Sunday, June 6, 2010
Proof and Communication
Some Philosophers might have an adversion to a Communication-Act theory of Language, because it classifies rational proof as an act of 'argumentation' or, in other words, as an act of attempted persuasion. As such, it is measured in terms of its success in e. g. persuading someone to do something, in which case a verbal threat might be a better 'argument' than a sound proof that falls on deaf ears. Platonism can be understood as a response to this depreciation--the concoction of a world, i. e. of Forms, in which the superiority of Socratic Dialectic to sophistic rhetoric is recognized. In contrast, for a Pragmatist such as Dewey, the Platonist response is an escape from a challenge to Philosophers to broaden their appeal, e. g. via the development of improved educational methods. But, also, rational proof is involved in another category of Communciation Act--the demonstration. While a demonstrative proof might have a secondary interest in persuasion, it serves primarily to show that and/or how a sequence of statements can be constructed, e. g. to show that there is a sound justification for the acceptance of some conclusion and/or how it can be constructed. Insofar as Logic is a study of demonstrative proofs, it is a study of a type of Communication Act, just as insofar as Rhetoric is a study of argumentative proofs, it is a study of another type of Communication Act.
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