Will and Life

Nietzsche suggests that given that Will is already alive, Schopenhauer's equation of 'Will' and 'Will-to-Live' is superfluous, a suggestion that Schophenhauer implicitly endorses when he dismisses 'death' as merely phenomenal.  However, the superfluity of the equation that poses a more serious threat to Schopenhauer's doctrine is the converse--that Life is Will.  For, as Heidegger proposes, any concept of 'will' is derived from Subjectivistic Psychology, as are the presumably noumenal characteristics that Schopenhauer attributes to it, i. e. "urge" and "striving".  Specifically vulnerable to Heidegger's challenge is the fundamental premise of Schopenhauer's theory of Will--that the volitional processes that he perceives in his own inner experience are noumenal, and are not merely already the objects of an interpretation.  Accordingly, Schopenhauer's own fundamental principle can be conceived as individualistic as he claims Kant's, i. e. Pure Reason, to be.