Wisdom and Strength

Spinoza defines Good and Evil as Healthful and Unhealthful, respectively.  Accordingly, the characterization of a person in those terms can be, as is the case in Utilitarianism, Consequentialist, i. e. how they effect others.  Thus, the terms are unavailable to him as an evaluation of a person as signifiers of their own internal condition.  So, it is as a possible alternative that he uses the Aristotelian term 'Virtue' as such in some contexts, i. e. as connoting the possession of Power.  However, unlike Aristotle, he does not go further to develop the use of the term systematically, and offers no indication of how he might use, correspondingly, 'Vice'.  Furthermore, in the time since Aristotle, those terms have acquired semantic baggage well in excess of their original precise definitions.  So, one suitable alternative available to Spinoza, and to Philosophical Ethics, in general, is, as has been previously discussed, 'Wise' vs. 'Foolish', defined in terms of maximizing the exercise of strength.  In that context, in which the exercise of strength can be to a greater or lesser degree, evaluation is correspondingly comparative, so the fundamental evaluative terms are, more precisely, 'Wiser' and 'Foolisher'.  Those terms are well-suited to his doctrine because, as is the case in their common usages, degree of knowledge of circumstances is a factor in degree of strength.  So, though Spinoza himself does not develop it as such, his doctrine does lack a replacement for traditional 'Good' vs. 'Evil' Axiology, and one based on the concept of Wisdom is both available and suitable.  The concept also has potential value to him in his attempts at a Philosophical critique of Biblical scriptures.