Will and Individuation

Popular psychological tends to interpret sexual impulse as a fundamentally subjective experience.  In contrast, Schopenhauer recognizes it as a species drive that occurs within an individual spatio-temporal locus.  Furthermore, he conceives that drive as exemplifying noumenal Will, with respect to which the popular interpretation is not merely superficial, but is an extrinsic phenomenal representation.  Now, just as he conceives perpetuation of the species to be the principle of reproduction, he conceives Will to be, more precisely,Will-to-Live.  Hence, he opposes the Will-to-Live to the Principle of Individuation, i. e. as essential noumenon to extrinsic phenomenon.  However, the reproductive drive does not merely appear in individuals as an object of representation--it produces individuals, an outcome that is much more difficult to dismiss as an extrinsic mere phenomenon.  In other words, Schopenhauer has no grounds for denying that Will is itself essentially a Principle of Individuation, and, hence, is, more accurately, a Will-to-Pluralize.