Wolfson and Spinoza's Geometrical Method

Wolfson asserts that "there is no logical connection" between the substance of Spinoza's Ethics, and its manner of presentation, which Spinoza himself characterizes as a 'geometrical method'. Wolfson does acknowledge that Spinoza's anti-Teleological Necessitarianism does reflect Spinoza's appreciation of Mathematical relations, but he still maintains that the 'literary style' of the work is primarily pedagogically motivated, i. e. because of the clarity of the geometrical method. However, if Wolfson's interpretation is correct, then Spinoza has either undermined the substance of his system, or has, at least, violated one of its central principles. For, if, as the system proposes, all events are rationally ordered, then so, too, must be the relation between the event of Spinoza's presentation of the system and the rest of Nature. So, if, as Wolfson implies, the presentation is an arbitrary deviation from that system of Nature, then either the system is not true, or it is has an inadequate idea of itself. Surely Spinoza believes that the system is true. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept Wolfson's implication that the deductive development of the argument of the Ethics, from self-evident axioms, with the help of definitions and postulates, is not, first and foremost, an expression of Spinoza's conscientiousness regarding one of the cardinal principles of the system, namely the difference between adequate and inadequate knowledge. So, regardless of the erudition of Wolfson's interpretation, it seems to miss its mark.