Bergson, Nietzsche, Moral Vitalism

A significant ambivalence in Bergson's Philosophy comes to light in a comparison with a Nietzschean principle. 'Vitalism' can be defined as both a Metaphysical and a Moral doctrine. Metaphysical Vitalism holds that everything that exists is an expression of an immanent Life force. Moral Vitalism holds that Life is the Highest Good and the criterion of all normative judgments. Nietzsche is both a Metaphysical and a Moral Vitalist--he asserts that everything that exists is an expression an immanent Life force, i. e. Dionysus, and he affirms that Life is the Highest Good and the criterion of all normative judgments. In contrast, Schopenhauer is a Metaphysical Vitalist, but not a Moral Vitalist, since while he asserts that all existence is an expression of Will, for him, Moral Goodness consists in Life-denial. Now, Bergson is a Metaphysical Vitalist, since he holds that everything that exists is an expression of Elan Vital. However, that he is not a Moral Vitalist is evident from his depreciation of repetitive life-forms, which shows that he would not affirm Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche's fundamental Moral Vitalist formula. Rather, he affirms Life only insofar as it is innovative, which, according to Nietzsche's criterion, is only conditional Vitalism. Instead, Bergson's unconditional Moral principle is Spirit, so, he is more accurately classified as a Metaphysical Vitalist, but a Moral Spiritualist.