Legislative Reason and Deontic Logic

The emergence of neo-Kantian Deontic Logic tends to obscure the insufficiency, for Kant, to his Moral Law, of the universalization of maxims.  For, as he makes clear in the 3rd Critique, mere subjective universality suffices as a criterion for judgments of Taste.  In contrast, his Moral Law requires the elevation of a maxim to objectivity, i. e. requires conceiving it not only as universal, but as a law, as well.  Furthermore, it is only as explicitly legislative that Reason is causal, i. e. that it is constitutive.  So, Deontic Logic, the focus of which is the practical syllogism, the major premise of which is a proposition that is universally quantified in some respect, e. g. subjects or worlds, remains no more than an exercise in formal calculation, that abstracts from the decisive innovations of Kant's Moral doctrine.