World, Thought, Language

While the ostensible primary topic of the Tractatus is the relation between Language and World, the combination of #3, #3.1, #4.002, and #4.0031 suggests that, rather, it is that between Language and Thought.  For, to summarize those passages: 1. Thought is the Logical picture of the World; 2. A Proposition is a sensible representation of a Thought; 3. A Proposition can misrepresent the Logical structure of a Thought; and 4. The function of 'Philosophy' is to clear up such misrepresentations.  Now, given the detailed and contentious history of Epistemology, #1 is superficial and questionable.  But, the heart of the sequence is the uncritical Platonism of #2, which ignores examples of  Thought needing to be 'worked out' on paper.  Such cases tend to confirm, instead, a Derridean inversion of the traditional concept of the Thought-Language relation, i. e. according to which Logic consists in Articulation, Articulation requires Spacing, and Spacing is uniquely effected by Writing, on the basis of which a Thought is either an inchoate Proposition, or a copy of one already formulated.  So, ignored in #4 is another function of Philosophy--to debunk dogmatic assertions, i. e. prejudices presented as categorical truths.