The Language-Game of Language-Games

In varying ways, #109, #124, and #309 of the Investigations join with the end of the Tractatus in distinguishing the ordinary use of Language from Philosophical discourse about that use.  Now, as Wittgenstein makes clear in #121, his concept of the distinction distinction is not one of Language to Meta-Language.  Instead, the implication of the Investigations, in general, i. e. in the model of a Language-Game, is that the distinction is a function of the use to which the Language is being put.  However, Wittgenstein thereby misses a possible characteristic of the Language-Game of Language-Games--that the Language in the former simultaneously discusses and exemplifies its topic, e. g. the definition of 'definition'.  Now, perhaps examining that simultaneity is not essential to Wittgenstein's purposes.  But, accomplishing it is a rare Philosophical art that he does not seem to appreciate.