Pleasure and Adaptation

Because of its prominence, Kant's response to Hume's concept of the Passion-Reason relation has overshadowed how Spinoza might respond.  To begin with, he would likely reject the premise of their distinction, on the grounds that he conceives Will and Reason to be identical, and, hence, that the latter inherently has motive power, i. e. 'A causes B' inherently means 'Doing A will bring about B'.  Furthermore, Spinoza analyzes 'Passion' as fundamentally Pleasure or Pain, which are not irreducible elements of experience, but are themselves signs of modifications of the capacity of the Causal efficacy of a Mode.  However, despite that analysis, Spinoza shares with Hume an Atomism in another respect: a concept of Experience according to which elements such as Pleasure, Passion, Reason, etc., regardless of how defined, are completely internal to the subject, i. e. are independent of any external circumstances.  In contrast, according to an Ecological concept of Experience, an Organism is inherently in interaction with its Environment, so, e. g. Pleasure is a feeling of the Organism in an harmonious relation with its Environment, and likewise, therefore, so, too, are Passion and Instrumental Reason inherently related to an Environment.  Hence, while Spinoza challenges Hume's immediate abstractions, an Ecological behavioral principle such as Adaptation further exposes the more general arbitrariness of his presuppositions.