Communication Act and Meta-Ethics

One of the central debates in Ethical Theory is over the meaning of the sentence 'X is Good'. On one view, e. g. Utilitarianism, it means 'X satisfies an objective criterion of Goodness'. On a second view, e. g. Kantianism, it means 'One ought to do X'. On the third view, e. g. Emotivism, it means 'I like X'. Typically, the presentation of any of three is accompanied by an attempt to dismiss the other two and/or to reduce them to it. But, on a Commuication-Act analysis, each of the three interpetations represents a variety of Communication Act--Description, Prescription, and Expression, respectively--which are irreducible to one another. Furthermore, what accompanies the presentation of each is itself a Communication Act, aiming at the acceptance of the particular theory by an audience. In other words, regardless of the content of a theory of the meaning of 'X is Good', its presentation asserts 'Subscribing to this theory is Good', meaning 'One ought to subscribe to this theory'. Hence, regardless of which theory is being explicitly espoused, its being espoused implicitly subscribes to the Prescriptive interpretation of 'X is Good'.