Judgment and Experimental Reason

If Kant had conceived 'Judgment' as he does his 'Transcendental Deduction', i. e. as legalistic, he might have anticipated Dewey in locating it as the termination of a process of examination.  As such, 'pronouncement', more precisely than 'utterance', characterizes the expression of a judgment.  For, 'utterance' also classifies the initiation of that process, which, likewise more precisely, can be termed a 'proposal', thereby avoiding, as well, the further ambiguities of the notion 'proposition', that figures prominently in many Epistemological and Logical theories.  Now, a proposal is implicitly questionable, and, hence, can be classified as an interrogative expression, i. e. it expresses 'What if?', with respect to which the pronouncement of a judgment is the settlement.  But, as has been previously discussed here, the source of such questions, is Experimental Reason.  Thus, the 'Theoretical' Reason that is the main topic of Kant's 1st Critique is a subtopic of Experimental Reason, i. e. it examines Knowledge in abstraction from the quest for it.  The preface to the 2nd edition, introduced by a quote from Bacon, suggests, at least briefly, his acknowledgment of the primacy of Experimental Reason.