Practice, Sufficient Reason, Disjunctive Syllogism

The previously introduced Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason, which requires of any action that doing it be better than not doing it, can be elaborated as follows, with 'refraining from some action' a special case of 'doing A': 1. You can either do A or not do A; 2. It is better to do A than to not do A; 3. Therefore, do A.  In other words the structure of the Principle can be classified as a Practical Disjunctive Syllogism, the significance of which is several-fold.  First, the Disjunction in the Major Premise acknowledges the irreducible choice of an addressee between compliance and non-compliance.  Second, it reflects that an action does not occur in a vacuum, i. e. that the non-performance of it leaves not a Nothing, but some concrete alternative, e. g. the status quo.  Thus, the Disjunction makes explicit what is suppressed in both the more familiar Theoretical Principle of Sufficient Reason, and in the Categorical Syllogism central to Kant's Moral Law and to the Practical Syllogism of contemporary Deontic Logic.  For, it illuminates that the standard Principle of Sufficient Reason abstracts 'Nothing occurs without sufficient reason' from 'There is always a sufficient reason why something occurs rather than does not occur'.  Likewise, it corresponds the inconvenient surd in Kant's doctrine--that a Rational human agent can always disobey the Categorical Imperative--to the alternative that Kant's formulation ignores, i. e. the clause in 'Act, rather than not act, only . . .'  Plus, unburdened by the Disjunct, current Deontic Logic is easily reducible to a species of Modal Logic, i. e. to a Theoretical exercise, the highest standard of which is Necessity, and, hence, is inadequate to Practical argumentation, which is governed by Sufficiency, a condition that is stronger than Necessity.  So. the Disjunctive structure of the Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason reflects the concrete conditions of Communication and Action better than do its established Theoretical Categorical counterparts.