Morality, Rationality, Will to Live

Schopenhauer presents a Humean response to Kant's Rationalist Morality: 1. Morality is based on Sympathy, which is grounded on a universal Will to Live; and 2. Kant's attempt to link Virtue to an external reward exposes his concept of Reason as Instrumental.  Now, the insufficiency of #2 is that it does not apply to the dimensions of Kant's doctrine, previously discussed, which are independent of what is arguably an overreaching by Kant, or, to, equivalently, Spinoza's more rigorous concept of Rational Ethics.  But #1 is based on a significant systematic confusion that squanders a deeper insight.  For Schopenhauer, only the universal Will to Live is real, with respect to which Individuation is sub-real in some respect that Schopenhauer does not fully explain.  But if Individuation is sub-real--mere appearance? epiphenomenon? illusion?--then so, too, is Egoism, from which it follows that Instrumental Reason is at the service of a Passion that can only be Universal, not Selfish.  What Schopenhauer briefly glimpses is the concept of an Individual Human whose behavior is a manifestation of a Species drive, localized in that member, just as blinking, while localized at an eye, is still part of the neurological system of an entire organism.  But, he instead directs this potential Evolutionist insight to Kant's regression--from a Rationalist Morality to one oriented towards traditional Theology.