Declarative, Normative, Analysis

Upon rigorous analysis, Russell's statement, from the introduction to the Tractatus, "The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts", is exposed as "The essential business of language ought to be to assert or deny facts".  In other words, Russell is making a normative claim in the guise of a declarative sentence, thereby falsifying itself, though whether or not it should be classified as another 'self-referential paradox', dismissed as 'unwitting', or accused of being 'disingenuous', is open to further debate.  Similarly problematic are statements of Wittgenstein's from both his pro-Russell and anti-Russell phases--"All Philosophy is 'Critique of Language'", from #4.0031 of the Tractatus, and "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can only describe it", from #124 of the Investigations--each of which is normative, despite appearances.  By obscuring the implicit value judgments in these, Wittgenstein blocks any examination of the underlying principles, which might be admirable as a rhetorical device, but coming from someone with his analytical ambitions, is, as is the case with Russell, either unwitting or disingenuous, neither of which is worthy of those ambitions.