Rule-Writing and Logic

The primary difference between the Logic of Russell and that of Hegel is that the fundamental principle of the former is 'If A, then A', expressing the essential fixed identity of an entity, while that of the latter is 'If A, then not-A', expressing the essential instability of an entity.  In other words, their difference is a variation of one of the oldest in the history of Philosophy--that between Parmenides and Heraclitus.  Now, the persistence of that debate indicates either 1. Both principles are correct; 2. One is correct, but the decisive factor in its favor has yet to be established; 3. Neither is correct, because some alternative, e. g. their synthesis, is correct; or 4. Neither is correct, because each principle, despite its appearance, is not a Proposition, and, hence, has no truth-value.  An example of the latter has been previously discussed here--that Philosophy is fundamentally a Rule-Writing activity, so that each of those principles is a Proposal, not a Proposition, and, hence, is neither true nor false.  So, one likely point of agreement between Russell and Hegel is a rejection of that example of #4, with Wittgenstein's position with respect to it uncertain--on the one hand, Rule-Writing is entailed in the concept of a Language-Game, but, on the other, he seems insistent that the Philosopher remain a detached observer of any use of Language.