Doubt and Morality

One reason that Descartes does not submit Moral phenomena and judgments, e. g. the Ten Commandments, to Doubt might be that it would expose his method to the charge of 'demonic temptation', if not to outright 'apostasy' and 'heresy'.  But, even aside from the fate of Bruno looming over that application of his criterion, the project would seem to stall at the implication that the Cogito is 'Evil', a significant consequence of which would be that a 'Good' God would not likely be available to underwrite any further knowledge claims.  Progress from that juncture might, therefore, require, as Nietzsche shows two centuries later, a more radical Skepticism than what Descartes is willing to commit to.  Instead, the Moral dogma that he does not challenge becomes entrenched in the Epistemology-dominant tradition that he pioneers, i. e. even Kant and Mill ultimately accede to it, e. g. the Deontology of the former, and the 'high'-'low' distinction of the latter.