Bergson, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche--Individuation

Bergson agrees with Schopenhauer that a human being is an individuated incarnation of a universal vital principle, in his case Elan Vital, in Schopenhauer's, Will. He also agrees that the human condition is an unsatisfactory one, though he disagrees with Schopenhauer regarding the unalleviability and the degree of the suffering involved. However, while Schopenhauer seeks freedom from Will, Bergson finds freedom in excarnated Elan Vital. Now, the earlier Nietzsche is Schopenhauerian, calling Will 'Dionysus', but otherwise accepting the general scheme of Schopenhauer's concept of the human condition. However, he eventually repudiates Schopenhauer, with a variation that also entails a critique of Bergsonism. His 'Will to Power' is more than a mere surrogate for Schopenhauer's 'Will'--while the latter is Monistic, the former is Pluralistic. That is, intrinsic to the dynamic of Will to Power is its specificity of actualization, i. e. its production of individual entities. In other words, from Nietzsche's perspective, Bergson, as much as Schopenhauer, errs in conceiving corporeal individuality as a misfortune that befalls Vitality, not its intrinsic actualization.