Freedom and Sympathy

A concept of Responsibility towards Others is easy to derive from that of Sympathy, except insofar as Individual Freedom is the fundamental principle, with respect to which Sympathy is, therefore, an imposition.  Kant's analysis of the Duty to promote the Happiness of Others typifies this subordination.  For, the obligation in this case is not towards others, but to refrain from not benefiting them.  So, on this analysis, helping others is a Virtue only because laziness or indifference is a Vice, as is expressed in his classification of the Duty as 'Imperfect'.  In contrast, Aristotle has no difficulty in conceiving Generosity as an unmediated Virtue, so the purported imperfection is not inherent in Reason, as Kant seems to imply.  Rather, underlying Kant's convolution is the implicit classification of Sympathy as a Passion, and, hence, as an unfree motivation.  In other words, Kant's privileging of Reason over Sympathy is ultimately at the service of protection the Freedom of the Individual, one consequence of which is that there is fundamental Responsibilty towards others.