Intersubjectivity, Life-World, Language-Game

Towards the end of his career, Husserl, in the Crisis of European Sciences, modifies his Logicism, by rooting his 'I' in a 'Life-World', and briefly deriving what might, correspondingly, be called 'Intersubjective Logicism'.  He therein examines what Wittgenstein bypasses in his encounter with Solipsism--that 'the' world is 'our' world, and not merely 'my' world.  Still, Husserl's goal in this later phase remains, as the title of the book suggests, to provide a foundation for scientific theory.  His development, thus, is not as radical as Wittgenstein's approximately contemporaneous metamorphosis, i. e. the Life-World does not become a general arena of the actual interaction of the multiple Subjects, and, hence, of Language-Games, and, so, does not complete a repudiation of Logicism.