Practical Logicism and Language-Game

Kant can be classified as not only a 'Theoretical' Logicist, but a 'Practical' one, as well.  For, he posits that not only are Cognitive propositions derived from Reason, so, too, is the Moral Law.  Therefore, insofar as, according to the Investigations, Logicism is a kind of Language-Game, so, too, is Kantian Morality.  However, Kant could argue that, in terms of the Investigations, Morality is, more precisely, a Meta-Language-Game, in which the formal conditions of the Language-Game in which Maxims are used are formulated.  Furthermore, he could argue that those conditions are that of any Game--that the rules of a Game be consistently observed, and that the independence of its Players be respected.  Now, corresponding to his distinction between 'Perfect' and 'Imperfect' Duty, is that between two interpretations of those Game-conditions--Regulatory, i. e. what a Player must not do, and Constitutive, i. e. what a Player must do.  But, in the latter case, the Meta-Language-Game becomes a first-order Game in its own right, i. e. 'Treating Others With Respect', arguably a universal Game.  Thus, while the Investigations exposes the subordinate status of Theoretical Logicism, it tends to reinforce the priority of Practical Logicism, by facilitating an illustration of the subtlety of Kant's concept of Pure Practical Reason.