Virtue, Reward, Self

In his attempt to systematize the Rationalism and Empiricism of the Modern era, Kant's most formidable predecessor is not Descartes or Hume, but the one with the thesis that eludes his appropriation--Spinoza.  Spinoza's thesis, 'Virtue is self-rewarding', is antithetical to Kant's thesis that Virtue is, in itself, an incomplete Good, thereby preempting Kant's claim of the  Necessity of the existence of a deity who can complete Virtue by rewarding it.  The unavailability to Kant of an adequate counter to Spinoza's thesis is implicit in the weakness of the one that he does present--a merely a posteriori Utilitarian argument as to which principle offers the greater Happiness.  A potentially more effective counter on a priori grounds is unavailable to him because his system cannot accommodate the two fundamental components of Spinoza's thesis-- the existence of an immanent deity, and a faculty of Intuition via which one can know the deity, the experience that Spinoza characterizes as both virtuous and joyous.  Now, this Intuition consists, more precisely, in the knowledge that one is a part of the divine substance.  So, Spinoza systematically joins a concept of I with one of Self-Interest, in contrast with, notably, Hume, who, as has been previously discussed, seems to not address a significant apparent discrepancy between his versions of those two concepts, i. e. that one is compound and the other is simple.

I and Self-Interest

The reduction of Soul to Mind enables Descartes to take the 'I' of his procedure as given as a Substance.  Similarly, the Human Mode and the Monad are each a self-evidently substantive I to Spinoza and Leibniz, respectively.  But, Locke points out the lack of evidence in their premise of the identity of 'I' from moment to moment.  So, eventually, Hume insists that the I is no more than a bundle of perceptions.  However, that insight does not seem to hamper his positing of Self-Interest as a fundamental behavioral principle.  In contrast, Kant does seem to recognize the discrepancy, but it is unclear if his proposed resolution is adequate.  For, on the one hand, his varieties of a Refutation of Idealism, express his acceptance of Hume's dismantling of the Rationalist I.  But, on the other, his proposed upgrade of the behavioral I--based on the concept of a continuous effort to act Rationally--still does not adequately explain the presupposed identity over Time of that I.  Furthermore, it leaves unaddressed the perhaps most easily overlooked element of his principle of Practical Reason--who the 'You' of 'Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law' might be.  So, a fundamental pervasive inadequacy of the preceding era continues with Kant--the groundlessness of the generally accepted principle of Self-Interest, in any of its varieties.  It is that groundlessness that enables Smith to equally groundlessly transform Selfishness from the traditional Self-Preservation, to Profit-Seeking, the consequences of which have been evident in the centuries since.

Soul, Nature, Consciousness

With no obvious methodological basis, Descartes departs from Plato and Aristotle by restricting the concept of Soul to Mind, with the influential implication that other animals and plants are only soulless mechanisms.  Now, his motivation might not be Theological, since though Pantheistic, but with just as little methodological basis, Spinoza distinguishes his version of the Human Soul, the self-aware Mode, from the rest of Nature. Thus, the Modern concept of Soul seems exclusively attributable, at least at the outset, to Humans, regardless of how defined.  Nor, does Nietzsche's discovery of depth Psychology entail a repudiation of that exclusivity.  Instead, it is only after the rise of the Biological concept of Nature, and, in particular, the Evolutionist establishment of a continuum between Humans and other animal species, that Soul can be re-attributed to the rest of Nature.  Thus, similarly, insofar as Descartes identifies Consciousness and Soul, the rise of Evolutionism entails that the former, too, can be attributed to all living beings.

Consciousness and Grasping

Whitehead seemingly breaks with a traditional concept of Consciousness--by modeling it on Feeling, rather than on Vision, as it is often taken to be.  However, he seems to not recognize that Vision as such is already conceived as a variety of Feeling--insofar as it is conceived as a mode of contact between a Subject and a part of an Object, i. e. part of one of its surfaces.  He then further muddles the similarity--when he defines what he calls a 'Prehension' as a 'Feeling'.  For, 'Prehension' means 'Grasping', and, as is plain in ordinary experience, there is a significant difference between contact with an object, and encompassing it.  Thus, what the experience illustrates is that if 'Prehension' is a correct characterization of the Subject-Object relation, it is not insofar as it signifies feeling an Object, but insofar as it signifies grasping an Object.  In other words, terminologically, but not substantively, Whitehead evokes Kant, who indeed substantively breaks with the dominant Modern concept of Consciousness, by conceiving it as a process of Synthesis, the Object of which is a totality, i. e. as structurally akin to Grasping, rather than to Feeling or Vision.  So, it is not until Whitehead's inappropriate terminology that Human Consciousness can be more clearly recognized as essentially corresponding to the unique versatility of the Human Hand. With no Theological pre-commitments, Descartes could have arrived at the same recognition, by reflecting on what he is immediately doing--holding a pen, and developing a Method.

Consciousness, Foundation, Fulcrum

The Foundation of Locke's theory is I Sense, so, in general, the Foundation of the Modern Foundationalism that spans the traditions initiated by I Think and I Sense is Consciousness, on the basis of which Rationalism and Empiricism are differentiated by virtue of their contrasting Objects, with varying concepts of the Subject of Consciousness also developed.  But regardless of these variations, the theories all share having been abstracted from a wider context, that, in terms of the central image, can be characterized as the Ground and the Groundwork that precedes them.  Thus, for example, consideration of the concept of Consciousness functioning as a Fulcrum, rather than as a Foundation, as has been previously discussed, is preempted by the abstraction.  Now, that function is difficult to conceive insofar as Consciousness is conceived as an a-causal, translucent, medium in which data are registered.  Nevertheless, that Consciousness is conceived as a Foundation, and, hence, as bearing the weight of the structure that is built on it, suggests the inadequacy of that standard concept.  In contrast, insofar as, following Kant, Consciousness is conceived as a process of Synthesis, Causality can be attributed to it--Formal Causality.  On that model, Consciousness is Comprehension, i. e. a virtual taking possession of an object, in order to control it, rather than merely having contact with it.  Such Causality is explicitly expressed in the formulation of the identity of Knowledge and Power, i. e. that Knowledge is fundamentally Techne.  But this function of Consciousness is difficult to recognize once the abstraction that eliminates it is itself abstracted from.

Foundation and Fulcrum

Before Descartes lays the foundation of his theory, he develops a method.  Now, while the criterion of the former--Certainty--is explicit, that of the latter is not addressed.  But, it is implicit--Versatility, since the value of his method consists in its applicability to any belief.  Furthermore, since Versatility connotes Dynamism, characterizing it as the 'foundation', which connotes stability, of Cartesianism is inappropriate.  Instead, more suitable is 'fulcrum', which signifies, more accurately, that a project that seems to be of world-creation, is actually that of world-moving, i. e. a theory with practical consequences, including, notably, continued adherence to religious activity, threatened by the new Heliocentrism.  Likewise, while Descartes seems to be trying to build a castle in the air, his actual ambition is Archimedean--locating I Think outside the world, with I Am as his fulcrum.

Ground, Groundwork, Foundation

The foundation of a building is its bottommost stratum, while the groundwork of a building is the preparation of the relation between its foundation and the ground that it rests upon.  Thus, 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals' and 'Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals' are not equivalent titles of Kant's work.   Now, the classification of Descartes as a 'Foundationalist' is based on that of I Exist as the Foundation of his system, just Spinoza, on the basis of his God/Nature, and Locke, on the basis of Sensations, are similarly classified.  But, often overlooked in such classifications is the preparatory groundwork that precedes them, which, in the case of Descartes, involves the development and implementation of a tool--his Method of Doubt.  But even in that phase of theory-building, overlooked is the nature of the ground itself that requires preparation in order to guarantee the stability of the structure.  Now, that nature cannot be found in the pages of the book itself, so can only, at best, be inferred from what is there.  Now, easily inferred is the fact that Descartes has been at a desk, writing, while affirming his incorporeality.  From there, almost as easily inferred are the circumstances of his act of writing--his Mathematical, Scientific, and Theological interests that have been previously.  So, from that perspective, the structure of which his incorporeal I Exist is the foundation is revealed as a castle in the air, one that has Theological value.

Dualism and Polarity

Descartes' Theological Dualism can be traced to a methodological error--when from 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting X', he isolates 'I doubt', and, hence, 'I think', from which he can attribute immateriality to 'I'.  Thus, to alternatively recover methodological rigor, 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting X' has potentially fruitful implications.  One is the inherent ordered polar structure of Experience, e. g. that 'I think' is always 'I think some X', which is the basic principle of Brentano's Intentionality, a theory that informs Husserl's tellingly named 'Cartesian Meditations'.  Another is that, conversely, the Objects of Experience are not independent of their Subject, from which can be developed a Perspectivist Epistemological theory.  Finally, that ordered polarity implies an Egocentric concept of Space, which Descartes's own device of a Geometrical Axis can be recognized as illustrating.  However, unlike Dualism, such Polarity does not serve the previously discussed urgent Theological purpose of relocating a deity that has been displaced in the repudiation of Geocentrism.

Geocentrism, Heliocentrism, Dualism

The Theological urgency for Descartes are the consequences of replacing Geocentrism with Heliocentrism.  Entailed in the replacement is the displacement of his deity in the former by the latter.  In Geocentrism, that deity inhabits the celestial realm that surrounds the Earth, and that, hence, is physically contiguous with it.  Accordingly, in Heliocentrism, that deity has no astronomical location, and no potential causal connection with the Earth.  Immaterial-Material Dualism solves that problem, by relocating his deity in the latter realm, with the power of crossing the divide.  Hence, to anchor that Theological revision with an I Exist that is the true premise of the traditional proofs of the existence of that deity, Descartes needs to instantiate the Dualism within the I Exist.  Thus, a primary Theological goal of his thought experiment is to separate Thinking from the Corporeal realm, and to attribute to the I Exist that it is essentially a Thinking being.  So, his Dualism, and the Epistemological implications of that, are extrinsic to Descartes' project of otherwise methodically incorporating Heliocentrism into his system.

Heliocentrism and Epistemology

Descartes' thought experiment can be interpreted as aiming at improving the Medieval Proofs of the Existence of God--by proving that I Exist, thereby upgrading an argument in which that proposition is the premise, from valid to sound.  It can also be interpreted as an attempt to reckon with the Epistemological implications of Heliocentrism, which, given the fates of Bruno and Galileo, is likely of paramount concern to him.  Tending to support this interpretation are the contents of his works surrounding the Meditations, including the publication of his advocacy of Heliocentrism almost immediately after.  But if so, his thought experiment misdiagnoses the Epistemological problem involved.  For, the error of the cognitive basis of the now discredited Geocentrism--the perception that the Sun is in motion while the Earth is at rest--is not that it is a dream, an hallucination, a deception, etc.  It is that some sense data have been misinterpreted due to a faulty inference, i. e. that it is the Sun, not the Earth, that is in motion as its apparent location in the sky changes.  Plainly, furthermore, improving the proofs of the Existence of God, the ground in the Meditation of renewed confidence in external perception, does not correct the perceptual error that is at the basis of Geocentrism.  Conversely, what that error illustrates is that if any sense datum in his thought experiment is dubious, it is because it is incomplete, not because it is a fabrication of some kind.  For example, another sense datum, i. e. the feeling of his finger as he sticks it in the apparent fire, would likely undermine the hypothesis that the fire does not in fact exist.  In other words, Heliocentrism tends to support a Comprehensiveness, rather than a Correspondence, theory of Truth. So, the Meditations are more effective as a Theological exercise than as an Epistemological one.

Knowing-That, Knowing-How, Theology

In an omnipotent, omniscient, creative, Good deity, Will and Knowledge are united, and Knowledge is Knowing-How.  On that basis, the existence of Evil can only be explained by a fall of Will from Knowledge in a creation of that deity, which entails a reduction of Knowing-How to Knowing-That.  Thus, no such fall is needed to explain a concept of 'evil' as 'harmfulness'.  In other words, two significant differences between Descartes and Spinoza--regarding the Will-Knowledge relation, and, accordingly, Knowledge qua Knowing-That vs. Knowledge qua Knowing-How--are derived from different Theological premises, regardless of their usual common classification as Rationalists.  Thus, while for Spinoza, human Will extends divine Will, for Descartes, even after he causally links God Exists and I Am, the efficacy of human Will remains limited to choosing what to affirm.

Will, Knowledge, Theology

Descartes distinguishes Will and Knowledge on the grounds that the former can be indiscriminately motivated by both Knowledge and False Belief.  Spinoza's response is that in the latter case, Will is deficient in some respect, so is not identical to Will that is fully Rational.  But there is a wider context to this conflict.  Descartes is pre-committed to some fundamental principles, including the thesis that humans are the source of Evil in a world created by his deity.  Accordingly, he must conclude that Will is motivated by falsehoods, and, hence, is not coextensive with Knowledge.  In contrast, according to Spinoza's Pantheism, divine Will and Knowledge are one and the same, both in general, and, specifically in a Mode of God/ Nature, from which it follows that Will in full never diverges from Truth.  Accordingly, Error is 'Evil' only insofar as it is harmful to a Mode.  So, in this example of a signal Philosophic debate, the differences are extrinsic, in which case, an evaluation of the two positions based on a comparison of them taken at face value is inadequate.

Attempt, Free Will, Determinism

Failure or uncertainty expose in Action the moment of Attempt, and when it does, the focus is typically on the mental component, i. e. Intention.  Thus usually obscured is the physiological process involved, e. g. a signal from the motor cortex.  Regardless, how Attempt can be less than certain whenever it occurs is unclear, i. e. it is difficult to conceive how one might be mistaken that they are trying, regardless of the degree of exertion.  Now, two characteristics of Attempt are easy to discern--it can vary according to degree, e. g. trying harder, and it is voluntary.  Thus, if Will is defined as Attempt, then it involves both Freedom of Choice and Causality, with the option in the former either to try or not to try.  But, those two characteristics of Will diverge when the option is between two distinct positive Actions.  Accordingly developing from the divergence is the equivocation of 'Will' that, as has been previously discussed, has tended to burden the traditional Free Will vs. Determinism debate.  As a result, the former position tends to abstract from the physiological dimension of Will, and the latter from the voluntary dimension of it.  On that basis, Kantian Compatibilism seems sound, and both correct are Descartes' thesis that 'Will' is unitary, and Spinoza's that it admits of degrees.  But, as is the case with many Philosophical debates, the common origin of this one in Attempt has gotten obscured.

Will and Attempt

Making a decision, and executing it, are clearly distinguishable moments in behavior.  However, considerable confusion has been sown in the history of Philosophy because each has been called 'Will'.  One notable example of their co-presence is in Kant's doctrine--the causality of Pure Practical Reason vs. the capacity to choose to disobey it.  Initially, Kant seems satisfied that the former exhausts the term, but later realizes that, in a disruption of an apparent closure of his system, he must recognize the latter, as well, forcing him to distinguish them by the two terms 'Wille' and 'Willkur'.  In contrast, the former can be recognized as Spinoza's exclusive version of 'Will', and the latter, as Descartes'.  Similarly, the standard 'Free Will vs. Determinism' debate is frequently burdened by the failure to consider the possible equivocation.  Now, Schopenhauer's Will to Live clearly connotes Causality, as does Nietzsche's Will to Power, notably when he defines it at the 'discharge of strength'. On the other hand, Nietzsche also ascribes to that principle the creation of Values, whereby preference, and, hence, choice is expressed.  Thus, for example, whether Zarathustra's affirmation of Life is an instance of Freedom of Choice, as Existentialists argue, or a consequence of a more dominant tendency, as Determinists insist, seems to remain unsettled.  Still, as in the case of driving a vehicle, in which pressing the accelerator and turning the wheel are clearly separate, the distinction between making a decision, and executing it is plain.  Nevertheless, that distinction suppresses a more subtle one--between execution and an attempt at execution--which becomes exposed when the former fails.  So, underlying this chronic confusion regarding 'Will' is a pervasive neglect of attention to Attempt in behavioral processes.

Faith and Will

Descartes does not test it in his thought experiment.  But that he conceives that Will = Freedom of Choice can choose to affirm some perception without having subjected the latter to the criterion of Doubt, implies that Will is independent of deception, i. e. that I Will is as certain as I Think.  So, given the Kantian undermining of his proofs of the Existence of God, an affirmation of that proposition is still available to him, though it would not qualify as Knowledge.  In other words, affirming that God Exists, with attributions such as Goodness, Omnipotence, etc., is still possible, though without certainty.  But such affirmation is nothing other than Faith, which is thus a simple exercise of Freedom of Choice, that has been dramatized as a 'Leap' and embellished as a 'Will to Believe', for example.  But choosing to affirm that 'God Exists' is structurally no different than choosing to affirm that one is not dreaming that one is sitting in a chair in front of a fire.  Thus, Descartes does not seem to recognize that implicit in his doctrine is that affirming Geocentrism is as sinful as affirming that cold-blooded murder is a means to happiness.  Or, that, therefore, such equivalence is applicable to Theological leaders who have condemned the likes of Galileo on the basis of the former.

I Exist, Therefore God Exists

According to Kant, the fatal flaw in Descartes' thought experiment is exactly that--its elements are no more than thoughts.  Thus, he argues, Descartes' fundamental error is an inference from predicates of God to the existence of God.  But, while he highlights that invalidity, it is based on a previous error that he also criticizes, but without there considering the Theological significance.  For, implicit in his earlier contention that Cogito is no more than a unifying intellectual function, is a rejection of Descartes'  "ergo" that links Cogito and Sum.  Accordingly, absent 'I exist' as a premise, 'God exists' cannot be derived.  The extent of Kant's influence beyond trained Philosophers is difficult to gauge, but the widespread contemporary emphasis on Faith in popular religion seems to suggest that the long-purported Knowledge of the Existence of God that is undercut by Kant's disproofs is no longer Theologically tenable.

Knowledge and Morality

Once Descartes' thought experiment becomes a potential arena for the conflicting influences of his deity and a malicious demon, the exercise takes on Moral significance.  Later, he develops the issue, when identifying Will as the Subject of such a conflict, implying that Error and Sin are one and the same, and, hence, that Knowledge and Salvation are one and the same.  In other words, what is now commonly classified as an Epistemological theory is originally a Moral doctrine, in which Knowledge is the Highest Good.  Likewise, his quest for Certainty is a Moral endeavor.  Now, it seems that he has thus established that his previous theses regarding Scientific Method and Geometry can be trusted, i. e. because his deity would not deceive him about such apparent truths.  Hence, he seems to have established that they are not sinful, significant given the fate of Galileo regarding Heliocentrism.  Thus, Morally, i. e. Deontically, they are Permissible, but not Obligatory, as they would be if derived from Kant's principle, i. e. as a case of cultivating one's talents, which is a Duty on that basis.  Accordingly, Science and Geometry are of no special interest to Descartes' deity, and, hence, of no particular positive Theological value.  Thus, the entire subsequent history of technical developments that is based on Descartes' innovations are extrinsic to whatever plan his deity might have for the species.

Mind, Soul, Brain

A more contemporary term for what Descartes presents in the Meditations is 'thought experiment', and a more contemporary version of it posits the possibility that one's brain is in a vat being stimulated to believe that one is e. g. sitting in front of fire.  But this version abstracts from the most significant detail of the original, the 'malicious demon'.  For the latter, which could also be called 'snake in the garden', connotes the possibility of error that is not merely intellectual, but moral and theological.  In other words, what Descartes is attempting in this thought experiment is a simulation of temptation to not merely err, but to sin.  Likewise, the aim of the experiment is not merely to avoid the formulation of a faulty hypothesis, but soul salvation.  Accordingly, a less noticed innovation in the work is a modification of the Ancient concept of Soul, which has both corporeal and incorporeal components, to that which is exclusively of the latter, i. e. Mind.  Thus the urgency for Descartes of establishing the substantial separation of Mind from Body.  So, while the brain in the vat image abstracts significantly from the original, i. e. is neither Mind nor Soul, the separation of 'Psyche' from 'Soul' in contemporary Psychology continues a Cartesian tradition, i. e. by studying only corporeal motivation.

Doubting and Attempting

Descartes' Method of Doubt begins with an attempt to doubt something, which, if unsuccessful, proves that it is certain.  Thus, his conclusion that he cannot doubt that he is doubting, begins with an attempt to doubt that he is doubting, and, hence, entails that he cannot doubt that he is attempting to doubt that he is attempting to doubt.  In other words, 'I attempt' is certain whenever it is posited.  But, unlike doubting, attempting can not be subsumed under Thinking.  Hence, it does not follow from I Attempt that I am a Thinking Being, and, thus, am an incorporeal being.  Instead, attempting is the initial stage of self-activation, so, what does follow from I Attempt is I am an Acting Being, which is not easily classifiable as an incorporeal condition.  What also follows from I Attempt is I am an Experimenting Being, and against the backdrop of the fate of an experimenter such as Galileo, the public ascertaining of I Attempt could be a risk to great for Descartes to take, even if that were his private conclusion.

Cogito, Agito, Dualism

The relation between Agito--I Act--and Cogito emerges from an examination of an erroneous interpretation of the latter.  Kant represents it as an impersonal function, but Certainty, as opposed to Necessity, is a personal condition, so Descartes' attribution of Certainty to Cogito indicates that it is not impersonal.  Instead, 'X is certain that P', like 'X believes that P', and 'X doubts P', are what Russell calls Propositional Functions.  Accordingly, Doubting, Believing, and Thinking, in general, are empty without some Proposition as an object.  Thus, 'Doubting that one Doubts' must be elliptical for 'Doubting that one Doubts some P', so that Descartes' inference from 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting' to 'I am certain that I am thinking' can only be elliptical for an inference to 'I am certain that I am thinking some P'.  In other words, his derivation of an ontologically detached Cogito from this Doubting exercise is invalid, i. e. I Think essentially has some other Proposition as an object.  Now, as the Pragmatists argue, to believe that P means to be willing to act on P, and, correspondingly, for doubting that P and unwillingness to act on it.  For example, to believe that it is raining out means to be willing to carry an umbrella.  Thus, Cogito, in general, guides Agito, just as the arrow of a Vector signifies the direction of motion away from an origin.  Furthermore, Spinoza argues that Cogito is essentially volitional, i. e. that the fundamental Propositional Attitude is Intention, in which case the arrow of a Vector signifies, specifically, the whither of Agito, i. e. a purpose.  In either case, the Vector illustrates that Descartes' Mind-Body dualism, and its subsequent mediation by a deity or the pineal gland, is already the product of a hypothetical fragmenting of an original continuum, i. e. the separation of the point of origin of a Vector, from the directed line that emerges from it.  Thus, Descartes' Geometry illustrates what Doubting the thesis confirms--that his Mind-Body Dualism is derived not Methodically, but from his Theological commitments, i. e. even the certainty that 'God exists' does not prove the separation of Mind and Body.

Cogito, Sum, Agito

As has been previously discussed, Descartes' fundamental Geometrical innovation is the introduction of the Vector, i. e. the Axis, as the foundation of Space.  Thus, insofar as the Vector signifies motion away from an origin,  the corresponding I that is the origin of Experience is neither Cogito nor Sum, but Agito, i. e. I Act.  Likewise signified is the Mind-Body relation as a continuum from point of origin to developing line, with no need of a mediating factor such as the pineal gland.  Similarly, the Thought-Extension relation is, properly, that of Thought-Extending, i. e. dualistic only analytically.  Thus, the Body is primarily a center of Motility, rather than Sensibility, which exposes the entire Empiricist tradition as a doctrine of passivity.  Nevertheless, starting with Descartes' settling for Cogito as his I, the Rationalist tradition only rarely develops as a dynamic alternative, prior to breakthroughs by Marxism, Will to Power, and Pragmatism.  However, Agito has subsequently been re-repressed in the emergence of Analytic Philosophy and Fundamental Ontology, thereby stifling the dynamic potential of Philosophy that has  appeared only sporadically since Descartes' invention.

Geometry, Vector, Action

Descartes' innovative Geometry is probably best commemorated by the eponymous Cartesian Plane, though unlike most versions of the latter, he uses only one axis.  Still, even one axis signifies the essential break from Euclidean Geometry.  For, any axis on these grids is a foundation of all the figures that appears in them, and is constituted by three basic components--a point of origin, a line originating in the point, and a direction.  In other words, the structural foundation of Cartesian Geometry combines two of the elements of Euclidean Geometry--the Point and the Line, and adds a third--Direction.  Thus, the foundation of the new Geometry is the Vector, in which Space is essentially oriented, even if the figures that appear in it are not.  So, the Philosopher who best appreciates how Geometry is a Form of Experience is not Kant, but Bergson, for whom the Subject of Experience is a center of Action.  Perspectivism is close, but, as a theory of Perception, inverts the fundamental direction of the orientation, i. e. from centripetal to centrifugal.  Likewise, it is only the later development of Polar Coordinates that highlights the fundamental break of Cartesian Geometry from its Euclidean ancestor--the institution of the Vector as its foundational element, thus signifying action and construction, rather than a fixed object of contemplation.

Geometry, Modern Philosophy, Medieval Theology

Taken on its own, the primary purpose of the Meditations seems to be Theological--the application of Cogito to two Medieval proofs of the existence of God--with renewed confidence in Mathematics one of its immediate consequences, i. e seems to be the work of a Jesuit experiencing an intellectual crisis.  In contrast, as a follow-up to a work called Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences, and one in which is developed Analytical Geometry, against a back-drop of the fate of Galileo at the hands of the Church, the real purpose of the later work can be recognized as a reinforcement of Descartes' innovative concept of Geometry, with the Theological dimension an extrinsic precaution.  Thus lost in the abstraction of the Mediations from its context, common in contemporary academic curricula, is the earlier innovation--from the traditional concept of Geometry as an eternal object of contemplation, e. g. for Plato, to the concept of it as a Technical device.  Now, Spinoza considers one of the implications of this innovation when he proposes the concept of a Circle as operational--the function of Mind as immediately applicable to, not the objects of perception, but to conduct.  In contrast, Kant just misses the implication, when, while examining how one cognizes oneself as one draws a line, he fails to consider the role of Mind in the act of drawing, i. e. how it determines how one is conducting oneself.  He thus misses the implication that Geometry is an a priori Form of cognition only because it is a priori qua Form of conduct that is cognized a posteriori.  In contrast, Bergson recognizes that Space is primarily a field of Action, which Geometry thus guides.  Otherwise, the predominant concept of Geometry in Modern Philosophy stems from one that is subordinated, as a precaution, to the principles of Medieval Theology.

Analytic Geometry and Will to Power

Generally abstracted from is the full title of what has come to be known as Descartes' 'Discourse on Method': 'Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences'.  Furthermore, while most subsequent Philosophers have focused on his abstraction from corporeality, his invention of Analytic Geometry focuses on the construction of geometric figures, not merely on the quantification of the perception of them.  In other words, what is widely accepted as his Epistemological Foundationalism is, in fact, abstracted from his foundational Constructivism.  Spinoza briefly recognizes this ground when he proposes a concept of Definition as operational, e. g. a Circle is 'the figure described when one end of a string is fixed and the other is moved', rather than 'a set of points equidistant from a point', i. e. the latter is derived from the former.  Kant, too, briefly examines the perception of the drawing of a Line, but too late to consider the implications for concepts of Time and Space as Forms of mere perception.  So, a derivation of Will to Power that is comparable to Nietzsche other depth analyses--the unearthing of the Dionysian principle, of the subconscious Psyche, and of Master Morality--begins by recovering the Cartesian Techne from which Modern Epistemology has been abstracted.

Cogito, Writing, Techne

To many Philosophers, Descartes is best known as the discoverer of the Cogito, and its immediate application to Medieval proofs of the existence of God.  But, his greatest influence on human society has been his invention of Analytic Geometry, an invention which would be impossible without writing, and without which much of the Quantification of everyday life of the past several centuries would be unthinkable.  The link between his two accomplishments is sometimes under-emphasized by Philosophers--the application of the existence of God to Mathematics, thereby grounding his trust in the latter.  Now, Quantification facilitates control of its matter.  Hence, fully developed, Cogito emerges as Techne, the significance of which tends to be lost on Philosophers who remain insular.  In contrast, a Darwinian might recognize in the connection between Cogito and the written formulas of Analytic Geometry Techne, i. e. the organic relation between Human intelligence and the uniquely Human thumb that grounds most of the Technical developments of the past several centuries.  Regardless, what begins as a Method of Doubt, develops into a Method of Quantification that complements Bacon's Methodology, the fruitful results of which have been abundantly in evidence for centuries.

Philosophy, Writing, Fiction

Modern Philosophy is fictionalized from the outset.  Descartes is not sitting in front of a fire, reflecting on sense-experience, until only Cogito remains.  He is at a desk, with a writing implement in hand, setting down words intended for others to read.  Whether or not the latter comes to pass remains at that moment uncertain.  Thus, Bacon's formulation of principles of Experimentalism is more veridical as an act of immediate reflection, though Locke's, and his successors', eventual attribution of immediacy to a Sense-Datum is not.  So, the comedy described in The Gay Science #1 applies to not only some Moralists, but to all Philosophers who formulate Foundationalist principles that abstract from the immediacy of a corporeal act of writing designed for others to read, which, in the era of Gutenberg, might even be a universal audience.  Thus, the fictional Zarathustra, a character in a book "for all and for no one", is the prototype of a Philosophical Subject, though Writing does not become explicit for Nietzsche until later.  So, evidence that the Moralist, functioning as a medium for a Species drive, is a propagator of Individualist fiction, is plainer than Nietzsche seems to realize in The Gay Science #1.  Likewise, even though his phrase 'human, all too human' signifies a deflation of pretensions, given the indispensability of the uniquely versatile thumb to the act of writing the words, it also expresses the Evolutionary development of the species.

Method, Genius, Species

The standard contemporary focus in Philosophy on Epistemology, with its two main theories--Rationalism and Empiricism--accurately reflects that each has generally lost sight of their common origin--Method, varieties of which are presented in Discourse on Method and Novum Organum, their respective seminal works.  Likewise, but less explicitly defined, Plato's Method is Dialogical, and Aristotle's is Classification. Thus, not only Epistemology, but Morality, and Political Philosophy, as well, are Methodological, i. e. ways of acquiring Knowledge, determining Behavior, and organizing Society, respectively.  Now, when Nietzsche likens future Philosophers to Artists, he implicitly recognizes that Philosophy is fundamentally a Methodological activity.  However, in neither his recovery of his Dionysian principle, his Genealogical re-discovery of Master Morality, nor, his brief derivation of Will to Power from Will to Live, is that recognition explicit.  He, thus, misses an opportunity to link, such Artistry to the Species goals that inspire these innovative Philosophers, e. g. via Genius, as Kant conceives it.

Perspectivism, Physics, Ecologism

One prominent application of the concept of Perspective has been in Physics--the Frame of Reference.  Newton uses the structure occasionally, but with the success of Einstein's formulations, it is now widely accepted as a universal feature of Physics.  One important, but generally unrecognized, implication of Frame of Reference is that it illustrates an influential but profound error in Modern Philosophy.  For, it demonstrates that as relativized to a perceiver, the Motion of a perceived object is external to the perceiver.  In contrast, the case of color blindness demonstrates that the perception of color involves an irreducible internal factor.  Hence, Berkeley conflates Locke's Primary Qualities with the latter's Secondary Qualities when reducing the former to the latter, thereby initiating a tradition of completely interiorizing Experience, carried on in various ways by Hume, Smith, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Husserl, etc.  Regardless, the concept of Frame of Reference has its own limitation--it is completely ungrounded in Modern Physics, since it introduces into the system an opacity that is related to other opacities by a relation not derived from the fundamental laws of the system.  In other words, even with Einstein's universalization of it, Frame of Reference is no more than a heuristic device in Physics, albeit a very fruitful one.  Accordingly, Physics is inadequate to Ecologism, which is populated by actual Frames of Reference, i. e. Organisms, that are essentially related to their Environment. Thus, that inadequacy suggests that it is Physics that is derived from Ecologism, and not, as it is widely held, vice versa.

Perspectivism and Ecologism

The abstraction of Agency from Perspectivism entails the abstraction from the possibility of one modifying one's World.  It also entails abstractions from these possibilities: that one can modify the World of another, that another can modify one's World, that in collaboration, modified Worlds can converge.  Absent these possibilities, the absurd consequence that a single offspring is actually two children, one per parent, follows.  Thus, most generally, Perspectivism abstracts from an Ecological concept of a Species adapting an Environment to its purposes, i. e. of collective World- modification.  On that basis, the original Perspectivist Subject-World concatenation is revealed as a condition of a Member of a Species as both isolated and passive in relation to the Environment of the Species.  Accordingly, the adoption of Perspectivism can be a first step from the Individualist Epistemology that dominates Modern Philosophy, to Ecologism.

Labor, Value, Morality

A primary debate in Modern Morality concerns the locus of Evaluation: the pre-conditions of an Action, e. g. the Intention, vs. the post-conditions of an Action, e. g.  a Feeling.  Thus, the two sides share a privileging of an inert condition in Moral Evaluation.  In notable contrast, the locus of Evaluation for Aristotle is the performance itself of an Action--whether or not it is balanced between extremes.  But, while this alternative is well-known to Modern Moralists of both stripes, they are apparently unfamiliar with a more contemporary variation of it--the Labor Theory of Value, according to which the locus of Evaluation is the degree of Exertion of an Action.  So, this concept of Value, with the Aristotelian modification of relativizing it to an agent, can be generalized to all Action, thereby privileging a dynamic condition over the traditional inert one.  The consequent revaluation of values seems consistent with Nietzsche's aim to invigorate an enfeebled society, and with the concept of Will to Power, but there is little indication that he recognizes its potential use in that context.