Adaptation, Knowledge, Causality

Corresponding to the distinction between Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of is Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How.  Thus, the distinction between those types of Knowledge is one of kind, not one of degree, e. g. not one of Perfect vs. Imperfect, as Aristotle posits.  Correspondingly, there are two types of Skepticism, e. g. uncertainty that the Sun will once again rise as usual vs. uncertainty that when one billiard ball strikes another, the later will move as had billiard balls in the past under identical conditions, to cite Hume's two well-known examples.  In other words, Hume conflates opposing Dogmatism with cautioning Experiment, thereby obscuring the triviality of the possibility of Uncertainty in the latter. Furthermore, uncertainty that trying something will again lead to the same previous results does not undermine the certainty that attempt must precede whatever ensues, even failure.  Thus, Kant's focus on Temporal order in his concept of Causality suggests that the concept of Knowledge that he is developing is that of -How, and, so, that it primarily targets the second of Hume's two kinds of Skepticism. Accordingly, the rejoinder, advanced by some, that Kant's concept of Causal Necessity still does not guarantee that a specific Effect will follow a Cause, is irrelevant.  So, the Evolutionist distinction between Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of helps clarify some of the confusion in one of the significant debates of Modern Philosophy.