate of irreducible independent elements, is more fundamental than that Language is essentially orderly.  Indeed, Atomism dissolves any such order, not only Inference, which is the heart of Logic, but any Relation, in general.  Thus, the distinctive feature of Russellian Logicism is his concept of Definite Description, in which the grammatical Subject is reduced to a disassociated 'x', though, which, to his critics, is an insular contrivance that is disassociated from any known 'Language'.

Communication and Grammar

According to the Tractatus, a Proposition corresponds to a Fact in two respects--its components and its structure.  Now, as has been previously been discussed, the latter is difficult to defend, since in the empirical manifold there is no obvious sharp distinction corresponding to that of Subject and Predicate, especially in the case of action verbs.  Furthermore, while it seems difficult to argue that a shared vocabulary is essential to effective Communication, adherence to the rules of Grammar seems equally inessential to that end.  So, perhaps the most important reason why Wittgenstein repudiates his earlier concept of Description is that he comes to recognize that the internal Logic of a Proposition contributes nothing to it meaningfulness, thereby rendering the Logicist privileging of that Logic questionable, at best.

Language About Language

According to Set Theory, the distinction between Universal and Particular is one of kind, i. e. Set vs. Member.  In contrast, the Venn Diagram representation of that difference is one of degree, i. e. more extensive vs. less extensive.  So, when Wittgenstein, in #121 of the Investigations, denies that Philosophical discourse about Language is "second-order", it does not follow that it must be 'first-order', like its object.  Rather, the Language-Game of Language-Games can be distinguished from other Language-Games as more comprehensive than any and all of them.  Likewise, Language can be about Language without being detached from it, as Russellian Logicism seems to insist.

The Language-Game of Language-Games

In varying ways, #109, #124, and #309 of the Investigations join with the end of the Tractatus in distinguishing the ordinary use of Language from Philosophical discourse about that use.  Now, as Wittgenstein makes clear in #121, his concept of the distinction distinction is not one of Language to Meta-Language.  Instead, the implication of the Investigations, in general, i. e. in the model of a Language-Game, is that the distinction is a function of the use to which the Language is being put.  However, Wittgenstein thereby misses a possible characteristic of the Language-Game of Language-Games--that the Language in the former simultaneously discusses and exemplifies its topic, e. g. the definition of 'definition'.  Now, perhaps examining that simultaneity is not essential to Wittgenstein's purposes.  But, accomplishing it is a rare Philosophical art that he does not seem to appreciate. 

Description, Prescription, Communication

Three characteristics of a Description are: it is pre-existed by its object, its object is not necessarily human, and it is monological.  In contrast, a Prescription pre-exists its object, its object includes a human component, and the latter is explicitly its addressee, i. e. one who is to enact the formulation.  In other words, a Prescription, but not a Description, is explicitly a mode of Communciation.  Thus, #309 of the Investigations, in contrast with #124, is significant insofar as in it, Wittgenstein defines Philosophy as an act of Communication, i. e. he prescribes to a reader a "way out of the fly-bottle".

Description and Showing the Way

Wittgenstein's insistence, at #124 of the Investigations, that Philosophy only "describe" Language, commits him to classifying the process of 'showing the way', the significance of which to him is clearly expressed in #309, as a 'description'.  However, in both ordinary discourse as well as the Tractatus, an attribution such as 'The ball is red', is the prototype of descriptive language.  Now, he addresses the variation in #291, by likening descriptions to blueprints--they are "instruments for particular uses".  But, that formulation does not easily apply to the prevalent use of the term.  Instead, the problem for Wittgenstein is that he is trapped in the bottle of the use of the term 'Description', forced to conflate his novel use of it with the prevalent one.  One escape is via the replacement that has been suggested here--'Prescription', for a formulation that 'shows a way'.  Similarly, as has been previously discussed, 'Proposal' and 'Rogative' are more suitable than 'Proposition' and 'Declarative', respectively, to his innovative concept of Language.

Philosophy, Language, Neologicism

Like Russell's 'Definite Description', Wittgenstein's 'Language-Game' is a term coined as a solution to an inadequacy in extant language use.  Thus, each, in the process, escapes from a 'bottle' of Language, in which, hitherto, the resources to illuminate some experience are lacking.  More generally, a sympathetic reading of most, if not all, of the seminal Philosophers throughout history can detect a similarly needful linguistic inventiveness, most of which, usually implicitly, but occasionally explicitly, has influenced ordinary language.  So, in that regard, the relation of Philosophy to ordinary language can be characterized as 'Neologicist'.

Philosophy, Language, Pluralism

Wittgenstein's declaration, at #124 of the Investigations, "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can end the end only describe it", contrasts noticeably with #309: "What is your aim in philosophy?  To show the fly the way out of the bottle."  For, the former issues a categorical fiat regarding Philosophy, while the latter personalizes his project in the Investigations.  But, a main theme of that project is a Pluralistic concept of Language, in the context of which, therefore, a univocal concept of Philosophy seems anomalous, at best.  So, from the perspective of the more appropriate #309, there is at least one actual use of Language with which Wittgenstein should have interfered--his own, in #124.

Universal Language and Ordinary Language

An example of a concept of Language that is based on a Moral principle is Leibniz', from Towards a Universal Characteristic--that of a "universal language", by which it becomes "possible for people of different nations to communicate".  For, implicit in this vision is the argument that, 1. Universal peace is good; 2. Universal communication is a means to universal peace; and 3. A universal language is a medium of universal communication.  Now, even though no Moral orientation is obvious in the Investigations, Wittgenstein's insistence, in #124, that "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language" is susceptible to the following application of Leibniz' concept: 1. The Philosophical promotion of a universal language is good; 2. Interfering with a hindrance to the promotion of a universal language is good; 3. Jingoistic language is a hindrance to the promotion of a universal language; and 4. Therefore Philosophy ought to interfere with at least some ordinary use of language.  The difficulty for Wittgenstein is that his self-imposed methodological limitations render him not merely defenseless against such a challenge, but oblivious to his vulnerability to it.

Analysis and Ordinary Language

A main point of the Investigations entails that Astronomical or Chemical analysis does not justify replacing 'Sunrise is at 6 AM', or 'I need some water', in ordinary conversation, with 'Due to the spin of the Earth, this location will enter sunlight at 6 AM', or 'I need some H2O'.  However, it does not further follow that Genealogical analysis does not justify replacing 'You are Evil' with 'I hate you for being stronger than me'.  For, Wittgenstein's method of bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (#116) neglects and, perhaps, reinforces, the ideological prejudices congealed, over a long history, in that everyday use.  Accordingly, his assertion, at #124, that "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language" may not be as ideologically neutral as he might prefer.

Declarative, Normative, Analysis

Upon rigorous analysis, Russell's statement, from the introduction to the Tractatus, "The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts", is exposed as "The essential business of language ought to be to assert or deny facts".  In other words, Russell is making a normative claim in the guise of a declarative sentence, thereby falsifying itself, though whether or not it should be classified as another 'self-referential paradox', dismissed as 'unwitting', or accused of being 'disingenuous', is open to further debate.  Similarly problematic are statements of Wittgenstein's from both his pro-Russell and anti-Russell phases--"All Philosophy is 'Critique of Language'", from #4.0031 of the Tractatus, and "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can only describe it", from #124 of the Investigations--each of which is normative, despite appearances.  By obscuring the implicit value judgments in these, Wittgenstein blocks any examination of the underlying principles, which might be admirable as a rhetorical device, but coming from someone with his analytical ambitions, is, as is the case with Russell, either unwitting or disingenuous, neither of which is worthy of those ambitions.

The Purpose of Philosophy of Language

Plato's interest in Language, following the fate of Socrates, is primarily political--to debunk the sophistry of influential rhetoric.  The ambition of Leibniz, probably the pioneer of modern Philosophy of Language, is the development of a universal language that would make it "possible for people of different nations to communicate", as he states it in Towards a Universal Characteristic.  Nietzsche's  attention to Language is closer to Plato's than to Leibniz'--to expose the latent ideology in the common use of terms such as 'good' and 'evil'.  In contrast, it is difficult to glean a purpose to Russellian Philosophy of Language, aside from some vague dissatisfaction with Hegelianism, and the inconvenience of gimmick propositions such as 'The Morning Star is the Evening Star' and 'The present King of France is bald'.  Accordingly, the attempts of the later Wittgenstein to liberate 'ordinary language' from that Logicism is, as he occasionally acknowledges, similarly rootless, since there is little indication that everyday Communication needs a Philosophy of Language to be effective.  So, since Anglo-American academia is nowadays dominated by Russell's program, and, to a lesser extent, by Wittgenstein's reaction to Logicism, contemporary Anglo-American 'Philosophy' has been trivialized as no more than an idle end-in-itself intellectual entertainment for a very few.

Cognition and Communication

Kant establishes the systematic relation between the universal structures of a Cognition, and its Communicability.  In the process, he seems to continue the Platonist tradition of advocating the priority of the former, with respect to which, the latter is extrinsic.  However, Pragmatism suggests at least the beginning of an inversion of  that ordering, and Wittgenstein further develops it with his argument against a 'private language', i. e. against a Language that signifies exclusively the non-structural components of an experience.  So, implicit in that development is not only the thesis that has been proposed here--that Language is fundamentally an intra-species phenomenon--so, too, is Cognition.

Aggregation, Organism, Language

According to the Atomism to which Russell and the early Wittgenstein subscribe, the World consists in Atoms, and their contingent associations, aka 'external relations', in the formation of Aggregations.  Thus, for example, it follows from that principle that the 'human species' is no more than an Aggregation of Atomic humans, communication between which is extrinsic to their fundamental natures.  Now, one shortcoming of such Atomism is suggested in #47 of the Investigations--it cannot distinguish between the relation of chair-leg to a chair and that of a branch to a tree, which, despite Wittgenstein's gloss in the passage, is more than a linguistic distinction, i. e. severing a leg from a chair will not affect it internally in the way that snapping a branch off of a tree will, e. g. it will cease to grow.  Likewise, Atomism lacks the capacity to recognize the possibility that a species is itself an Organism, not an Aggregation, so that the possibility of communication between its parts, i. e. inter-personal communication, is intrinsic to their fundamental natures.  At minimum, the Atomistic rejection of the thesis that Language is fundamentally an intra-species phenomenon can be only on extra-linguistic grounds, just as the advocacy of a theory of 'external relations', can be only on extra-logical grounds.

Language and Individual

In #46-7 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein criticizes Russell's concept of 'Individual', on the grounds that whereas it entails Indivisibility, all his examples plainly have parts.  Now, implicit in the Tractatus is a converse criticism--that an Individual is not a fundamental element of the World, but merely a component in what are its Atoms, i. e. Facts, which are nexuses of Russell's Individuals.  The latter criticism can also be applied to Social Individualism, i. e. that the fundamental human unit is not necessarily an individual person, but a collective, e. g. a family, a nation, or, perhaps, the entire species.  So, if Language is essentially a collective phenomenon, Russellian Individualism will falsify it by, e. g. conceiving it as extrinsic to an individual person.

Language, Biology, Species

Like Reproduction, Communication is fundamentally an intra-species biological process, e. g. when people converse simply in order to socialize.  That is, in humans, Language fundamentally is interpersonal, not any of the following: 1. an inert impersonal entity; 2. an elective individual activity; 3. about the World, either as a description of it, or as a means to the modification of it.  Thus, Logicism strays from the outset when it abstracts Language from its biological context, as does the later Wittgenstein, when he conceives it as mediating an activity, rather than as coordinating the participants in an activity.

Language-Games and Biology

Communication that seeks to simply commune with another is as much a part of a 'Language-Game' like builder-assistant dialogue, as is lifting weights is a use of one's wrists like the use of a saw.  Rather, Communicability is a dimension of the preconditions of any Language-Game, just as the strength and coordination of wrists is a precondition of the ability to grip a piece of wood with one hand in order to saw it with the other.  In other words, Language is fundamentally biological, which the definition of it as an element in a Language-Game tends to obscure.

Language, Use, Tool, Instrument

The 'use' of a saw as a 'tool' or an 'instrument' is as an inert object, by an animate being.  On that basis, to say that one 'uses' one's hand, as a 'tool' or an 'instrument', e. g. to grip and to cut with a saw, is inappropriate.  Likewise inappropriate is to characterize smiling that is an expression of happiness, as a 'use' of a smile to express happiness.  Now, while oral and handwritten speech are immediately and animatedly expressed, the printed word seems, by contrast, inert.  Hence, it is by the misleading example of the latter that Language is characterized as a 'tool' or an 'instrument' that one 'uses', which Wittgenstein fails to discern.

Dialogicism and Language-Game

While presenting his concept of Language-Game as Pluralistic, Wittgenstein does not seem to consider the possibility that some Games are more comprehensive than others, and, thus, that some might be contained in others, as well as determined by them .  For example, if the builder and the assistant in #2 of the Investigations are father and son, then that particular Builder-Assistant Game may be one episode in, and determined by, a Father-Son Game.  Likewise, some will argue, any Builder-Assistant interaction is a function of more general economic conditions, and, thus, varies under Feudalism, Capitalism, and Socialism, for example.  Indeed, a Marxist, following Hegel, would likely argue that all human society is governed by a Dialectical principle, on the basis of which, therefore, the concept of Language can be called 'Dialogicism'.  Thus, while Russellian Logicism is easily classified as one among many Language-Games, Dialogicism is, by implication, the fundamental universal Language-Game, i. e. in which every verbal exchange is a moment in an overarching Dialectical development.  But, if so, the concept of Language-Game is Monistic, a thesis that Wittgenstein could not challenge without confirming it, or by remaining silent.

Constructivism and Language-Games

Wittgenstein's choice, in #2 of the Investigations, of the example of a building activity, as an introductory illustration of his concept of Language-Game, may be more than arbitrary.  For, preceding this phase of his transition from the Logicism of the Tractatus, he explicitly breaks with Russell regarding the structure of Mathematical Propositions--that they are 'Synthetic', rather than, like those of Logic, 'Analytic', in Kantian terms.  Furthermore, like Cassirer, he recognizes in the concept of Synthetic Propositions potential Constructivism, e. g. "the mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer", from I, 168, of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.  But, 'Constructivist' can apply to more than Propositions--all human activity can be interpreted as governed by that principle, i. e. can be classified as what has here been called 'Artifactual', signifying that it is an expression of an active 'second nature', rather than as given as derived from 'Natural' or 'Supernatural' sources.  So, the image of building, in #2, can be appreciated as not merely a familiar simple example of a human activity, but as a symbol of all Language-Games.