Language-Game, Work, Play

In a sequence beginning at #65 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein addresses an objection to his concept of Language-Game, that is advanced on the ground that he fails to justify the classification with a demonstration that that concept entails an essential property of the concept of Game.  His response is that since no such essence can be gleaned from the ordinary use of 'game', that Language-Games share "family resemblances" (#67) with those activities suffices to justify the subsumption.  However, he does not seem to consider that that response also implies that if some activity more closely resembles what are commonly recognized as non-games, then, the subsumption is unjustified.  For example, one ordinary indication of the distinction between Game and non-Game is the distinction between the uses of the terms 'play' and 'work', and not only the activity that he describes in #2, but also many involving tools, are commonly regarded as work-activities.  Accordingly, the use of Language in the latter cannot be easily characterized as a 'Language-Game'.  Thus, while his empirical argument against the formal objection may sufice, it is seemingly does not against a related empirical alternative.