Philosophy of Language and Morality

Wittgenstein's break with Logicism begins not sometime in between the Tractatus and the Investigations, as is widely believed, but right at the outset of the former.  For, as soon he introduces a concept of a 'World', he transgresses the usual parameters of the Logicist treatment of Language, i. e. by relating it to the easily recognizable principles of that concept--Empiricism and Atomism.  In other words, he exposes the systematic Epistemological and Metaphysical presuppositions of Logicism, thereby dissolving its presumed insularity.  Furthermore, the consequent, as Wittgenstein shows, Solipsism is more than merely a Metaphysical or Epistemological problem--it is a Moral one, as well, i. e. it seems difficult to deny the classification of a Solipsist as an 'Egoist'.  Accordingly, the transition to a World inhabited by a plurality of Language-Game-Players, i. e. which entails the recognition of the independent existence of others, is, similarly, a Morally significant development.  However, if #77 of the Investigations is any indication, Wittgenstein seems unprepared to appreciate the wider implications of his new perspective.  For, in that passage, seemingly the only one in the book that attends to the topic, he treats Morality as a type of Language-Game, which makes it difficult to recognize the inherent Moral significance of any Language-Game.  So, he misses an opportunity to encourage a study of his works that transcends the typically insular purview of Philosophy of Language.