Universal Language and Ordinary Language

An example of a concept of Language that is based on a Moral principle is Leibniz', from Towards a Universal Characteristic--that of a "universal language", by which it becomes "possible for people of different nations to communicate".  For, implicit in this vision is the argument that, 1. Universal peace is good; 2. Universal communication is a means to universal peace; and 3. A universal language is a medium of universal communication.  Now, even though no Moral orientation is obvious in the Investigations, Wittgenstein's insistence, in #124, that "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language" is susceptible to the following application of Leibniz' concept: 1. The Philosophical promotion of a universal language is good; 2. Interfering with a hindrance to the promotion of a universal language is good; 3. Jingoistic language is a hindrance to the promotion of a universal language; and 4. Therefore Philosophy ought to interfere with at least some ordinary use of language.  The difficulty for Wittgenstein is that his self-imposed methodological limitations render him not merely defenseless against such a challenge, but oblivious to his vulnerability to it.