Reason, Objectivity, Universality, Pluralism

The concept of Subjective Universality, that Kant introduces in the 3rd Critique to characterize the interpersonal communicability of judgments of Taste, bears out that the Object-Subject distinction is not equivalent in his system to the Universal-Individual one.  The priority of the former contrast to his Moral theory is evinced at the outset of his exposition, in the Groundwork, of the concept of Imperative, which he there introduces as a relation between a perfectly rational entity and an imperfectly so one, i. e. between objective necessity and subjective contingency.  Now, no multiplicity of rational entities is entailed in that relation, nor is it entailed in the fundamental formulation of the principle of Pure Practical Reason, in which the only multiplicity entailed is that of maxims.  In other words, the concept of Subjective Universality bears out that the Pluralism of Kant's doctrine is not derived from Pure Practical Reason, or, at least, not from how he fundamentally conceives it.