Attempt, Free Will, Determinism

Failure or uncertainty expose in Action the moment of Attempt, and when it does, the focus is typically on the mental component, i. e. Intention.  Thus usually obscured is the physiological process involved, e. g. a signal from the motor cortex.  Regardless, how Attempt can be less than certain whenever it occurs is unclear, i. e. it is difficult to conceive how one might be mistaken that they are trying, regardless of the degree of exertion.  Now, two characteristics of Attempt are easy to discern--it can vary according to degree, e. g. trying harder, and it is voluntary.  Thus, if Will is defined as Attempt, then it involves both Freedom of Choice and Causality, with the option in the former either to try or not to try.  But, those two characteristics of Will diverge when the option is between two distinct positive Actions.  Accordingly developing from the divergence is the equivocation of 'Will' that, as has been previously discussed, has tended to burden the traditional Free Will vs. Determinism debate.  As a result, the former position tends to abstract from the physiological dimension of Will, and the latter from the voluntary dimension of it.  On that basis, Kantian Compatibilism seems sound, and both correct are Descartes' thesis that 'Will' is unitary, and Spinoza's that it admits of degrees.  But, as is the case with many Philosophical debates, the common origin of this one in Attempt has gotten obscured.