Consciousness and Grasping

Whitehead seemingly breaks with a traditional concept of Consciousness--by modeling it on Feeling, rather than on Vision, as it is often taken to be.  However, he seems to not recognize that Vision as such is already conceived as a variety of Feeling--insofar as it is conceived as a mode of contact between a Subject and a part of an Object, i. e. part of one of its surfaces.  He then further muddles the similarity--when he defines what he calls a 'Prehension' as a 'Feeling'.  For, 'Prehension' means 'Grasping', and, as is plain in ordinary experience, there is a significant difference between contact with an object, and encompassing it.  Thus, what the experience illustrates is that if 'Prehension' is a correct characterization of the Subject-Object relation, it is not insofar as it signifies feeling an Object, but insofar as it signifies grasping an Object.  In other words, terminologically, but not substantively, Whitehead evokes Kant, who indeed substantively breaks with the dominant Modern concept of Consciousness, by conceiving it as a process of Synthesis, the Object of which is a totality, i. e. as structurally akin to Grasping, rather than to Feeling or Vision.  So, it is not until Whitehead's inappropriate terminology that Human Consciousness can be more clearly recognized as essentially corresponding to the unique versatility of the Human Hand. With no Theological pre-commitments, Descartes could have arrived at the same recognition, by reflecting on what he is immediately doing--holding a pen, and developing a Method.