Appearance and Reality

'Appearances can be deceiving' is an uncontroversial common judgment, that entails a possibility--the 'can'-- that many prominent Philosophical doctrines have converted into a Principle. In them, 'Appearance', in general, is Ontologically inferior to, for example, 'The Thing-In-Itself', 'Reality', and 'Nothingness', and, in some cases, is treated as sub-real even without some superior correlate being posited. One problematic corollary of such doctrines is that processes such as manifesting, presenting evidence, exhibiting, and expressing, which are commonly regarded as valuable, must be dismissed as Ontologically degenerative. Now, Epistemological theories such as Coherentism and Constructivism have effectively shown how to accommodate the possible non-veridicality of an appearance without having to resort to Ontology, so they need not be repeated here. But they still fall short of accounting for the value of processes like manifesting, etc. In the Formaterial Individual, those processes are various modes of Exposition, one of the two main components of Evolvement, and, so, their value is accommodated by Evolvemental Phronetics.