Microcosmos, Macrocosmos, Self

In establishing Certainty as the criterion of Knowledge, Descartes implicitly recognizes that only subject-object unity can satisfy that condition, and that Selfhood is essentially an Epistemological relation.  Thus, the decisive anti-Cartesian thesis is Kant's proposition that one can know oneself only as one appears to oneself, not as one is in oneself, because it rejects the possibility of subject-object coincidence in even the most intimate Epistemological case.  Nevertheless, not to be deterred, various successors continue to conceive the subject-object abyss as at least, in principle, surmountable--via e. g. Hegelian Dialectic, Pragmatist probabilistic approximation, Bergsonian Intuition, etc.  However, the microcosmos-macrocosmos model of Experience, that has been presented here, shows that such neo-Cartesian ambition is not merely futile, but misguided.  For, on that model, Selfhood is essentially not an Epistemological relation, but consists in a coordination of two heterogeneous dimensions--the subject of perception and the agent of motility.  Hence, any correspondence between them is a practical problem of experiential coordination, not an ideal given or discoverable Epistemological condition.