Phronetics and Art

Aristotle's distinction between 'doing' and 'making' seems to suggest that he considers skilled productive activity, especially Art, as outside of the scope of Ethical evaluation. On the other hand, his Aesthetic theory focuses on Artistic products, rather than on the process of creating them, so the place of skilled activity, if any at all, in his Axiology remains uncertain. For Kant and Mill, Artistic activity merits no distinctive consideration, it being as subject to their respective evaluative processes as any other act, though Kant does hold up as an example the cultivation of one's talents as being Morally obliged. Formaterialism does not draw an essential distinction between doing and making, for every Action is at the same time an episode of self-cultivation by the Individual, a shaping of oneself in accordance with an Intention, as the common expressions 'making something of oneself' and 'inventing oneself' suggest. So, skilled activity is subject to the same Phronetic evaluation as any other Action, and furthermore, as controlled movement, often highly-developed, Artistic Action thus often entails a great degree of Evolvement. Worthy of special mention is the skilled use of implements and instruments. As Marx and McLuhan have noted, tools are extensions of the human body, and, so, their very use demands going outside oneself. Hence, the skilled use of implements and instruments in itself usually entails a great degree of Evolvement.