Will and Self-Denial

When Schopenhauer characterizes the structure of Asceticism as 'self-denial', he means, more properly, "denial of the will-to-live".  But, despite the greater precision of the latter formulation, it abstracts from the reflexivity of the former, thereby enabling an evasion of any analysis of the subject of the process of denial.  Now, implicitly for Schopenhauer, that subject is the same will-to-live as the will-to-live that is being denied.  But, if so, then lacking is an explanation of how a negation can be derived from a principle consisting solely in persistence, a difficulty that convinces Spinoza of the logical impossibility of Suicide.  For, within Schopenhauer's system, Contemplation, as absorption in an object, might suffice to ground Compassion, but not Asceticism.  In contrast, Kant and Nietzsche each recognize Self-Denial as an instance of Self-Control, the basis of which must be a volitional principle that is an alternative to Will-to-Live, i. e. Pure Practical Reason, and Will-to-Power, respectively.