Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Microcosmos and Temporality

In the Cartesian tradition, perception is conceived as fundamentally a private event, usually subject to subsequent epistemological study, by Rationalists and Empiricists, alike.  One exception is Spinoza, for whom the significance of perception is primarily conative, e. g. as a stimulus, that constitutes a modification of the subject of perception.  Now, for Kant, such a process of modification suggests a temporalization of experience, i. e. as consisting in a 'before' and an 'after', while for Pragmatism, as well as for Bergson, the conative character of perception suggests that the perceptual world is primarily a field of action.  So, in the Phenomenological Ontology of, notably, Heidegger and Sartre, in which these developments converge, the psychological microcosmos, i. e. the perceptual world, is the immediate past of a subject.

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