Will, Thinking, Counter-Example

While Descartes holds that volition and thought are distinct processes, for Spinoza, they are one and the same. Now, insofar as, Will is a principle of Diversification, as it is defined here, and 'thinking' is a process of synthesizing, volition and thought are not only distinct, but are inversely related. On the other hand, insofar as Exteriorization is, following Levinas, experiential Diversification, and Cartesian doubting is a departure from the given, 'thinking' qua 'Cartesian doubting' is volitional. Likewise for Spinozistic 'thought', insofar as it is conceived as deduction, emanation, or expressive, each of which entails the explication of what is implicit in God, i. e. explication is a type of exteriorization. However, both varieties of thinking remain circumscribed by the scope of the given that they modify. In contrast, a more decisive transgression of the given is effected by the thinking that generates counter-examples, a truly agitative process that not only introduces a rogue element, but often provokes a subsequent quest for a more comprehensive theory that can better accommodate the novelty. Such 'thinking' better exemplifies the concept of Will than does that of either Descartes or Spinoza.