Language-Game and Evaluation

'Gamesmanship' can be defined as 'Respect for the integrity of some Game', and, hence, can be classified as a Game-Playing 'Virtue'.  Accordingly, in Competition-Games, cheating and deliberately losing are vices.  Now, such valuations are Game-specific.  For example, while bluffing is a virtue in Poker, it is a vice in Promising, as Kant insightfully argues, in contrast with which Wittgenstein's classification of Lying, in #249 of the Investigations, as merely one other Language-Game, is superficial and inadequate.  Likewise, while solipsistic behavior can be a virtue in Solitaire, insofar as any Language-Game involves at least two players, it is a vice in any of them.  Thus, insofar as the Logicist concept of Language is solipsistic, as the Tractatus shows, the use of it is not a Language-Game, but a vice, from the perspective of the Investigations.  So, even if Wittgenstein does not recognize it, by expanding the scope of Language in the later work, he expands that of the evaluation of it, as well,