Will, Doubt, Ontological Difference

Descartes' assertion, 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', can be interpreted either as phenomenological or as logical, i. e. either as 'Despite all my efforts . . . ', or as 'It is contradictory that . . . '. That he does not, in the course of his project, submit Logic to Doubt suggests that the latter is his ambition. If so, then Heidegger's interpretation of him as a 'subjectivist' misses the mark, i. e. Descartes is not, contrary to that interpretation, asserting that he is the measure of his existence, or of any existence that can be inferred from it. That interpretation misses the mark because of the one-sidedness of the criterion on which its is based, i. e. Heidegger's 'Ontological Difference', the attention of which is to the appropriation of beings by Being, to the neglect of, and, perhaps, with the suppression of, the inverse, namely, the differentiation of beings from Being. Hence, Heidegger does recognize Will, the principle of Differentiation in Experience, of which Cartesian Doubting is an example.