Reason and Evolvement

With its emphasis on the process of Totalization, Kant's notion of Reason expands on Leibniz', the primary principle of which is reductionistic Identity. Kantian Reason thereby gives rise to the pan-Rationalism of Hegelianism, for which the limits of its predecessor become fodder for further Totalization. For Kant, Reason is inadequate to the Totalization of the Nature that it did not create, so its pre-eminence lies in the Practical sphere. But, even in the latter, there are two caesuras in the proposed totality. First, as has been previously been discussed, Kant's Practical Rational Principle, while sufficing to impart Freedom to an agent, fails to account for the preceding freedom inherent in one's choice to act Rationally to begin with. While that caesura can be classified as an 'irrational' moment in the System, the second eludes such easy characterization. The other is Kant's category of 'imperfect duties'. The 'perfect duties' are all prohibitory, e. g. against false promising, and, hence, are constraints against the disruption of a totality. In contrast, imperfect duties, e. g. cultivating one's talents, promoting the happiness of others, neither create, maintain, nor disrupt a totality, but increase it. Hence, therein, Reason produces a new particular, and then re-totalizes the result. In other words, in Kant's System, Reason becomes not only a totalization process, but an Evolvemental one, as well.