Will and Suffering

Schopenhauer's aim is the elimination of suffering.  The source of suffering, according to his diagnosis, is Individual Will, but because that concept is unsettled in his doctrine, he offers three different correctives.  First, he conceives suffering as inherent in Universal Will, of which Individual Will is an instance, so, Will per se is the problem, the corrective of which is the denial of Will, expressed in Ascetic behavior.  Second, he conceives suffering to arise specifically from the personal dissatisfactions of Individual Will, the corrective of which is, therefore, denial of Self, expressed in Compassionate behavior.  Third, he conceives suffering to arise in the combination of Will and Self, the corrective of which is Will-less, Self-less Subjectivity, expressed in the contemplation of Platonist Forms as presented in Art, especially in Music.  Now, he plainly seems most enthusiastic about the latter solution to suffering, but he recognizes that such experiences are short-lived, so he vacillates between promoting Asceticism and promoting Compassion, which are not necessarily consistent.  For, insofar as Compassion for the suffering of another entails Self-Denial in the alleviation of the suffering of another, it implicitly affirms the source of that suffering, i. e. some selfish desire of the other, and, hence, reinforces non-Ascetic behavior.  In any case, in his promotion of Asceticism, he is well aware that a Will to deny Will is a problematic concept, which is why ultimately the Contemplation of Will is the only sound basis for Asceticism.  Still, he does not seem aware that only Will can be at the source of the judgment that suffering per se is a problem that requires correction, rather than is simply an objective fact, i. e. a failure, requiring no further action.  So, Schopenhauer's own acts of writing and publishing doctrines that offer correctives to suffering seem themselves to not quite exemplify their contents.