Whitehead, Locke, Bergson, Perception

Whitehead's concept of Perception follows Bergson's in some crucial respects, but not in at least one other. That concept is also essentially Lockeian, i. e. perceptual objects combine Primary Qualities that inhere in an object, with Secondary Qualities that are the projections back into the Primary Qualities of modified received physical transmissions. Since perceived Secondary Qualities are not actually in those objects, Whitehead refers to perceptual objects as 'object-images', which is evocative of Bergson's similar analysis of Perception, i. e. for Bergson, perceptual objects are "images". However, for Bergson, Perception is inherently preparation for subsequent physical modification of a perceiver's environment, in accordance with its practical needs. In contrast, Whitehead only briefly, and vaguely, alludes to the potential future "relevance" of object-images to a perceiver, i. e. while he exhaustively analyzes the development of a received physical transmission to the formulation of a purpose, he seems to have no specific account of the experiential transition from the formulation of a purpose to its being physically carried out. So, the comparison with Bergson regarding Perception exposes Whitehead's lack of attention to what the former characterizes as the motor phase of experience.