Will, Denial, Beneficial

Spinoza's use of 'will' seems equivocal insofar as he classifies conceiving an idea, and conceiving an idea as beneficial, each, as volitional. However, the two processes are apparently united by the implicit thesis that a true idea is necessarily a beneficial idea, so that to conceive an adequate idea is to conceive it as beneficial. However, remaining unexplained is, as has been previously argued, his classification of Denial as both volitional and an alternative to conceiving, which he identifies with Affirmation. That is, he leaves unexplained how it is possible to deny an adequate idea, a process which is not merely a systematic possibility, but is entailed as actual in the process, which he recognizes, of rejecting one beneficial idea in favor of a more beneficial one. In contrast, here, Will is the principle of Diversification. So, insofar as denial is abstracted from the process of positing an alternative, it is volitional. In contrast, because to conceive is to synthesize, it is an inverse of Will, and hence, is not volitional. Furthermore, to conceive an idea as beneficial entails the adoption of it as a plan of action, and, hence, presupposes Will qua Motility, as a distinct process. Finally, the conceiving of one idea as more beneficial than another entails the denial of the less beneficial of the two. So, the difficulties with Spinoza's theory of Will begin with his attempt to classify conceiving as a volitional process.