Standpoint and End

To 'transfer' oneself, as Kant characterizes the process, at #40 of the Critique of Judgment, as part of his development of his Aesthetic Theory, to the standpoint of some other, entails, at least heuristically, a relocation in space, to the experience of a radically, because private, different set of empirical objects.  In contrast, to transfer oneself to a "universal" standpoint simply entails the abstraction from the empirical components of experience, to its a priori components.  In that process, not only is no spatial relocation involved, but the otherness of the other is abstracted from, as well.  Likewise, according to the Groundwork, as part of the development of his Moral doctrine, to treat an other as an 'end in itself' is to respect and promote a set of empirical interests, that are radically, because private, different from one's own.  In contrast, his thesis, "Rational nature exists as an end in itself", abstracts from all empirical differences, and, hence, from not only the contingent private interests of others, but from the very otherness of others, as well.  In other words, his concepts 'standpoint of others' and 'end in itself' are similarly ambiguous, i. e. each admits of both a universalistic and an particularistic interpretation.  One perhaps surprising distinction between the two is that it is the Aesthetic concept that receives from Kant a universalistic emphasis, while it is the particularistic sense of 'end in itself' that predominates in his Moral doctrine.