Argument, Logic, Showing a Way

The influence of Russell's principle, previously discussed here, that the essence of Language is Assertion/Denial, is evident in the more recent predominance of the 'Argument' as the mode of Logicist expression.  From that perspective, Wittgenstein's later concept of the "aim of philosophy--to show . . . the way" (Investigations, #309), as a solution to the prototypical philosophical problem, "I do not know my way about." (Investigations, #123), is commonly regarded as deviant, if not unacceptable.  However, a 'Proof', as defined by Logicists themselves, is constituted by a sequence of Propositions, beginning with 'Premises', and ending with a 'Conclusion'.  In other words, a Proof shows a way from the former to the latter.  So, if there is a deviation from the essence of Logic, it is the result-oriented Argument of contemporary Logicism, not Wittgenstein's later concept of Philosophy.