Friday, December 30, 2011

Will, God, Writing

According to Spinoza, every adequate idea has causal efficacy, and, so, initiates some action. Hence, his highest good, the intuition of God, is no terminal moment of disembodied contemplation, as he sometimes seems to suggest, and as he is sometimes interpreted as asserting. Rather, some action must ensue from that intuition, and, in Spinoza's case, it is likely that that action is the process of the writing of the Ethics, which is, thus, a product of that peak experience, and not a mere extrinsic representation of it. Now, a process of writing is impossible without what Spinoza calls 'Extension', or what here is the principle of Motility, Will. Hence, the Ethics demonstrates that the highest good consists in empowerment, not in enlightenment, i. e. consists in the performance of an action that has the characteristics of a divine performance, which would explain why a deity is sometimes credited with the writing of religious scripture. Of course, Spinoza is a unique Mode, so the writing of the Ethics is only one example of divinely-inspired action. More generally, the intuition of God transforms a Mode into an active participant in a divine/natural work-in-progress.

Thursday, December 29, 2011

Will, God, Humpty Dumpty

Despite its originality and idiosyncrasies, e. g. its Pantheism and its Parallelism, Spinozism exemplifies a traditional paradigm that has been previously called here 'Humpty Dumptyism'--a program of first demeaning, and then overcoming, fragmentation. The pattern is evinced by Spinoza's diagnosis of corporeal individuality as the source of human suffering, with the mental integration with the rest of God/Nature as the cure. Implicit in that diagnosis is the judgment that the differentiation of Substance into discrete physical Modes constitutes a cosmic deterioration--i. e. substance is perfect, while Modes are imperfect--if not a calamity, a judgment shared by most systems, 'Eastern' and 'Western', Ancient and Modern. A more pious alternative would respect that differentiation as a positive cosmic development, a respect expressible in an associated ethical program by a cultivation of variation, not an escape from or a suppression of it. For example, here, the Material Principle, i. e. Becoming-Diverse, is equiprimordial and equi-valent with the Formal Principle, i. e. Becoming-the-Same, so the ethical program involved promotes a balanced combination of Will and Comprehension, the Material and Formal Principles, respectively, of the sphere of Personhood. An adjustment of Spinozism along analogous lines would begin with the recognition that the divine attribute Extension, understood as the dynamic process of Extending, is such a Material Principle.

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Will and Immortality of the Soul

Despite his thesis of Mind-Body Parallelism, which holds that to every mental sequence there is a corresponding physical sequence, Spinoza allows for the survival of at least some ideas in a Mode on the occasion of corporeal death. However, he does not similarly acknowledge the survival of at least some bodily parts, each of which has its own 'mind', on that occasion, e. g. the skeleton. Thus lacking in his argument that Mind survives corporeal death, is any elaboration of the possessive pronoun, e. g. 'our', with which he qualifies 'Mind', thereby avoiding a possible trivialization of the purportedly most profound moment in his doctrine. In contrast, here, possession is a product of what has previously been called 'propriation', i. e. the process of interiorization effected by Comprehension. On that model, as has been previously discussed, the immediate matter of Comprehension is always Will, i. e. Motility. In other words, here, possession is a relation that is peculiar to a specific combination of the Formal and the Material principles of the system, namely, to the Comprehension-Will combination that constitutes Personhood. Thus, in contrast with Spinoza's line of reasoning, from the fact that possessiveness is the product of a combination of instances of impersonal processes, it does not follow that it transcends that combination, i. e. it does not follow that the combination that the produces it is a priori 'one's own', a point made in other terms by Kant, Heidegger, and Sartre, among others.

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Will and Passivity

While in common parlance, 'passive' means 'inactive', for Spinoza, it means 'partially active', i. e. in definition II of book III of the Ethics, he asserts that being passive means "being only the partial cause". This concept of passivity thus entails that all behavior includes at least some contribution that originates in the performer, the degree of which can vary indefinitely, as the qualifier 'partially' connotes. Here, that irreducible variable factor is Will, i. e. even the most deeply ingrained habit is at least partially voluntary. For Spinoza, that factor is conatus, which is independent of its degree of contribution to some specific course of behavior.

Friday, December 23, 2011

Will and Adequacy

Spinoza's definition of an 'adequate' idea is seemingly paradoxical--such an idea has "all the marks of a true idea", independently of any correspondence to its object, which is the mark of a 'true' idea, according to the first book of the Ethics. Some prominent interpretations of this definition, e. g. Wolfson's and Deleuze's, speculate that the marks of adequacy are internal features such as certainty, clarity, distinctiveness, or expressiveness. However, none of these seems relevant to the distinctive internal structure of at least one example of an adequate idea that Spinoza presents--the genetic definition of Circle. Furthermore, those interpretations seem to ignore a fundamental respect in which an idea is 'true' in Spinoza's system--as an aspect of God's creativity. Accordingly, the distinctive mark of a true idea in a genetic definition is its formational role in the production of an object, a role which is independent of any correspondence to that object. So, since such production requires Motility, to which the formulation applies, one mark of a true idea in a Spinozistic adequate idea is its applicability to Will, the principle of Motility.

Thursday, December 22, 2011

Will, Parallelism, Causality

Spinoza's Parallelism entails not only the simultaneity of the mental and the corporeal sequences, but their non-communication, as well. In other words, it entails, for example, that Mind is never the origin of Motility, which, he suggests, always has a physical cause, even if the mechanism involved remains undiscovered. In contrast, here, that explanation is not adequate enough to override the plain and familiar evidence that one can initiate a physiological process with a mental command, i. e. that Will, the principle of Motility in Experience, originates mentally and eventuates physiologically. Furthermore, Spinoza leaves unexamined how, in either sequence, one and the same element in the concatenation can be both cause and effect, i. e. can be first the effect of a prior cause, and then the cause of a subsequent effect. In contrast, here, a fundamental significance of the distinction between cause and effect is that the former initiates a sequence, while the latter terminates it, an irreducible distinction that is derived from that of the two principles of Experience, Will and Comprehension, respectively. So, insofar, as each of Spinoza's two sequences are causal concatenations, his Parallelism of Body and Mind presupposes, and abstracts from, a more fundamental interaction of the two.

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

Will, Mode, Alterity

For Spinoza, inter-Modal alterity is a potential source of harm to a Mode, correctable by Reason, which promotes inter-Modal commonality. In contrast, here, inter-personal alterity is an opportunity for personal growth, accomplished by the incorporation of a novel perspective into one's experience. That incorporation is a two-stage process, combining Will and Comprehension--the former effects an extending of oneself towards another, while the latter integrates what one encounters with the products of past experiences. Hence, such personal growth entails a process of active extending. In other words, Spinoza's lack of appreciation of the value of inter-Modal alterity is one consequence of his failure to develop a notion of active Modal Extension.

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

Will, Mode, Extension

For Spinoza, 'Ethics' is a program of a Mode's realization of its divine nature. That realization consists not, as it sometimes taken to be, in the cognition that it is natura naturata, i. e. a created being, but in its actualization of its creativity, i. e. as part of natura naturans. Now, since there are two aspects to one and the same process of God's creativity--Thought and Extension--Modal creativity, too, consists in both Thought and Extension. Thus, for example, the cultivation of active intellectual processes, i. e. Reason and Intuition is one dimension of a Mode's realization of its creative nature. However, Spinoza devotes little attention to the corresponding physiological dimension, a neglect typified by his continued rendering of that dimension of a Mode as 'Body', i. e. as a created static entity, with no consideration of the processes of the active extending aspect of creativity. In contrast, for example, here, Will, the principle of Extending in Experience, has been developed and examined in detail. So, in the absence of an analogous exposition, the culmination of Spinoza's program reduces to the achievement of a moment of immobile, if not disembodied, contemplation.

Monday, December 19, 2011

Will, Parallelism, Disembodiment

Spinoza seems to distinguish the process of intuiting that a circle is 'the figure described by the line whereof one end is fixed and the other free' from the process of drawing a circle in accordance with that intuition. It is perhaps such a distinction that informs his speculation that a Mind can survive the death of the Body, i. e. because the contrast exhibits the possibility of a disembodied mental act. However, the relation between such possible disembodiment and his Parallelism thesis--that a mental sequence and a physical sequence are two aspects of one and the same process--is unclear. One interpretation of the apparent inconsistency is that it demonstrates that the parallel of the two sequences is happenstance, and not necessary. For example, here, as has been previously discussed, Will and Comprehension, the two principles of Experience, occasionally coincide, but often do not. Thus, on that model, the drawing of a Circle in accordance with the idea of a Circle, combines two fundamentally distinct processes, one of which can produce an idea of a Circle without its necessarily being implicated with the Motility of drawing one.

Sunday, December 18, 2011

Will, Parallelism, Joy

Spinoza's 'Parallelism' proposition, that 'the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things', is, in his system, fundamentally a cosmological thesis, following from the status of Thought and Extension as two aspects of one and the same Substance. However, he, and many of his successors, tend to present it as an Epistemological principle, i. e. as a characterization of an 'adequate idea' as a representation that accurately corresponds to its object. The implicit de-emphasis, in the latter version of Parallelism, of the role of Body in experience, i. e. of the body of the subject of representation, becomes more blatant when he later proposes that a Mode can achieve joyous unity with God via a possibly incorporeal Intuition. In contrast, a notion of monadic Joy that is more consistent with Cosmological Parallelism is the achievement of exact Mind-Body coincidence in an experience. For example, here, peak experiences are constituted by the occasion of a balance, e. g. of simultaneity, between Will and Comprehension, the two fundamental principles of Experience, a balance that is exemplified by some artistic or athletic performances, ones that are sometimes characterized as 'divinely inspired'.

Saturday, December 17, 2011

Will, Comprehension, Parallelism

Some events seem to exemplify Spinoza's 'parallelism' thesis that ' the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things', e. g. the process of drawing a circle in accordance with the definition of a 'circle' as 'the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other is free'. However, other events seem to fail to exemplify the thesis, e. g. the sequence of events that transpires while the ideas 'praying to god' and 'it is raining' are successively occurring. Spinoza's accommodation of the latter possibility involves qualifying the thesis as applying to only adequate ideas, but another approach is to treat both the proposed rule and its apparent exception as special cases of how the two orders can be related. For example, here, Will and Comprehension, the two principles of Experience, can combine in an infinite variety of ways--often with either preceding the other, but, occasionally, they occur simultaneously, therein achieving what can also be characterized as 'parallel' ordering. Similarly, what Spinoza considers to be a necessary archetype may be only a contingent, albeit important, special case.

Friday, December 16, 2011

Will, Denial, Beneficial

Spinoza's use of 'will' seems equivocal insofar as he classifies conceiving an idea, and conceiving an idea as beneficial, each, as volitional. However, the two processes are apparently united by the implicit thesis that a true idea is necessarily a beneficial idea, so that to conceive an adequate idea is to conceive it as beneficial. However, remaining unexplained is, as has been previously argued, his classification of Denial as both volitional and an alternative to conceiving, which he identifies with Affirmation. That is, he leaves unexplained how it is possible to deny an adequate idea, a process which is not merely a systematic possibility, but is entailed as actual in the process, which he recognizes, of rejecting one beneficial idea in favor of a more beneficial one. In contrast, here, Will is the principle of Diversification. So, insofar as denial is abstracted from the process of positing an alternative, it is volitional. In contrast, because to conceive is to synthesize, it is an inverse of Will, and hence, is not volitional. Furthermore, to conceive an idea as beneficial entails the adoption of it as a plan of action, and, hence, presupposes Will qua Motility, as a distinct process. Finally, the conceiving of one idea as more beneficial than another entails the denial of the less beneficial of the two. So, the difficulties with Spinoza's theory of Will begin with his attempt to classify conceiving as a volitional process.

Thursday, December 15, 2011

Will, Individuation, Mode

As has been previously discussed, Individuation is a two-stage process--indefinite diversification from some given, and specification. So, for example, on the Formaterial model, Individuation in Experience consists in an exercise of Will, i. e. in Motility, in combination with some determining plan of action. Similarly, Descartes' 'I am' is an Individuation of an entity--indeterminate 'I doubt' in combination with its representation as 'thinking being'. Accordingly, Spinoza's rejection of the first stage, i. e. of spontaneous volition, entails an undermining of a possible process of Individuation, thereby rendering his notion 'Mode' problematic. For, in the absence of a theory of Individuation, his modes are Schopenhauerian illusions, not concrete expressions of his 'substance'.

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

Will, Affirmation, Denial

Spinoza argues, apparently against Descartes, that a dubious perception is only an inadequate one, i. e. it is not the product of some power of 'free will' that has the capacity to suspend judgment regarding the truth of a perception. On the other hand, he elsewhere classifies the capacity to affirm or deny as 'volitional'. Hence, the relation between the power that he rejects and the capacity that he recognizes is unclear, as is the basis of the "or" that relates affirmation and disjunction. Furthermore, his equating of affirmation with conceiving, a synthesizing process that, fundamentally, represents bodily modification, leaves unexplained the constitution of a corresponding process of denial. Hence, he does not consider that, as is proposed here, 'denial' is an abstraction from Will, the process of diversification in Experience, and is, therefore, volitional, whereas affirmation is not. Accordingly, he does not consider that affirmation and denial are alternatives only insofar as denial is the generation of an alternative to some affirmation.

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Will and Questioning

The process of Questioning has more in common with Descartes' procedure than does the common notion of doubting, i. e. it is intellectually methodical, as opposed to a vague feeling of unease. Questioning also exhibits some of the characteristics of Will, as conceived here. First, it spontaneously diverges from some given. Second, it is not necessarily a teleological process, i. e. while in many cases it eventuates in an answer, in others it does not, and need not. Third, on the other hand, it more immediately admits of formal causality, i. e. insofar as some interrogative pattern provides it with a definite structure. Finally, it often activates further processes, e. g. inquiry. As such, Questioning has more in common with Lucretian Swerve than with Heideggerian Ontological Call.

Monday, December 12, 2011

Will and Soul

Descartes' characterization of 'thinking being' as 'mind' or 'soul' constitutes, conversely, a re-definition of the traditional concepts of the latter. At the same time, the term that he uses for it, 'animus', perhaps inadvertently indicates that he is less conscientious than are his philosophical and theological forerunners in explaining how mind animates body, e. g. the Meditations lacks any discussion of Motility. Deriving 'I think' from 'Agito', i. e. from 'I activate' is a promising step in providing such an explanation, but one that is ultimately abortive insofar as he adheres to a separation of mind and body. In contrast, for example, Will, the principle of Motility here, is a unitary process that originates mentally and eventuates physiologically, i. e. is a process that is prior to any mind-body severance. Thus, while Descartes' concept of soul is innovative, it is also enervated.

Sunday, December 11, 2011

Will, Existence, Essence

The contrast between Existence and Essence is often presented as that between 'that one is' and 'what one is'. As such, therefore, they stand in a Matter-Form relation. Now, in Formaterialism, the Material Principle of Experience is Will. Accordingly, 'I exist' is equivalent to 'I will'. Furthermore, in the system, the Material Principle and the Formal Principle are equiprimordial. Hence, in it, unlike in some others, neither Existence nor Essence in principle precedes the other.

Saturday, December 10, 2011

Will, I Think, I Am

'A, ergo B' usually signifies a relation of inclusion obtaining between a property represented in A and a property represented in B. Accordingly, Descartes' 'I think, therefore I am' actually expresses a relation of inclusion between two attributes of 'I'--'a thinking being' and 'am'--which he derives from the sundering of the unitary process 'I think' into 'I' and 'think'. If so, then though the explicit sequence of his project is, first, the establishment 'that I am', and, then, the determination of 'what I am', the latter implicitly precedes the former. One alternative case in which the inference is valid is when A and B are identical. For example, insofar as Cogito is, as has been previously discussed, a mode of Will, the assertion that 'I am' and 'I think' are equivalent could be an expression of the thesis that to Exist is to Will, i. e. that to Exist is an indefinite dynamic process, a 'that' that indeed precedes, in the order of Descartes' presentation, its 'what'. However, it seems unlikely that this is the interpretation that he intends.

Friday, December 9, 2011

Will and Teleological Doubt

Peirce conceives the relation between Doubt and Belief as teleological--the former is a condition of cognitive dissonance, the latter one of cognitive consonance, and the former seeks the latter. Now, Descartes seems likely to be suffering from a theological crisis, at least part of the root of which is the cognitive dissonance occasioned by the irreconcilability of dogmatic Medieval Cosmology and Copernican Heliocentrism. So, given that that dissonance motivates a procedure that eventuates in his affirmation that God exists, it can be classified as 'Teleological Doubt'. In contrast, his methodological Doubt can be classified as 'Material'. For, that method is implicated in a second procedure, one that is a descendant of Stoic Detachment and a forerunner of Husserlian Epoche--the process of self-dissociation from the world. That process, as has been previously discussed, is effected by Will, the principle of Diversification in Experience, and, hence, by a Material Principle, in a system in which 'Material' means 'becoming-diverse'. Accordingly, the arrival of the belief 'I am a thinking being', in the context of Descartes' exercise of Material Doubt, is not a teleological outcome, but is an intervention effected by a distinct principle, the Formal Principle of the system. In other words, the Meditations entails two projects--the resolution of theological confusion, and the search for an epistemological foundation--which do not coincide as well as Descartes presumes them to.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

Will and the Doubting of Doubt

The logical soundness of Descartes' pivotal assertion 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting' entails simultaneity, i. e. that 'I doubt' and 'I am not doubting' cannot both occur at the same time. So, insofar as Descartes does indeed make the assertion on logical grounds, the proposition is vulnerable to the phenomenological challenge that doubting, and the attempt to doubt that doubting, are, in fact, successive, not simultaneous, events. However, the phenomenological report is inaccurate, so the challenge is flawed. For, as previously discussed, the proper object of doubt is a belief, i. e. the actual experiential sequence is: 1. doubt the belief of X, 2. believe not-X, 3. doubt the belief that not-X, rather than: 1. doubt X, 2. doubt the doubting of X, as the standard phenomenological report has it. Thus, a third interpretation of Descartes' assertion is that it unwittingly expresses his discovery that he cannot doubt in the absence of some affirmation. On that interpretation, underlying the discovery is the realization that Doubting, as a mode of Will, the principle of indeterminate Diversification in Experience, lacks the capacity to generate a determinate Belief. Accordingly, the lacuna in Descartes' procedure is his transition from 'I doubt' to 'I am a thinking being', which requires straying from the method to which he has adhered until that point.

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

Will, Doubt, Ontological Difference

Descartes' assertion, 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', can be interpreted either as phenomenological or as logical, i. e. either as 'Despite all my efforts . . . ', or as 'It is contradictory that . . . '. That he does not, in the course of his project, submit Logic to Doubt suggests that the latter is his ambition. If so, then Heidegger's interpretation of him as a 'subjectivist' misses the mark, i. e. Descartes is not, contrary to that interpretation, asserting that he is the measure of his existence, or of any existence that can be inferred from it. That interpretation misses the mark because of the one-sidedness of the criterion on which its is based, i. e. Heidegger's 'Ontological Difference', the attention of which is to the appropriation of beings by Being, to the neglect of, and, perhaps, with the suppression of, the inverse, namely, the differentiation of beings from Being. Hence, Heidegger does recognize Will, the principle of Differentiation in Experience, of which Cartesian Doubting is an example.

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Will, Comprehension, I

Descartes' assertion 'I am' seems to beg the question, since 'I can doubt' is one of his premises. Regardless, it is his other conclusion, namely 'I am a thinking being', that has generated controversy over the subsequent centuries. As, perhaps, Kant best shows, the problem is not whether or not the I exists, but what the I is, for, e. g. in his system, it can denote a synthesis of appearances, the synthesizer of appearances, or the initiator of a physiological process. Similarly, Formaterialism's recognition of two I's--the origin of Will and the terminus of Comprehension--on the grounds that there are some irrefutable features of ordinary experience that 'I' denotes, the nature or natures of which are open to further clarification, suffices to establish the existence of an I.

Monday, December 5, 2011

Will, Comprehension, Habit

According to the Formaterial model of Experience, Will exceeds its antecedents, while Comprehension, in its fundamental homeostatic function, restores connection of the novelty with the given, e. g. via a plan of action the first moment of which is the given situation that Will exceeds. Now, Repetition, as has been previously discussed, can be analyzed as a case of minimal differentiation, i. e. because a second cycle is distinct from a previous one. It can, thus, also be understood as a combination of Difference and Sameness in which the latter predominates. Now, 'a' habit is, in fact, a generalization of a repetition of a behavioral sequence. Hence, Habit is an experiential episode constituted by a predominance of Comprehension over Will.

Sunday, December 4, 2011

Will and Individuation

While adolescence is typically characterized as a general rebellion against upbringing, adulthood is achieved by the subsequent assumption of some definite social role, perhaps one that had previously been the target of rebellion. Similarly, Descartes' general doubt is followed by his commitment to a specific set of beliefs. Formaterialism recognizes, in each case, the two-stage pattern of 'Individuation'--the first stage effecting indefinite divergence from the given, the second achieving determinacy by the selection of one of the alternatives opened up by the indefinite divergence. Furthermore, the system recognizes Individuation as more than a phase of personal development or as the structure of a pivotal work in the history of Philosophy. Individuation is a fundamental rhythm of Experience--Will exceeds given circumstances, and becomes concrete action with the choice of a plan of action.

Saturday, December 3, 2011

Will, Doubt, Pain

It seems easier to doubt the existence of a distant, contained fire than of that consuming the stake to which one is tethered. To someone in the latter plight, the most immediate likely options are to either recant one's heresy or to resist the compulsion. In contrast, the exercise of Cartesian Doubting, is, in the context, at best a feeble third possibility. But, if so, then it is revealed as a volitional alternative to either eliminating or enduring the cause of suffering. So, if Descartes had applied his method to the extreme agony, he might have arrived at the indubitability of 'I will'.

Friday, December 2, 2011

Will, Certainty, Autonomy

While Descartes presents his project as a quest for Certainty, it can also be interpreted in Ethical terms--a quest for, in Spinozistic terms, Adequacy, or in Kantian terms, Autonomy--an interpretation encouraged by Descartes' own ascription of Doubting to a process derived from 'Agito', i. e. 'I activate'. Accordingly, the pivotal transition from the certainty of 'I think' to that of 'I am a thinking being', can also be interpreted as autonomy-preserving, i. e. as a transition from an active process to an active idea. Hence, insofar as a belief that Descartes proceeds to derive from that foundation maintains Certainty, the adoption of the belief for practical purposes is guaranteed to be autonomous, though Spinoza and Kant, as well as Aristotle, develop other principles of Autonomy, i. e. the idea of God, the law of Practical Reason, and the Golden Mean, respectively. Here, the thesis that 'Will is the immediate matter of Comprehension' is an analogous attempt. For, the positing that Belief functions fundamentally in combination with the exercise of Will, establishes it as primarily at the service of the Voluntary principle of Experience.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

Will, Impulse, Habit, Doubt

For Dewey, Impulse is both a constituent of, and a breaker of, Habit--as a plastic force Impulse can be organized into a repeatable behavioral pattern, but as fundamentally independent of any organizational influence, it can break free of any established pattern. Now, Descartes' ascription of Doubting to Cogito, derived from Agito, suggests that it is a species of Impulse. Furthermore, here, Impulse is interpreted as Will, and is classified as a Material Principle, with the imparting of determinacy to it the effect of its accompanying Formal Principle. In those terms, the system of beliefs that Descartes eventually establishes and develops--starting with 'I am a thinking being', and proceeding to 'God exists', Mathematical propositions, etc.--are adoptable Formal Causes. Hence, the arc of the Meditations can be interpreted in terms of Impulse--from the Habit-breaking of Doubting to the Habit-formation that begins with 'I am a thinking being'.