God and Epistemology

Descartes' introduction into the Meditations of the Moral predicates "good" and "evil" leads to that of a concept of a God the primary function of which is to intervene in Cognitive processes.  As, a result, Epistemology becomes Theologized, and, thereby, elevated to a predominance that is maintained even as Philosophy in subsequent centuries becomes more apparently secular, e. g. the justification of contemporary Analytic Philosophy as a corrective to conceptual confusion.  However, that introduction is ungrounded, and, so, violates his own method.  In contrast, for example, on the basis of, as has been argued here, the more rigorously established principle that he is a writing being, an appeal to God might be elsewhere directed, e. g. as an expression of his hope that a reader would not misunderstand him.  In more radical contrast, for example, he might have recognized the severe limitations of Certainty as a criterion, and abandoned it in favor of Probability, thereby obviating any need for involving God.  So, the implication of God in Epistemology is, at minimum, arbitrary and unnecessary, in both the Cartesian project and the tradition that it has spawned.